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ABSTRACT
Keeping Alternative Institutions Alternative:
A Comparative Study
(September 1980)
Grant M. Ingle, B.A., Amherst College
M.S., University of Massachusetts, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Howard Gadlin
This research investigated the issue of keeping alternative insti-
tutions alternative both as an organizational problem of bureaucratiza-
tion and as a research area with methodological complications. More
specifically, the research addressed both sides of the issue by defining
bureaucratization as gradual transformation of member control into con-
ventional hierarchical control, and by employing an action-research
model. To develop a coherent context for substantive and methodological
questions, a detailed literature review identified several relevant
areas of past research and commentary. In this review the Holleb and
Abrams (1975) model of organizational development was examined in de-
tail. Following consideration of workplace democratization and organi-
zational learning areas, a central research proposition emerged: suc-
cessful alternative institutions require formal organizational structure
in three areas: (1) work, decision-making and coordination; (2) main-
tenance; and (3) organizational learning. To evaluate this proposition,
interviews and documents were obtained from eight varied alternative in-
i v
stitutions from the same geographical region. By employing the Holleb
and Abrams model, the current state and the previous structural develop-
ment of each organization was assessed, resulting in eight detailed case
studies. By equating organizational success with the same model's con-
sensual democracy stage, the case studies were divided into three suc-
cessful and five unsuccessful instances, and were then subjected to
three comparisons of structural features to test the research proposi-
tion. The first comparison examined current structural features and ap-
peared to support the proposition. Successful organizations employed
all three areas of formal structure while unsuccessful ones employed
only those in the first two areas. In order to assess the converse of
the proposition, that no organization with formal structures in all
three areas could be unsuccessful, a second comparison was devised that
considered instances of formal structure throughout each organization's
history. In this comparison, both types of organizations evidenced for-
mal structures in all three areas, apparently invalidating the proposi-
tion. Based on a rationale that formal structure should be enduring,
the original proposition was modified to say organizational success re-
sulted from sustained formal structure in all three areas. By defining
sustained structures as those lasting at least one year, a third compar-
ison was performed which produced a pattern of results very similar to
the first comparison: successful organizations employed sustained for-
mal structures in all three areas, while unsuccessful organizations em-
ployed them only in the first two areas. Since the results strongly
v
supported the modified proposition, the comparison was examined in de-
tail. In the area of work, decision-making, and coordination, only suc-
cessful organizations employed sustained structures of job rotation and
decision-making. In the maintenance area, successful organizations
showed considerably more structures than unsuccessful organizations, es-
pecially in regard to information sharing, conflict resolution, and mem-
ber orientation and training. Since only successful organizations em-
ployed sustained formal structures of organizational learning, their
specific structures, usually retreats or special portions of meetings,
were scrutinized closely. This examination revealed that the organiza-
tional learning structures were consistently used by members to create
and modify structures in the first two areas, as well as to alter orga-
nizational goals. From this examination, it was apparent that sustained
formal structures of organizational learning were central to the success
of these alternative institutions. Following this major structural com-
parison, some comparisons of non-structural features were also made.
The results of these secondary comparisons generally suggested that in
contrast to unsuccessful organizations, successful organizations have
lower member turnover, and slightly older members with better process
skills and more relevant past experience. The results were shown to
have practical applications for the design and creation of new alterna-
tive institutions, as well as for intervention activity within existing
ones
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
Over the past half-decade, the term "alternative institutions" has
become a way of describing a diverse range of unconventional organiza-
tional structures^ for work and living. Examples of such structures
include, among others, cooperatives, collectives, collaboratives, com-
munes, networks, free schools, and free clinics. The rubric, "alter-
native," derives from a major characteristic shared by these institu-
tions: the fact that they stand as "alternatives" to conventional forms
of producing, distributing or consuming goods and services. Alternative
institutions represent more than organizations which are merely uncon-
ventional, however -- their oppositional nature is political as well as
organizational. As Rothschi ld-Whi tt (1976) points out, alternative in-
stitutions can be defined by "their resolve to build organizations which
are parallel to, but outside of, established institutions and which can
fulfill social needs without bureaucratic authority" (p. 76). In their
attempt to replace bureaucratic hierarchy
2
with other forms, alternative
institutions have developed a commitment to "participatory/democratic"
(or "consensual/democratic") modes of organization, modes which con-
trast sharply with the rational -bureaucratic society in which alterna-
tive institutions are embedded (see Rothschi 1 d-Whi tt, 1971; Benello &
Roussopoulos, 1971). Within bureaucratic hierarchy, authority filters
down from upper levels, while in consensual democracy, the theory of
1
2political democracy is applied at an organizational level, distributing
final authority equally among all the members of an organization.
Alternative institutions are an important social phenomenon in at
least two ways. For their members, these institutions often represent
a concrete means of social change (Roussopoulos, 1971). By successfully
demonstrating that work and living can be organized in new and meaning-
ful ways, alternative institutions maintain a crucial tension between
"what is" in a society at large, and what "could be." As a route to
social change, such institutions are unique in that they simultaneously
serve as both method and example: observers on the outside see a tan-
gible demonstration of what could be, while participants within gain
direct experience of the alternatives proposed. In this way, alterna-
tive institutions represent "experiments" in the best sense of the word.
And secondly, alternative institutions are noteworthy precisely be-
cause they are not a new phenomenon. As pointed out by a number of
authors (e.g., French & French, 1975; Kanter, 1972), the emergence of
alternative institutions over the past decade closely mirrors the rise
of communal and communitarian movements in this country during the mid-
nineteenth century. Others suggest that these contemporary institutions
represent only new forms of the cooperative movement which developed its
formal beginnings within 1870' s agriculture (see Abrahamsen, 1976). Nor
are these institutions unique to this country — they share much in com-
mon with the kibbutzim of Israel (Rosner, 1973); worker self-management
in Yugoslavia, Norway and Sweden (Adizes & Borgese, 1975); the Mondragon
worker cooperatives of Spain (Johnson & Whyte, 1976; Oakeshott, 1979);
and the collectivist organization in China (Whyte, 1973).
3In short, alternative institutions represent a pervasive and recur-
rent social phenomenon which extends beyond both national and histori-
cal boundaries. What also transcends these boundaries is an additional
characteristic shared by alternative institutions: their tendency to
degenerate over time, taking on the organizational form and function of
their more conventional counterparts in a society. This process can be
seen in many of the nineteenth-century Utopian communities (Kanter,
1972), in the transformation of American agricultural cooperatives into
twentieth-century agribusiness, or in the recent history of the kibbut-
zim (Vallier, 1973). This degeneration is typically gradual, persistent
and, in addition, often goes unnoticed by those most affected by it. In
terms which are more contemporary and local, we can find examples as
well. The cooperative household, which begins as an exemplar of
shared activity, over time often looks more and more like a rooming
house, family or dormitory -- traditional sex- roles reemerge, decision-
making and responsibility fall to one, or perhaps two people, and lit-
tle more is shared than a collective roof. Similarly, the food co-op,
despite rhetoric to the contrary, begins to take on characteristics of
the supermarket: jobs originally performed by co-op members in exchange
for lower food prices increasingly become the domain of paid employees;
food prices rise accordingly; and policy decisions, at one point re-
solved in large open meetings, start to be made by the small group of
paid staff. The co-op which initially set out to remove the middlepeo-
ple in the food distribution chain has now recreated them; what was con-
ceived as an alternative to the supermarket now appears to be a clumsy
and inefficient replica of one. While the process of degeneration can
4take a number of forms, there is one central theme throughout. Power
and authority become concentrated in an organization where they were to
be shared originally — a reemergence of the most basic feature of
bureaucratic hierarchy. While it is difficult to find an exact term to
describe such a process, there is one which seems appropriate, although
admittedly awkward: "bureaucratization."
Thus we begin to define the central problem of alternative institu-
tions -- how are they to be kept alternative? If we are concerned with
the viability of this mode of social change, the question is of utmost
importance. The bureaucratization 3 process, when it occurs, is easily
interpreted by both observers and participants alike as negative evid-
ence regarding the practicality of the organizational forms and
goals advocated by alternative institutions (e.g., see Doyle, 1977; Hack-
man, 1975). In order for these institutions to stand as effective
demonstrations of how work and living could be organized in our society
along parti cipatory/ democratic lines, it is essential that they work
and work wel 1
.
Problems with Existing Research
Although a small, but increasing amount of research focuses upon
alternative institutions, little of it is of direct relevance to the in-
dividuals who populate them and their need to confront the central
problem of bureaucratization outlined above. For example, Kanter's
(1975) recent paper on "Couples in Communes" provides the communard with
a well -written and moving description of the difficulties which couples
encounter in communal living arrangements. Kanter's paper, however,
5provides few hints to communal couples as to how their recurrent con-
flicts and tensions might be resolved. In other work which focuses upon
urban communes we find similar shortcomings (see Brown & Brown, 1973;
Hershberger, 1973). Organizational difficulties and personality clashes
are carefully documented by means of questionnaires, interviews, and
sociometric measures, but such descriptive research alone does not pro-
vide a basis for addressing important organizational issues. Research
participants in alternative institutions often come to this realization
and react by refusing to answer questionnaires (Hershberger, 1973) or by
directly confronting the researchers about the nature of the research
relationship (Abrams & McCulloch, 1976, pp. 221-224).
In other research concerned with alternative institutions, we find
that the level of analysis chosen by the researcher may preclude effec-
tive application of the results. Rothschild-Whitt's (1976) recent study
outlines structural conditions which can support or undermine the parti-
cipatory/democratic functioning of alternative institutions. Many of
the conditions upon which she focusses, however, are largely external to
these institutions and consequently beyond the ability of their partici-
pants to alter. For instance, Rothschild-Whi tt concludes that an alter-
native institution will be supported if it is located in a community
which has a large 1 iberal -professional community. Such information may
be helpful for those who wish to locate a new alternative institution,
but is of no help to the institution which finds itself located in a
community lacking such a population.
The point to be made here is that present research regarding alter-
native institutions does have value: it can illuminate and define many
6of the critical problems of these institutions. Where this research
falls short, however, is in the identification of appropriate ameliora-
tive strategies given these problems. Herbst (1976) argues that such
shortcomings are a function of both the conception of research activity
and the research relationship which accompanies such a conception. In
brief, Herbst divides social research into three broad categories:
(1) Basic research . Research in this mold attempts to produce
theory. "The data and those from whom the data are obtained are looked
at as dispensible after use" (Herbst, 1976, p. 109). The research re-
lationship, modeled after the natural sciences, is one of researcher-
object. Traditional academic research typically falls into this cate-
gory, regardless of the setting in which it takes place.
(2) Applied research . In this case the product of research is a
new system which results from the appl i cation of theory in a specific
setting. Theory guides the application and is not revised as a conse-
quence of research activity. The research relationship is one of re-
searcher-client: the researcher is seen as an expert who brings his or
her skills and knowledge to bear upon the client's problem. A typical
example is the researcher who designs an advertising campaign for cli-
ents on the basis of his or her know! edge of attitude change theory.
(3) Action research . Research conducted along these lines pro-
duces a new process. Within organizational research, for example, the
theory about the existing organization often loses its relevance once a
modified form of organization arises through research activity. The re-
search relationship is a collaborative one in which the researcher
learns about the organization and the organization learns about re-
7search. If carried out successfully, the organization gradually devel-
ops its own internal research capacity, thus minimizing future depen-
dence upon the researcher.
Given Herbs t's typology, we can easily categorize most of the ex-
isting research concerned with alternative institutions as basic re-
search. That such research often fails to directly address the problems
of alternative institutions in general, and those of bureaucratization
in particular, should not be surprising. The primary emphasis of basic
organizational research is theory-building and not problem-solving.
Thus within a basic research model, the most immediate client is the
researcher and not the individuals within the organization who produce
the researcher's data. Consistent with this priority, the research re-
lationship is constructed in ways which exclude research subjects from
contributing to either the formation of important research questions or
the identification of probable crucial variables. Less obvious, per-
haps, is the possibility that these features of basic research are them-
selves expressions of an implicit theory of organization. Drawing upon
the functional similarities between the research relationship of basic
research and the manager-worker relationship Argyris (1970, pp. 89-102)
argues that basic research is typically structured along rational
-
bureaucratic lines. As C. Wright Mills (1959) points out, the bureau-
cratization of social science in general should allow us to understand
its inability to meet the needs of those it claims to serve. Such a
condition not only places the researcher within a unique set of struc-
tural relations, but also endows him or her with a particular conscious-
ness regarding scientific activity which Mills identifies as the
8"bureaucratic ethos" (1959, pp. 100-118). Given Mills' analysis then,
the interaction of researcher and collectivist becomes something more
than social science: it also represents the clash of opposing institu-
tions (for an excellent example of this, see Abrams & McCulloch, 1976,
pp. 221-222). By requiring the members of alternative institutions to
become his or her "workers," the basic researcher inadvertently invokes
a research relationship which is directly contrary to the relationships
upon which these institutions are built. Research activity predicated
upon this research relationship can both disrupt alternative institu-
tions and antagonize their members. Viewed in this light, the resis-
tance of individuals within these institutions to research involvement
becomes more comprehensible. Their reactions, of course, inevitably af-
fect not only the quantity of data, but also its quality. In this way
the end-results of basic research can often be more revealing of the
research relationship itself than of the institutions in question. What
is needed, then, is not only more research regarding alternative insti-
tutions, but also a fundamentally different conception of how that re-
search should proceed.
Research Conception
The development of a research mode appropriate for addressing the
issue of bureaucratization in alternative institutions has two major
aspects: (1) developing a specific conception of research that can be
concretely translated into method; and (2) placing the research activity
within a larger strategic framework.
In attempting to define the dimensions of a new paradigm for social
psychology, Gadlin and Ingle (1975) and Ingle (1976) point to what the
general features of a different research conception might be: that we
should learn from past errors and omissions; that phenomena should pre-
cede method; and that research should be both relational and reflexive.
Taking these injunctions one at a time allows us to provide rather di-
rect translation to guidelines for research with alternative institu-
tions :
Learning shoul_d occur from p_as_t ej^rors_ and^ omissions
. Previous re-
search regarding alternative institutions, with few exceptions, is
characterized by two major shortcomings -- a preoccupation with re-
searcher needs and concern with variables and parameters which are of
limited usefulness to those within the institutions under study. Thus
a revised conception of research requires: (1) that alternative insti-
tutions and their members be considered partners in a collaborative re-
search enterprise; and (2) that the variables or conditions examined
within the research activity are aspects of organizational life that the
participants within these institutions can in fact alter.
Phenomena should precede method
. Method, as it is used here, is
conceived broadly: it encompasses not only the tools and techniques of
research, but also the relationship between the researcher and re-
searched, as well as the researcher's awareness of that relationship:
Rather than selecting for research those phenomena suited to
our methods, we ought to shape and develop our methods to fit
phenomena. . . . Method is essential to science, but it can
emerge from confrontation with phenomena rather than being
applied to them (Gadlin & Ingle, 1975, p. 1007).
From this perspective, the development of research "method" appropriate
10
to examining bureaucratization process is not a simple task. It demands
a familiarity with both the dynamics of bureaucratization and the or-
ganizational setting in which it takes place. Such familiarity encour-
ages a sensitivity to not only the unique features of alternative insti-
tutions, but also the possible effects of raising the issue of bureau-
cratization for their members.
Research should be relational and reflexive
. For research to be
relational, it must attend to the nature of the research relationship
and acknowledge that invariably this relationship becomes part of the
phenomena under study (Ingle, 1976; Rowan, 1974; Argyris, 1968). In
other words, research which directly examines social systems is synony-
mous with intervention. In regard to alternative institutions, then,
it is crucial that the research relationship is consistent with or even
better, encouraging of, the relationships existing within these organi-
zations (for an elaboration of this point see Ingle, 1976, pp. 69-95).
Put in more concrete terms, the cooperative relationships which are the
underpinnings of alternative institutions should themselves suggest
models for the research relationship.
Developing congruence between the research relationship and the re-
lationships under study represents one way in which research can become
reflexive: the researcher who asks questions about alternative institu-
tions is also examining his or her relationship with those institutions.
Reflexivity also arises in at least one other curious way. If we review
the guidelines generated here we soon arrive at the conclusion that this
revised conception of research is as much an "alternative" as the insti-
tutions for which it is designed. Thus the central question of alterna-
11
tive institutions - how to stay alternative - becomes a relevant one
for the development of "alternative" paradigms in the social sciences,
as well. The conception of research outlined here is hardly made new
by its al ternati veness
,
however; it is a conception with historical pre-
decessors and even a name — action research (Lewin, 1946).
Research Strategy
Action research, unlike its conventional counterparts, however, de-
mands the articulation of a general strategy in which individual studies
can be located. Herbst (1976), drawing from his personal involvement
with workplace democratization in Northern Europe, argues that there are
three stages in an action-research project which focusses upon organiza-
tions. The first of these may appear to be similar to academic research
in that it is characterized by descriptive and analytic field studies.
In point of fact, however, these field studies are conducted as action
research projects and not in the basic research mold. The relationship
between researcher and organization is a collaborative one, and the re-
search itself often represents a short-term organizational intervention
in that the resulting data form the basis of a formative evaluation for
the participating organization. The second stage requires the estab-
lishment of demonstration projects and long-term interventions with
selected organizations. The third and final stage is diffusion of the
innovative forms of workplace organization.
Herbst' s three stages of action-research, while perhaps appearing
as an idealized strategy, actually represent a fairly accurate reflec-
tion of the development of workplace democratization in Northern Europe
12
over the past twenty years. The applicability of these stages to the
present situation of alternative institutions in this country, however,
is somewhat restricted, but still useful. The emergence of alternative
institutions occurred largely in small isolated pockets during the mid-
dle sixties. Primarily through the medium of the alternative press,
these organizational forms became widely known by the early seventies --
as evidenced by the sudden increase of cooperatives, collectives, etc.,
at that time (French & French, 1975). In terms of Herbst's model, the
development of alternative institutions in this country largely omitted
the first stage of descriptive and analytic research, and jumped ahead
to the second and third stages. Although descriptive case studies ex-
ist, comparati ve studies which are both descriptive and analytic are ex-
tremely rare (see Holleb & Abrams, 1975, for a solitary but excellent
example). Alternative institutions are the demonstration projects; the
diffusion process tells us about their failings as well as their suc-
cesses; and precious little is known about why or how they fail or suc-
ceed.
On the basis of my personal experience, which includes ten years of
living, working and intervening in alternative institutions, I am con-
vinced that there are three levels of knowledge which are needed if these
institutions are to effectively and creatively circumvent the bureaucra-
tization process to which they are apparently so susceptible. The first
level needs to occur within alternative institutions themselves. The
members of these institutions need to learn more formally about their
internal functioning if they are to make informed choices regarding the
future of their organizations. This entails both the generation of
13
valid information and the means of generating it. The second level of
knowledge requires the accumulation of more generalized and comparative
information regarding alternative institutions. This second level com-
plements the first in that it provides the members of alternative in-
stitutions with a broader perspective in which to place their own or-
ganizational changes, conflicts and development. And lastly, the third
level of knowledge involves the sophistication of those, like myself, who
often intervene in faltering alternative institutions. Ourknowledae
presently is informal at its best, haphazard at its worst. We need a
more systematic way of understanding both the institutions within which
we work as well as the effects of our interventions.
Taking these three levels of necessary knowledge and Herbst's stages
of action research together, the most prudent choice at this point in
time appears to be a return to the first stage -- descriptive and analy-
tic field studies:
The aim is to identify emerging innovative trends,
and to diagnose existing situations which are known
to be problematic in order to generate possible direc-
tions for development (Herbst, 1976, p. 43).
Provided that these studies are both comparative in nature and placed
within an action research framework, we can see that three possible
levels of research activity arise which parallel the three levels of re-
quired knowledge outlined above. First of all, information collected at
the level of a single organization can begin a process of formative re-
search for that organization. The second level of research activity
occurs when information obtained across organizations is compared, pro-
14
viding a broader view of alternative institutions in general. A third
level of research takes place if the researcher chooses to assess the
effects of formative research across participating organizations. Ar-
gyris characterizes the simultaneous occurrence of all three levels as
a broad form of intervention activity in itself:
The resources of the client system and the resources of the
interventionist are joined together to conduct an intervention
that helps the client understand the nature of its problem and
adds to the.
. .theory of intervention activity. The objec-
tive of this intervention activity is to help the client sys-
tem and simultaneously to develop new conceptual models that
help to explain that particular case as well as others that
may be identified in the future (Argyris, 1970, p. 32).
The purpose of the present research is to better conceptualize the
problem of b urea uc rati zation in al ternati ve institutions and to identify
some of its contri buting factors , in order to pinpoint potential areas
for amel iorati ve intervention in exi sting organizations and to improve
the design of future organizations . Given such a purpose, the appropri-
ate focus of research is the second level of learning and research out-
lined above -- the comparison of data across alternative institutions.
While it is recognized that the process of action research involves im-
portant activity at the other two levels, formative research and inter-
vention effects, their careful assessment requires extensive longitudin-
al documentation which is beyond the scope of the present research ef-
forts. As potential sources of incomplete information, however, these
two levels may provide supplemental material which aids our understand-
ing of the how and why of both bureaucratization and its remedies. Hav-
ing defined the purposes and general strategy of this research, it is
15
now appropriate for us to turn to the literature which bears more
directly upon the problem of bureaucratization in alternative institu-
tions. Consistent with the concern for organizational intervention and
design, it is important that we examine not only the understanding of
bureaucratization that this literature provides, but also the courses of
action which this understanding suggests for alternative institutions.
CHAPTER II
CONTEXTS FOR BUREAUCRATIZATION
Introduction
Viewed from the perspective of traditional political theory, alter-
native institutions are both unreasonable and unworkable. This pessi-
mistic view, based upon what is generally known as the "iron law of oli-
garchy," or the "Weber-Mi chels position," maintains that the eventual
fate of truly democratic forms of social organization is ajway_s_ oligar-
chy (see Michels, 1960, for a lengthy statement of this position). In
brief, this transition comes about primarily because of structural dif-
ficulties inherent in large scale democracies and because individuals
at the top of an organization often subvert democratic organizational
goals in order to preserve their own positions of privilege and power,
focussing instead upon organizational growth and maintenance. Contem-
porary writers (e.g., Rothschi ld-Whi tt, 1976) who link the "iron law of
oligarchy" to the situation of alternative institutions do so with a
disregard for the issue of scale. Both Weber and Michels were primarily
concerned with large-scale organizations -- social movements, states and
nations -- not smaller work organizations. Michel's views, for example,
were based largely upon observations of nineteenth-century political
parties and labor unions. Weber, in fact, was even positive about the
prognosis for smaller democratic organizations:
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Though a certain minimum of imperative powers in the exe-
cution of measures is unavoidable, certain corporate groups
may attempt to reduce it as far as possible. This means per-
sons in authority are held obligated to act solely in accor-
dance with the will of the members and in their service by
virtue of the authority given by them. In small groups where
all the members can be assembled at a single place, where they
can know each other and can be treated socially as equals this
can be attained in a high degree. It has, however, been at-
tempted in larger groups, notably the corporate cities and
city states of the past.
. .(Weber, 1947, p. 412).
Despite qualifications regarding scale, acceptance of "the iron law of
oligarchy" by contemporary organizational theorists is widespread (see
Tannenbaum, 1966; Katz & Kahn, 1966). Its influence can also be seen in
traditional models of organizational development which typically assume
the appropriateness and necessity of rational bureaucracy (e.g. Filley
& House, 1969). Given such foundations, most models of organizational
development are clearly inappropriate to the examination of alternative
institutions. And of those relevant models, only one directly addresses
the problem of bureaucratization in any detail. Given this model's sin-
gular appropriateness, it is essential that it be reviewed thoroughly.
As we shall see, such a review not only sharpens our sense of the
bureaucratization process but also raises important questions about its
interpretation.
The Holleb and Abrams Model
During 1973 and 1974, Holleb and Abrams (1975) carried out exten-
sive interviews with members of several alternative community mental
health programs that had emerged in the late sixties and early seven- s
ties. On the basis of their interviews, Holleb and Abrams were able to
reconstruct individual program histories and then create a stage-model
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which generally describes the developmental features common to the pro-
grams. As the authors point out, however, this model is not limited to
alternative community mental health programs, but is also applicable to
"other innovative service programs and work cooperatives" (Holleb &
Abrams, 1975, p. 142). In order for us to appreciate this point, it is
necessary to look closely at the model itself.
Overview
.
Central to the Holleb and Abrams model is the notion that the
development of consensual /democratic organizations includes a period of
bureaucratization from which these organizations may or may not recover.
In total, the model is comprised of three initial stages, and one of two
final stages. The first stage, consensual anarchy
,
characterizes the
nascent organization which has no formal decision-making procedures or
division of labor. Informal differentiation , the second stage, marks
the beginning of bureaucratization. Conventional modes of work and de-
cision-making emerge in an unacknowledged manner. In the third stage,
formal differentiation , deliberate organizational structure is created
which is bureaucratic in nature. According to Holleb and Abrams, orga-
nizations in this third stage eventually reach an important point of
choice. Consistent with prevailing trends, they can move on to full-
fledged bureaucracy , or they can attempt to move towards consensual
democracy , a stable compromise between consensual/democratic ideals and
the realities of organizational life. Different organizations, of
course, move through these stages at different rates and the movement
itself can be reversed, as in a temporary return to a previous stage.
Schematically, then, the model is as follows:
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consensual anarchy
I
informal differentiation
formal differentiation
bureaucracy or consensual democracy
Further elaboration of the model requires that we carefully examine each
stage by pointing to its major features. What follows is taken directly
from Holleb and Abram's original outline (1975, pp. 142-150).
Consensual anarchy
.
According to Holleb and Abrams, an organiza-
tion at this stage is still an association of friends and coworkers,
and has yet to be formalized. Its major features are:
Characte ri sties
:
--fluid membership and minimal entrance requirements
--undifferentiated tasks (everyone does everything)
--highly ideological
--response to crises rather than planning
--high energy
Leadership
:
--small group or single charismatic leader
--consensual decision-making with no formal procedures
—emphasis on individual autonomy
Staff rewards:
--commitment to ideals
--social contact
— personal growth
--autonomy in work
Problems and pressures:
--little or no money
--decision-making procedures unclear
--power struggl es
--membership unclear; potential members continually unsure
whether they are in or out
--inconsistent delivery of services
--important work does not get done because tasks are too
loosely delegated
--sloppy public relations
20
—high staff turnover
In commenting on this stage, the authors note that:
This period may last for a few months or for a few years, de-
pending upon the ideological commitment and tolerance for am-
biguity of the staff. In this stage service is secondary to
planning and staff building, but as the program becomes more
accepted by the community and the pressure builds to provide
more and better services, problems with the consensual anarchy
system begin to emerge. Some of the staff realize that others
are forgetting to show up for work shifts. It becomes clear
that certain members are more competent, responsible and com-
mitted than others. The more work-oriented and dedicated staff
members become frustrated with the difficulties of trying to
organize amid the chaos and ambiguity of the program's struc-
ture. Gradually these people push the organization in the
direction of increasing differentiation of roles and tasks,
and clarification of procedures (Holleb & Abrams
,
1975, pp.
143-144).
What is important to emphasize about the consensual anarchy stage is
that it represents the emergence of an organizational ideal which lacks
substantial procedures for actualizing that ideal. As the organization
begins to face the pressures of day-to-day operations, we start to find
a divergence between consensual theory and organizational practice.
Informal differentiation . Holleb and Abrams' description of this
stage captures the beginning of the bureaucratization process. Informal
di fferentiati on has the following features:
Characteri sti cs
:
--de-emphasis of ideology
--informal divison of labor; first job description
--continued fluid membership but informal boundaries
tighten
--membership based on friendship or "good vibes"
--organization in period of rapid expansion and implemen-
tation of services
Leadership:
— formation of the core group
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— day-to-day decisions made by core group with major deci-
sions left to entire membership
--lack of formal decision-making procedures
Staff rewards
:
— increasing effectiveness and competence as helpers
(learning through skill sharing)
--sense of family in core group
—autonomy i n work
--personal growth
Problems and pressures:
--power struggles between core group and other staff;
jockeying for status and influence
— core group feels responsibility but none of the power
--non-core staff feels left out of important decisions
--organizational rules and regulations apparent but not
formally recognized or written down
--outside agencies, especially funders, demand tighter
bookkeeping and internal accountability
--clients and referral services demand more consistent
servi ces
Within informal differentiation
, the formation and functioning of the
core group should be highlighted. This group fills an important gap
within the organization by providing leadership and taking responsibil-
ity for day-to-day activities. At the same time, however, the way in
which this gap is filled generates new organizational problems:
[The individuals comprising the core group] are recognized by
most other members as being the leaders; however their leader-
ship is not acknowledged in the form of titles or higher sa-
laries or formal investitures of power. The core group devel-
op feelings of closeness and sharing. They act like a family.
The other staff feel excluded from this family and envy the
status, power and intimacy of the core group. Since there
are no clear boundaries around membership in the program or
in the core, staff struggle to find ways to be sure that they
really belong. Differing factions of cliques within the staff
vie for power and influence within the organization.
At the same time the work of the programs begins to be
more rationally distributed. . . . Administrative jobs are
apportioned to specific staff members with particular skills.
Staff members begin to take on consistent duties and respon-
sibilities. The problems at this stage of development usually
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converge around issues of power and issues of inclusion-
exclusion (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, pp. 144-146).
At this point we can see that the process of bureaucratization is
starting to gather momentum. Not only is the organization beginning to
appear more conventional, but it is also beginning to function more
conventionally as well. Thus attempts to resolve internal issues of
power and inclusion-exclusion within the organization themselves become
expressions of this increasing conventionality.
Formal differentiation
. The next stage is described as follows:
Characteristics
:
--creation of administrative hierarchies
--staff positions filled by "qualified outsiders"
--administrative and clinical staff differentiated
--volunteer and client status and power diminished
--energy directed toward service rather than organizational
experi mentation
--lower staff turnover
Leadershi p:
—program leadership formalized in core group or one or
two administrators
—more efficient decision-making procedures
Staff rewards:
—career training
--more clearly delineated power relations
--more clearly defined work
--more recognition from outside world
Problems and pressures:
--loss of ideological purity
--loss of family
--breakdown of interpersonal and intergroup communications
--decreasing autonomy in work
As we can see, power and inclusion issues are resolved within this stage
by further formalization of the organization along conventional lines.
Both organizational roles and decision-making procedures are defined by
an increasingly bureaucratic and hierarchical structure. At this point,
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claim the authors, the organization reaches a critical crossroads:
The transformation from a consensual to a hierarchical organi-
zation occurs through numerous minor reforms and policy
changes rather than one massive reorganization. Bureaucracy
can happen without the conscious intent of the staff. Soon
the staff begin to realize that they have little by little
lost many of the values upon which they were founded. This
realization leads to an important organizational point of
choice. The staff can either reassert their initial goals of
equality and consensus.
.
.[by moving towards consensual
democracy]
. .
.or, with a shrug of their shoulders and a sigh
of regret, move on to an even more bureaucratic and hierar-
chical structure.
. .[bureaucracy ] (Holleb & Agrams, 1975, p.
The choice, then, is between bureaucracy or consensual democracy as a
final stage in organizational development. Let us look at the two
choi ces.
Bureaucracy
.
Major parameters include:
Characteri sti cs
:
--staff responsibilities and power clearly defined
--differential salaries
—minimal involvement by volunteers
--jobs filled by professionals and highly trained non-
professionals
--hiring and firing done by administrators
Leadershi p:
--administrators become unquestioned leaders and decision-
makers on all programmatic, financial and public rela-
tions issues
--individual staff members exercise autonomy only in their
—specific job areas and are carefully monitored by super-
visors
Staff rewards:
--job security
--competitive salary
--recognition from outside world
Problems and pressures:
--decreasing autonomy in work
--loss of personal commitment to job
--formalization of relationships
—staff excluded from organizational decision-making
--competitive pressures from other social service agencies
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If this path is chosen, the process of bureaucratization is nearly com-
pleted -- the organization now mirrors the forms to which it was origin-
ally an alternative. Although innovative services may still be provided
by the organization, it is usually only a matter of time before func-
tional replication sets in also.
Consensual democracy
.
Major features of this stage include:
Characteristics:
--return to consensual forms
--constitutional democracy with clear rules and procedures
--clearly defined boundaries and entrance requirements
— structures for sharing work and feelings
--administrative and maintenance work shared by all staff
--work contracts for staff
Leadership:
--leadership informal, shifting and shared
--subgroups, program components given wide latitude in
decis ion-making
— representative groups employed for overall program plan-
ning
--all major decisions referred to total staff
Staff rewards:
--autonomy
--involvement in planning and decision-making
--community and support
--increasing effectiveness and competence
Problems and pressures:
--low salaries
--decision-making slow and cumbersome
--difficulty in hiring and firing
--loss of clinical time doing administrative work
--difficulty in obtaining funding
--licensing laws and other threats from professional es-
tablishment
--limitations in scope of services and target population
--difficulty in getting referrals from and tying in with
established agencies
As Holleb and Abrams point out, the organization which moves towards
this stage enters uncharted territory. The articulation of consensual
democ racy does not occur in a vacuum, however. It is guided by past
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organizational lessons:
. .
.this system differs from the more rudimentary consensual
forms of the early years. The staff know if they are to avoid
hierarchies and tight lines of management, they have to devel-
op consensual forms that meet some of the needs that hierar-
chies fulfill. They need rules and procedures for running the
organization that are well defined (if changeable). No one
should be left to wonder if he is a member. When a new member
joins the program or an old member changes his job, his re-
sponsibilities must be clearly delineated (Holleb & Abrams,
1975, p. 150).
The programs have discovered that a system of clearly de-
fined rights and obligations is less repressive of individual
autonomy than the illusion of total freedom with an actual
underlying system of expectations (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, p.
137).
Recovery from bureaucratization . Within the sample of organiza-
zations studied by Holleb and Abrams, most resisted further bureaucra-
tization and moved toward consensual democracy , while a few succumbed
to the momentum of increasingly bureaucratic forms. What distinguishes
the organizations which survive the bureaucratization syndrome from
those which do not? Holleb and Abrams identify one major factor:
The swing back from bureacuracy results primarily because
of deeply held political values of the staffs. As we have
said, the staffs are made up of former political activists and
counter-culture standard bearers; even as they age and become
more conservative, they maintain a commitment to innovation
within the structure of their organization. They attend to
the process of its development and worry over the meaning of
changes in structures (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, p. 153).
While members' political values may provide the stimulus for a
shift away from bureaucratic forms, Holleb and Abrams also argue that
the marginal ity of these organizations is what allows such a shift to
take place. Located outside of the established social service system,
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innovative programs are not directly obligated to respond to pressures
for "more efficient" structures of leadership and service delivery.
Their marginal ity, then, ensures the organizational flexibility neces-
sary for restructuring along consensual
-democratic lines.
The beginnings of bureaucratization
. Although Holleb and Abrams
are quite explicit about the organizational features which promote re-
covery from bureaucratization, they are less clear about those which
bring it on in the first place. Drawing heavily upon Sarason (1972),
they argue that the prior socialization
. . .will begin, over time, to exert a strong influence over
how people in alternative programs modify their creations.
Staffs of such alternative organizations carry with them, in
the back recesses of their minds, old scripts about how an
organization should be run. These scripts will be more con-
ventional than the rhetoric of the founding days. Over time,
the basic beliefs will be enacted and the organizations will
begin to swing back, in terms of structure of tasks, type of
staff rewards, and nature of services, to more conventional
approaches (Holleb & Agrams
,
1975, p. 152).
In addition, the authors periodically mention three other factors which
seem associated with the onset of bureaucratization: pressure exerted
by external agencies and funding sources for more conventional organi-
zational arrangements; lack of ideological commitment on the part of
members; and lack of forms of organizational structure which are con-
sistent with consensual-democratic ideals. Holleb and Abrams' treatment
of prior socialization and these other three factors associated with
bureaucratization is largely descriptive. The authors point to forces
which seem responsible for bureaucratization, but never attempt to ex-
amine either their individual or combined effects in an analytical
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fashion.
Summary
.
Holleb and Abrams' work represents the state-of-the-art
model of organizational development for alternative institutions. Al-
though their model is based upon the development of alternative com-
munity mental health programs, there is little doubt that their descrip-
tion of both the bureaucratization process and the choices which this
process brings about are highly relevant to other alternative institu-
tions as well. Their model details a path of change which is all too
familiar to those of us concerned with these unique organizations. Un-
fortunately, this relevance is slightly clouded by the authors' under-
standable use of social service parlance in designating various organi-
zational roles. If, instead of administrator, staff and client, we
substitute the terms manager, member and consumer, respectively, trans-
lation of the Holleb and Abrams model to contexts other than the social
services is simplified. In consensual anarchy there are no managers,
only members and/or consumers. Within informal differentiation , the
core group represents a clique of informal managers; by assuming re-
sponsibility for day-to-day operations, this group takes on executive
functions. Under formal differentiation , managers are officially desig-
nated and hold executive powers as well as an increasing share of legis-
lative or policy-making functions. Bureaucracy is marked by the un-
questioned executive and legislative powers of managers (which trans-
forms members into employees). And within consensual democracy , legis-
lative powers are returned to members (and/or consumers) by means of an
explicit organizational structure which also alters the executive func-
tions associated with day-to-day operations. Phrasing the Holleb and
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Abrams model in these terms, we find that it clearly details a scenario
consistent with past developmental accounts of food cooperatives (Nagy,.
1978; Wertheim, 1976), free clinics (Taylor, 1976), collectivized work-
places (Bernstein, 1976; French & French, 1975), and large cooperative
households (Israel, 1971). In all of these accounts, organizations
constructed initially upon ideals of shared work and decision-making
slowly move towards more bureaucratic arrangements; some succumb while
others reaffirm their ideals by establishing formal consensual democra-
cies. Broadening Holleb and Abrams' terminology not only underscores
the appropriateness of their model to a broad range of alternative in-
stitutions, but also crystallizes our sense of the problem of bureau-
cratization itself: we can now define bureaucratization as the emer -
gence of both conventional manager-employee relati onships and the
structure of organi zational authori ty by which these relationships are
increasingly forma li zed .
The congruence between Holleb and Abrams 1 stage-model and the de-
velopmental accounts of other alternative institutions appears to sup-
port their claim that this model
. . .describes the basic stages of growth of many other inno-
vative service organizations and work cooperatives. This se-
quence represents the general directions in which alternative
programs move, as, over the years, they establish a degree of
stability and permanence (Holleb & Abrams, 1975, p. 142).
As this statement makes clear, Holleb and Abrams see their model not
only as a description of the development of alternative institutions in
the past, but also as a guide for their present and future development.
Despite the descriptive accuracy of their model, however, its value as
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a prescriptive device needs to be questioned.
Critiquing Holleb and Abrams. Holleb and Abrams' treatment of the
problem of bureaucratization in alternative institutions is undoubtedly
the most significant aspect of their stage model, but this significance
has both positive and negative sides. In order to appreciate this
point, we need to look more carefully at both their model and the cor-
rective strategies which it suggests.
Historical description versus organizational prescription
. Central
to the Holleb and Abrams model is the clear implication that a large
measure of bureaucratization is an inevitable step in the organizational
development of alternative institutions. For one of these institutions
entering the informal differentiation stage, their model suggests that
little can be done until formal differentiation is reached. It is only
at this point, according to the authors, that the contradiction between
members' radical political values and an increasingly bureaucratic
structure brings the organization to the critical point of choice be-
tween bureaucracy or consensual democracy . Applied in this prescriptive
way, the Holleb and Abrams model, as any model, promises to be trans-
formed from a historical description into a self-fulfilling prophecy.
By locating the critical point of choice late in the bureaucratization
process, their model precludes the possibility of earlier attempts to
establish stable consensual -democratic forms of organization. For ex-
ample, alternative institutions which deliberately develop clear organi-
zational structures right from the beginning (and there are a few such
instances) are seen as anomalies from Holleb and Abrams' perspective.
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And secondly, what the authors label as "a critical point of choice" for
alternative institutions threatens not to be a choice at all for many
organizations -- the call for major organizational change comes at a
time when it is already too late. As an organization moves into formal
differentiation
,
members with strong political convictions may leave and
be replaced by others who are less committed to the consensual ideals of
earlier days. Increased division of labor between "production" tasks
and "managerial" tasks at this point can also inhibit a change toward
more consensual forms. Since managerial expertise and knowledge is con-
fined to a small number of people, the majority of the organization's
members may be at this point unwilling or unable to share in managerial
tasks and responsibilities. And finally, the onset of formal differen-
tiation is associated with the creation of a managerial hierarchy which
may place the responsibility for both raising issues and the authority
for implementing change in the hands of those who stand to lose the
most (i.e., in terms of salaries, status, power, etc.) in a shift to
consensual democracy
.
Although most of the programs examined by Holleb
and Abrams were able to surmount those difficulties and reassert their
consensual ideals, the suggestion that contemporary alternative institu-
tions must also face the same delays in their attempts to establish con-
sensual democracy seems ill advised: it would ensure that many of these
alternative institutions would continue to succumb to bureaucratic
forms. What contemporary organizations need is a clearer picture of
"earlier" choices in their development.
Freeman (1972 / 1973), in an analysis of organizational forms char-
acteristic of the women's liberation movement, provides an excellent
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example of what one of these earlier choices might be. Pointing to
groups which Holleb and Abrams would categorize as consensual anarchies,
Freeman argues that so-called "structureless" groups simply do not ex-
ist. Although groups of this sort may not have formal structures, such
as explicit and recognized roles, rules and procedures, informal struc-
tures inevitably emerge which are contrary to the original notions of
shared power and responsibility. Some individuals are aware of the in-
formal structures and are able to use them; others without such aware-
ness are denied access to the real structures of power in the group.
Due to the prevailing theory of "structurelessness" in such groups,
however, these informal structures and the unequal distribution of power
that they represent typically remain unacknowledged or unquestioned.
According to Freeman, this situation can be rectified only by deliberate
efforts to make group structure explicit so that ". . .the rules of de-
cision-making are open and available to everyone. . ." (Freeman, 1972/
1973, p. 152). As we can see, the determination to formalize decision-
making procedures in ways consistent with democratic ideals obviously
represents a critical choice for alternative institutions early in their
development. Holleb and Abrams' failure to identify this and similar
"early choices" stands as a significant omission in their work. How are
we to understand such an omission? Consideration of both their sample
and methodology suggests a number of possible explanations.
All of the organizations examined by Holleb and Abrams are repre-
sentative of the "first wave" alternative institutions which arose in
this country during the late sixties and early seventies. One major
characteristic shared by these "first wave" organizations was their al-
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most total ignorance of the numerous accounts of past attempts to es-
tablish organizations predicated upon consensual ideals (French &
French, 1975). Deprived of these critical lessons of the past, members
of emergent alternative institutions were not able to anticipate the de-
velopmental difficulties which their organizations were certain to face.
As Holleb and Abrams point out repeatedly, the organizations which they
studied were largely unaware of the "choice" between consensual and
bureaucratic modes of organization until quite late in the bureaucrati-
zation process. From the perspective of the individuals within these
organizations, then, "earlier choices" did not exist -- some degree of
regression was unavoidable. In essence, the work of Holleb and Abrams
captures this historical innocence, detailing the uninformed development
of "first wave" alternative institutions as it was played out within
innovative community mental health programs. What is somewhat striking
about Holleb and Abrams 1 work, however, is the degree to which their
view of bureaucratization (i.e., that some bureaucratization is inevit-
able) merges with that of their research participants. That Holleb and
Abrams incorporated this pessimism within their model might be traced to
a descriptive rather than analytic research approach. On the other
hand, these authors may not have known any other way of looking at
bureaucratization problems, since they themselves were central members
of one of the programs in their sample. In attempting to understand
their own experiences within a "first wave" alternative institution,
Holleb and Abrams may have been unable to take on the more distant and
analytical stance evident in Freeman's (1972/1973) work. In any event,
a careful reading of their book suggests that one other element may have
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influenced their view of bureaucratization - the timing of their re-
search relative to the developmental stage of their sample.
In 1973 and 1974, when Holleb and Abrams interviewed members of al-
ternative programs, it appears thatmostof the participating organiza-
tions were in the process of switching from formal differentiation to
some form of consensual democracy
. Although the authors were able to
reconstruct the entire histories of individual programs, the bulk of the
bureaucratization process in these organizations existed only as history
at the point when their research began. Given this sense of Holleb and
Abrams' timing, we can better appreciate why their model emphasizes re-
covery from bureaucratization rather than the conditions which encourage
bureaucratization in the first place and then sustain it: the informa-
tion most relevant to the bureaucratization process was that which was
least accessible to them. This aspect of Holleb and Abrams' research
may also have contributed to their view of partial bureaucratization
(i.e., informal and formal differentiati on) as a necessary feature of the
development of alternative institutions. Looking back upon the recon-
structed histories of these organizations, it may have been difficult
for the authors not to attribute a degree of inevitability to bureau-
cratization. Had Holleb and Abrams' research focused upon organizations
in earlier stages of their development they might have understood the
onset of bureaucratization in a way more similar to Freeman's (1972/
1973) -- as an unfortunate and perhaps unacknowledged choice, rather
than an inevitable course of events.
Despite the generality of their description beyond community mental
health settings, then, we find that the failure of Holleb and Abrams to
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phrase bureaucratization within conditional terms raises substantive
questions regarding the prescriptive value of their model. What is at
issue is not their description of bureaucratization, but rather their
interpretation of it. While their model could serve contemporary alter-
native institutions as a critical warning from the past, in that it de-
tails the probable consequences of ignoring bureaucratization in its
beginning stages, it remains a questionable prescription for the pres-
ent. A brief consideration of the intervention value of the Holleb and
Abrams model raises additional questions about the adequacy of their in-
terpretation of bureaucratization.
Implications for intervention
. One major difficulty with Holleb
and Abrams' interpretation of bureaucratization is that it points to
ameliorative strategies which are of dubious value for alternative in-
stitutions. In order for us to see how this is the case, we need first
to examine the contributing factors which these authors link to bureau-
cratization.
Hooeb and Abrams mention three factors which seem to precipi tate
bureaucratization initially : (1) external demands for more conventional
forms of organization (raised by agencies, funding sources, etc.); (2)
lack of ideological commitment on the part of members (and the re-emer-
gence of conventional consciousness regarding organizational life) and
(3) lack of organizational structures which reflect consensual-democra-
tic ideals. Their detailed analysis of why organizations recover or
fail to recover from bureaucratization , however, is couched primarily
in terms of a single characteristic of members -- the degree of their
commitment to radical politics. If this commitment is strong, an or-
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ganization can reverse the tide of bureaucratization, but if it is weak
or lacking, bureaucratization continues until conventional forms are
firmly established. Despite the fact that Holleb and Abrams do mention
other contributing factors, the emphasis they place upon this single
membership characteristic leads to a view of bureaucratization which I
believe is problematic for at least two reasons.
First of all, a person-centered interpretation of bureaucratization
can be misleading because it redefines the nature of organizational dif-
ficulties. What was initially a problem with the relationships which
bind people together within organizations now becomes a problem only
with the people themselves. The inappropriateness of such an interpre-
tation becomes even more apparent when we begin to trace its implica-
tions for corrective action within alternative institutions. Given
Holleb and Abrams 1 analysis, we are quickly led to conclude that the
best hedge against bureaucratization would be the careful selection of
members on the basis of their political beliefs. The flaw in such an
approach, of course, should be quite obvious. Rather than constructing
alternative institutions, we find ourselves constructing institutions
full of "alternative" people.
And secondly, Holleb and Abrams' person-centered interpretation of
bureaucratization suffers because of its uni directional i ty . Members'
political beliefs are seen as affecting the structure of the organiza-
tion over time, but this structure is not seen as acting on members'
political beliefs. To deny the effect of organizational structure upon
political beliefs is to deny the reality of socializing forces in orga-
nizational life. It should be obvious that particular structural ar-
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rangements within an organization can either reinforce or undermine
members' original political beliefs. These structural arrangements can
also influence the entry and exit of members in ways which could affect
the degree of political commitment within the organization as a whole.
For example, an organization which mixes consensual rhetoric with infor-
mal bureaucratic practices may lose its more politically inclined mem-
bers, while at the same time attracting new members whose political po-
sitions are more moderate. Recognizing the probable connection between
members' political commitment and organizational structure, we find what
Holleb and Abrams have identified as a critical factor contributing to
bureaucratization may instead represent an associated symptom. In al-
ternative institutions succumbing to bureaucracy
,
then, the lack of
political commitment can be seen as at least a partial consequence of
the organizational structure (formal or informal) in previous stages of
development. This is not to say, however, that political commitment is
unimportant. Holleb and Abrams did find that this single member char-
acteristic effectively discriminates between consensual and bureaucratic
paths of organizational development in the innovative programs which
they studied. What these authors fail to do is provide a basis for un-
derstanding the issue of political commitment in organizational as well
as individual terms. Consequently we are not led by their analysis to
look for structural arrangements which might either support or undermine
political commitment in the first place.
There is, then, a certain amount of irony within Holleb and Abrams'
work. Although these authors have carefully documented sequential
changes in the organizational structure of alternative institutions, at
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the same time they have ignored these changing structural arrangements
as a vehicle for both comprehending and confronting the problem of
bureaucratization. Their person-centered interpretation of bureaucra-
tization not only downplays the structural aspects of alternative insti-
tutions, but also directs our attention away from the fundamental task
of these organizations -- that of creating new sets of relationships for
sharing work and decision-making. In this way, the greatest single re-
source of alternative institutions — their willingness and ability to
deliberately alter their own internal organizational structure --
threatens to remain both unexamined and underutilized.
Learning from Holleb and Abrams
. In order for us to make sense of Hol-
leb and Abrams' work in ways which would point to corrective actions for
alternative institutions, we clearly need to attempt another interpreta-
tion of the problem of bureaucratization. Building on the shortcomings
of their interpretation, we now know that any improved understanding of
bureaucratization will need to be based at least in part upon the struc-
tural features of these organizations and not solely upon the character-
istics of their members. Not surprisingly, it has been my personal ex-
perience to hear this same conclusion voiced by members of more success-
ful alternative institutions who are altogether unfamiliar with the work
of Holleb and Abrams. Their experiences in past organizational experi-
ments have led them to construct alternative institutions which seem to
be pursuing a path of organizational development which diverges consid-
erably from the Holleb and Abrams scenario. Older and probably wiser,
these veterans have begun to build alternative institutions which for-
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malize some aspects of consensual democracy right from the start. In
one case that I am aware of, for example, a recently established food
cooperative began its operation with a full set of bylaws which clearly
outlines participation in decision-making and work as both rights and
obligations of all members. Such examples, now apparently on the in-
crease, appear to point to a "second wave" of alternative institutions
which are much more structurally sophisticated than their predecessors.
There are presently no written accounts of these anomalous "second wave"
organizations, and few indications of their probable success or failure,
but it seems reasonable to follow their lead and explore the structural
side of alternative institutions more closely. As we should recall,
Holleb and Abrams mentioned three factors which contribute to regres-
sion, but highlighted only one -- the issue of members' political com-
mitment. At this point, let us begin to consider the two not emphasized
-- lack of organizational structures consistent with consensual /democra-
tic ideals and external pressures for more conventional organizational
arrangements. By turning now to a literature rarely associated with
alternative institutions, I believe we can see not only how these other
factors are related to the problem of bureaucratization, but also how
they can provide a realistic basis upon which to predicate corrective
strategies
.
CHAPTER III
THE RELEVANCE OF WORKPLACE DEMOCRATIZATION
Introduction
If the recent emergence of alternative institutions could be termed
a "movement", we would then find that it is not the only "movement"
whose primary goal is the development of radically democratic alterna-
tives to bureaucratic hierarchy. This same general goal is shared by
another quieter, but somewhat broader coalition which includes the pro-
ponents of self-management (Vanek, 1975; Adizes & Borgese, 1975), work-
ers' control (Gorz, 1967; Hunnius, Garson & Case, 1973), workers' parti-
cipation (Pateman, 1970), industrial democracy (Bellas, 1972; Blumberg,
1968), and workers' cooperatives (Oakeshott, 1979). While the particu-
lar choice of terms often reflects important differences and distinc-
tions within this movement regarding specific long-range objectives, the
diverse factions are bound together by a common strategy which appears
to set them apart from the proponents of alternative institutions. Ra-
ther than attempting to create new organizations, this movement primari-
ly seeks to transform existing ones. In recognition of this strategic
similarity, Bernstein (1976) and Gustavsen (1973) have given the process
of transformation itself a label -- workplace democratization -- which
is increasingly applied to the movement as a whole. As Bernstein points
out, the choice of the word "democratization" is significant not only
because of its inclusiveness, but also because
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. .
.the emphasis on process that is inevitable with the termdemocratization seems more realistic for the long run It
helps to keep us aware of the fact that, in all probability,
there is no fixed, single, or final state of workplace demo-
cracy (Bernstein, 1975, p. 4).
Bernstein's comments should serve as a clue to the relevance of the
workplace democratization movement for those of us concerned with the
construction of alternative institutions. As we shall see, what initi-
ally appears as a major strategic schism diminishes in importance when
we compare the two movements more closely.
History
.
Much like the current attempt to create alternative institu-
tions, the workplace democratization movement can also locate its early
history in the nineteenth-century communal and communitarian experiments
of both Europe and the United States. The philosophical and political
underpinnings of these experiments figured prominently in the develop-
ment of organized labor in the United States during the latter half of
that century. For example, the Knights of Labor, the first major labor
organization in this country, was a strong advocate of restructuring
workplaces along radically democratic lines (Grob, 1961). Similar in-
fluences can be seen at work in the plywood cooperatives which emerged
in the Pacific Northwest during the 1920 's and 1930's. Not surprising-
ly, these early production cooperatives are often pinpointed as the pro-
totypic attempts to create democratized firms in this country (Bern-
stein, 1976).
Focal point of change . In essence, the proponents of alternative insti-
tutions and those of workplace democratization both agree that the cen-
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tral problems of conventional workplaces stem from the manager- employee
relationship and the system of bureaucratic authority in which it is
embedded. Due to the fact that attempts at workplace democratization
often need to be sanctioned by owners and managers of traditional firms,
however, proponents of this movement sometimes veil this conviction.
Bernstein, for example, defines workplace democracy as any attempt to
"increase employee influence in the management process, especially in
decision-making" (1976, p. 4). Other advocates are much more straight-
forward, declaring openly that this movement "strives for the elimina-
tion of boss-employee relationships" (Wilson, 1974, p. 45). The disdain
for manager-employee relationships does not extend to management func-
tions in themselves, however. Proponents of democratization recognize
the critical need for management functions (planning, coordination,
etc.), but seek to develop increasingly egalitarian sets of workplace
relationships through which these functions might be carried out.
Overall vision . For the proponents of workplace democratization, the
manager-employee relationship merely reflects at an interpersonal level
the downward flow of authority which characterizes conventional organi-
zations. They would like to see instead a leveling of the hierarchy of
authority, in which authority is distributed equally throughout the or-
ganization, making workers, of course, very influential. In actual
practice, the details of such an arrangement depend in large part upon
the size and scale of the work organization under consideration. In
large conventional industries, for example, the management functions
represented by the day-to-day chain of command remains in place, but the
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managers in this hierarchy are answerable to those whom they manage.
In small worker co-ops, on the other hand, many management functions may
be distributed among the workers, with perhaps a coordinator to manage
the remaining day-to-day affairs. Although the various factions of the
workplace democratization movement differ considerably on the degree to
which authority should be shared and the specific mechanisms for its
administration, they remain united by the central premise that final
authority should always rest with all the members of an organization.
Such a notion, of course, is very similar to that of consensual demo-
cracy espoused by Holleb and Abrams (1975).
The process of change
. While it is impossible here to provide a de-
tailed discussion of the range of specific strategies which fall under
the rubric of workplace democratization, it should suffice to say that
most strategies aim at a fundamental alteration of the governance system
within traditional firms, and often at increasing collectivization of
work groups on the shop floor (see Zwerdling, 1978, for a recent review
of current examples). It is precisely this focus -- the restructuring
of work and decision-making -- which points to the most crucial simi-
larities and differences between the workplace democratization movement
and that of alternative institutions.
In the process of reorganizing work and decision-making, both move-
ments are faced with the task of generating new workplace relationships
with only the negative examples of conventional workplaces to guide
them. In addition, both need to maintain these new relationships over
time and buffer them against internal and external pressures to return
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to more conventional arrangements (see Hackman, 1975; Bernstein, 1976).
Recognition of these similarities underscores the fact that both move-
ments share a number of identical concerns about the process of change
itself. Equally important, however, is the awareness that they begin
the process of change under very different conditions.
A crucial difference
.
The major factor which differentiates alternative
institutions from workplace democratization projects is the nature and
intensity of their respective confrontations with bureaucratic hierar-
chy. In brief, democratization projects are firmly grounded in the con-
ventional work organizations which they attempt to alter, while alterna-
tive institutions have a less substantial basis on which to predicate
change. For democratization projects, bureaucratic hierarchy provides
an immediate context which must be faced directly and continuously, on
both organizational and personal levels. Typical projects require the
authorization of top management, the downward implementation of author-
ized changes, management approval of innovations recommended by lower-
level employees, and much more. In addition, the individuals within
these projects have been immersed in bureaucratic hierarchy for most of
their working lives, making their thoughts and actions at times insep-
arable from it. While this fact makes change a risky and difficult
undertaking for these individuals, in that it threatens the security of
long-established roles, relationships and assumptions (e.g., the tradi-
tional "perogatives of management"), it also ensures that all partici-
pants have a working knowledge of the specifics of bureaucratic hierar-
chy, at least as it is applied to their specific industry. In democra-
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tization projects, then, there is little disagreement about the conven-
tional practices for distributing work and decision-making responsibil-
ities -- the everyday realities of bureaucratic hierarchy are quite
clear. Instead, disagreements center on the viability of altering spe-
cific practices and the long-range effects of such alterations (e.g.,
replacing individual piece-rates with group incentives).
Within alternative institutions, on the other hand, the confronta-
tion with bureaucratic hierarchy is much less straightforward. First
of all, these organizations are typically isolated from conventional
workplaces. True, there is some contact with banks, suppliers and gov-
ernmental agencies, but these periodic interchanges occur at the inter-
organizational level, typically revealing more about the external rela-
tions of bureaucratic hierarchy than about its internal dynamics. Sec-
ondly, members of alternative institutions are usually young and from
middle or upper-middle class backgrounds. Thus their contacts with
bureaucratic hierarchy are often limited to short-term employment and to
experiences gained as receivers of services from educational, health and
governmental institutions. For example, it appears that very few indi-
viduals active in food cooperatives have ever worked in a supermarket,
or in any other facet of the food distribution industry (Nagy, 1978).
This is not to say, however, that members of alternative institutions
have not learned about bureaucratic hierarchy -- clearly they have. As
Herbst (1976) points out, one fundamental building-block of bureaucratic
hierarchy is the superior-subordinate relationship. Considering the im-
pact of school systems alone, we would be hard-pressed to argue that mem
bers of alternative institutions had not "learned" in some ways about
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bureaucratic hierarchy. Such learning, of course, is qualitatively dif-
ferent than that of the long-term employee in a conventional work orga-
nization
- more akin to socialization than the accumulation of a day-
to-day working knowledge. Thus we find that the members of alternative
institutions are placed in an awkward position. They have been
"schooled" in the fundamentals of bureaucratic hierarchy, but have only
limited experiences in actually practicing it. Handicapped by a lack of
specific information regarding day-to-day practices and somewhat isolated
from conventional workplaces, they often build organizations in opposi-
tion to a conception of bureaucratic hierarchy, rather than in opposi-
tion to its working-day realities. Under the circumstances, of course,
this conception of bureaucratic hierarchy not only tends to become sty-
lized and oversimplified, but also promises to remain untested. Worse
yet, the oppositional notions which underlie the construction of alter-
native institutions may also tend to be stylized and oversimplified,
providing a poor basis for generating new modes of work and decision-
making. Non-hierarchical can come to mean no structure; and non-bureau-
cratic can translate to no procedures. By tracing the effects of such
conceptions we can both illuminate the organizational development of al-
ternative institutions and also demonstrate the particular relevance of
what has been learned within the workplace democratization movement.
Imp! i cations . Recognizing the partial vacuum of experience and informa-
tion that surrounds the creation of alternative institutions, we are now
in a position to comprehend more fully the developmental scenario docu-
mented by Holleb and Abrams (1975). In particular, we can appreciate
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how an oversimplified view of bureaucratic hierarchy can lead to the
first stage of development - consensual anarchy_ - a stage character-
ized primarily by the absence of formal structure and procedures. Given
this void, we can also appreciate how the prior socialization of members
provides them with conventional models of the workplace which soon be-
come the basis of informal structure and procedures within the organiza-
tion. As pointed out previously, these conventional models, over time,
also become the means to increasing formalization along bureaucratic
lines. Within the Holleb and Abrams model, this process of bureaucrati-
zation continues until the formal differentiation stage, when the con-
tradiction between members' initial values and the organization which
they have built precipitates a major organizational choice: bureaucracy
or consensual democracy
. With a certain amount of irony, it should be
pointed out that the members of an alternative institution who decide
to change the course of bureaucratization by moving from formal differ-
entiation to consensual democracy are engaged in a workplace democrati-
zation project of sorts: at this critical point in development, they
are actually attempting to transform an existing organization (admitted-
ly of their own making), rather than create a new one. From a larger
perspective, it is as if members have inadvertently compensated for
their limited experience with bureaucratic hierarchy by relying on their
past socialization to build a bureaucratic version of their own organi-
zation; armed with the vividness and immediacy of this experience, they
are then in a better position to begin fashioning a more realistic oppo-
sitional structure.
Thus we begin to see the genuine relevance of experiences gained
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within the workplace democratization movement for those of us concerned
with building alternative institutions. What appears initially as a
major strategic division between these two movements now emerges as the
central basis for their integration. For alternative institutions which
have committed themselves to the transition from formal differentiation
to consensual democracy
,
the factors central to successful workplace
democratization are clearly worth examining. As argued previously, how-
ever, the attempt to move to consensual democracy at this late point may
be thwarted because the process of bureaucratization has already gone
too far -- the "management" of an alternative institution may not be
willing to "authorize" the move. In keeping with the notion of identi-
fying "earlier choices" for alternative institutions, then, it is impor-
tant that we look closely at the factors deemed essential for workplace
democratization with an eye to how they might provide clues for improv-
ing the initial development of oppositional structures. With these con-
siderations in mind, let us now turn to a major work in the workplace
democratization literature.
The Bernstein Model
Drawing upon an extensive number of cases involving manufacturing
firms in the United States and abroad, Bernstein (1976) has constructed
a comprehensive model of six interdependent components minimally neces-
sary for the maintenance of the workplace democratization process. The
six components are:
1. Participation in decision-making, whether by direct or by
elected representation.
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2. Frequent feedback of economic results to all employees (in
the form of money, not just information).
3. Full sharing with employees of management-level informa-
tion, and, to an increasing extent, management-level ex-
pertise
.
4. Guaranteed individual rights (corresponding, it turns out
to the basic political liberties).
5. An independent board of appeal in case of disputes (com-
posed of peers as far as possible).
6. A particular set of attitudes and values (a type of consci-
ousness) (Bernstein, 1976, p. 45).
In his book, Bernstein elaborates at some length upon each of the com-
ponents, illustrating with numerous examples the range of specific
mechanisms which lie between full and minimal democratization. For our
purposes, a brief review of each of these components should be suffici-
ent to introduce us to his model:
1. Participation in decision-making
. Bernstein begins by defining
a completely democratized organization:
. .
.the upward flow [of criticisms and suggestions] expands
to include the selection of the managers by the managed; in
such cases it equals or outweighs the downward flow of instruc-
tions and information from the managers to the managed. A
ci rcul ar pattern of authority is, therefore, said to exist in
fully democrati zed organizations, daily managerial authority
downward being balanced by employees' ultimate power to remove
the managers, plus employees' frequent upward input into
policy-making at almost every level (Bernstein, 1976
, p. 47).
In order to locate different systems of participation in the range be-
tween full and minimal democratization, Bernstein relies on three dimen-
sions :
1 . the degree of control employees enjoy over any single de-
cision
,
2. the issues over which that control is exercised, and
3. the organizational level at which it is exercised (Bern-
stein, 1976, p. 47)
.
49
2. Economic return
.
In his research Bernstein finds that one
crucial component supporting participation is "regular monetary feedback
to employees from the surplus that they themselves have produced" (Bern-
stein, 1976, p. 63). Important qualifications regarding this economic
return are: (1) that it be related to what workers themselves have pro-
duced; (2) that this return belong to the employees by right; (3) that
the return be made to the entire participating group, managers included;
(4) that it be separate from the basic wage; and (5) that the return be
frequent in order to inform employees of the immediate effects of their
efforts
.
3. Sharing management-level i nformation
. This third component is
also necessary for effective participation. Bernstein's research sug-
gests that "any degree of access.
. .that is less than guaranteed access
to the company books will not sustain democratization" (Bernstein, 1976,
p. 69). Given such a finding, the crucial factor underlying this com-
ponent then becomes the ability of employees to interpret and to act on
management-level information. Bernstein argues that although the devel-
opment of this expertise has often presented a major stumbling block to
democratization efforts in the past, employee training and certain struc
tural arrangements of employee representation have proven themselves to
be acceptable long-term solutions. Citing the past experiences of labor
unions, Bernstein also points to the use of employee-controlled techni-
cal assistance programs as a short-term solution for obtaining manageri-
al expertise prior to extensive employee training.
4. Guaranteed individual rights . The assurance that individuals
cannot be penalized for their participation is also crucial for the de-
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velopment of a democratized workplace:
Such acts as criticizing existing procedures or opposing pro-
posed policy changes could invite reprisals from management
or sometimes from fellow employees. Establishing workers'
councils (or some other structure for participation), or en-
suring full access to information will be worthless as long as
it is too risky to voice one's view because one is in the
minority, or because one can be penalized by persons in hiqher
positions of power. ...
Consequently, to be successful, democratization needs to
guarantee to its participants freedom of speech, assembly, pe-
tition of grievances, secret balloting in elections, due pro-
cess and the right of fair appeal in cases of discipline, im-
munity of workers' representatives from dismissal or transfer
while in office, and a written constitution alterable only by
majority or two-thirds vote of the full collective Bernstein,
1976, p. 75).
5. An independent judiciary
.
Although Bernstein's data show that
this component is seldom fully differentiated from legislative and exec
utive bodies in democratized firms, its three major functions remain
quite clear:
1. To settle infractions of the rules in a just manner;
2. To uphold and be the last-resort enforcer of basic rights;
and
3. To protect the by-laws (constitution) of the enterprise
from violation by any member, be he manager or managed
(Bernstein, 1976, p. 83)
.
6. A participatory-democratic consciousness . While admitting that
this particular component is undoubtedly the most difficult to specify,
Bernstein emphasizes the centrality of attitudes for the successful im-
plementation of all the other components and of democratization efforts
more generally. Basing his conclusions upon an integration of existing
research (including his own), Bernstein is able to isolate two primary
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factors which comprise a participatory-democratic consciousness: a re-
sistance to being manipulated; and an ability to create and organize
policies (Bernstein, 1976, p. 93). Phrasing these factors more general-
ly in behavioral terms — as a willingness to participate - he traces
the implications of a participatory-democratic consciousness for leader-
ship within the democratized organization. In particular, he focuses
upon the interplay of structural arrangements and attitudes necessary
to block the well
-documented tendencies of leaders to accumulate and
prolong the power granted to them.
Given this very basic introduction to Bernstein's model, we are now
in a position to briefly review its dynamics and also examine other com-
ponents which seem to facilitate the democratization process.
Bernstein's model in action. Although the practical mechanics of any
single component are often complex, the overall logic of Bernstein's
model is quite straightforward. For the process of democratization to
develop over time, there must be employee participation (1), but for
this participation to be meaningful, it must be linked directly and fre-
quently to the economic performance of the organization (2), and re-
quires that employees are supplied with both the appropriate information
and (increasingly) with the expertise to interpret it (3). Participa-
tion also requires that employees are protected from reprisals when
voicing their opinions (4), and that this protection is irrevocably
guaranteed by an independent judiciary system (5). And lastly, partici-
pation requires what Bernstein terms a participatory/democratic consci-
ousness. From this summary, we can begin to see the interdependence of
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the six components if any one is weak or lacking, then the process of
democratization decays. From Bernstein's perspective, the interactive
nature of his model can best be understood by focussing upon the effects
of the first five components upon the sixth one:
Regarded as a whole, the interdependence of the components
operates through a positive or reinforcing cycle and a nega-
tive or extinguishing cycle. The negative cycle.
. .is en-
tered if any of the initial five components are absent, or if
experience confronts employees with too many rejections of
their attempts at participation. The positive reinforcement
cycle.
.
.is entered when each of the five initial components
are added (and so long as they continue to function effective-
ly)
,
as well as when experience rewards employees with adop-
tions of their suggestions and criticisms.
The model reveals the important fact of simultaneity in
the dynamics of workplace management. Some past attempts to
democratize the workplace have failed because their implemen-
tors failed to realize this need and did not introduce enough
components at once. At other times, failure occurred because
the implementors assumed that attention to one component was
sufficient when in reality the readjustment or coordination of
several components at once is required (Bernstein, 1976
, pp.
112-113).
In addition to identifying the six necessary components for demo-
cratization, Bernstein's research also uncovered five other components
which are not essential for democratization, but do appear to facilitate
or advance the process:
1. Job-equalization
2. Status -equalization
3. Pay-equalization
4. Forbidding individual rewards, in favor of collective con-
sumption, and,
5. Abolishing private ownership (Bernstein, 1976 , p. 119).
Bernstein points out that the importance of these five additional compo-
nents lies in their ability to reinforce the sixth component -- consci-
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ousness
:
Rotation of jobs.
. .can foster attitudes of reciprocity
and equality, in particular, attitudes which we found neces-
sary for power-holders in a democratized firm.
Equalization of pay -- whereby all members receive the same
pay regardless of their task — goes even further in erasing
distinctions among participants. Differences in skill and re-
sponsibility are no longer taken as sufficient reason for dif-
ferences in personal income.
. . .
In a similar vein, some collectives think it is better to
distribute the surplus (that economic return which is above
the mini mum wage) in a group form rather than as payment to
individuals.
. . .
The argument behind this practice is that
individual payments weaken the consciousness component. They
break down group identity and group concern and foster selfish
motives with individualist orientations, which can interfere
with group activities required for participatory enterprise
and society.
. .(Bernstein, 1976
, p. 119).
From this view it should be evident that Bernstein's work in parti-
cular, and the workplace democratization movement more generally, have
immense value for those of us concerned with the creation of alternative
institutions. Bernstein's enumeration of both the necessary and facil-
itative factors underlying successful democratization efforts not only
points to specific functions and practices critical for the maintenance
of democratic workplaces, but also prods us to reconsider the develop-
ment of alternative institutions from a fresh perspective. And, as we
shall soon see, the most significant aspect of this perspective derives
from Bernstein's treatment of individual consciousness in the democra-
tization process.
Learning from Bernstein . In broad terms, the Bernstein model raises a
number of issues which are either neglected or oversimplified in the de-
velopmental scenario put forth by Holleb and Abrams (1975). The first
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of these issues concerns the absence of "earlier choices" for alterna-
tive institutions in the Holleb and Abrams model. Despite their recog-
nition that the lack of organizational structure consistent with consen-
sual/democratic ideals initially precipitates the process of bureaucra-
tization within alternative institutions, these authors provide few con-
crete clues that could point to ameliorative strategies. In this re-
gard, the Bernstein model is particularly appropriate.
Critical omissions
.
On the basis of the work of Holleb and Abrams
(1975) and others, it appears that alternative institutions often begin
with the intent of putting into practice some if not all of Bernstein's
facilitative components. In the process, however, they have failed to
lay the foundation of a democratic workplace as it is enumerated by
Bernstein's six necessary components. Of these six, only participation
seems to be considered at all; the other components are often absent or
only assumed to be present (e.g., a participatory/democratic conscious-
ness). The Holleb and Abrams scenario of bureaucratization suggests
that the most glaring omission is represented by the absence of the
third component -- sharing of management-level information. Without
formal mechanisms for communicating these vital data, participation
loses its meaning and an informal clique of managers soon promises to
become a formal contradiction within an alternative institution. Thus
we corne to see that Bernstein's model is a crucial one for alternative
institutions because it articulates the minimal internal conditions
wh i ch are necessary for the maintenance of a^ democrati c workplace . And
recognizing that some of these minimal conditions are often weak or
missing in emergent alternative institutions, we now have a much more
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substantial basis for comprehending the process of bureaucratization -
as the deterioration of an insufficiently democratic workplace. Such a
realization implies one obvious "earlier choice" for the members of
these organizations: that the minimal features of a democratic work-
place need to be put in place at the outset of an organization's devel-
opment, or some degree of bureaucratization will surely follow. In es-
sence, this choice is a refined version of the one pointed out by Free-
man (1972/1973): institute formal structure consistent with democratic
ideals, or suffer the "tyranny of structurelessness ." The advantage of
drawing this same conclusion from Bernstein's model, however, is that it
specifies in very concrete terms the elements which require translation
into formal structure. While the specific mechanisms for formalizing
each necessary component in alternative institutions may differ somewhat
from those appropriate to workplace democratization projects, there
should be little doubt that the functions represented by these compo-
nents do need to be replicated. Their importance, of course, is tied to
the last of Bernstein's necessary components -- a particular conscious-
ness
.
Relating structure and consciousness . What Bernstein identifies as
a participatory/democratic consciousness roughly parallels the notion of
political commitment which Holleb and Abrams single out as the critical
factor discriminating between alternative institutions which survive
bureaucratization and those which succumb to it. We should recall that
for Holleb and Abrams, the issue of political commitment is lodged sole-
ly at the individual level; political commitment is seen as unaffected
by both time and changing structural arrangements of work and decision-
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making. Within their view, alternative institutions can change the
source of bureaucratization only if the individuals populating them are
endowed with a sufficient amount of this single characteristic. Bern-
stein also focusses upon a single membership characteristic, but does
so in a much more sophisticated manner. The significance of his work
lies in the fact that it locates the issue of consciousness within the
structural realities of an organization and not just within individuals.
He argues convincingly that a participatory/democratic consciousness is
not only a requirement for the development of a democratic workplace,
but also highly dependent upon the successful operation of other struc-
tural features (his first five necessary components). Put quite simply,
Bernstein's model suggests that the quality and consequences of members'
past participation serve as major determinants of their future partici-
pation. It also suggests that a participatory/democratic consciousness
is not just a trait which individuals either have or do not have, but
rather that it is a characteristic which can be developed or discour-
aged, depending upon the experiences of individuals within an organiza-
tion. The central features of Bernstein's model, then, are: (1) that
it acknowledges the directional relationship between organizational
structure and consciousness -- that the ways in which our work is or-
ganized determines the ways in which we think about the organization of
our work; and (2) that it defines the structural conditions under which
the potential reciprocity of this relationship can be realized. In this
definition, of course, lies the essence of the democratization process
-- increasingly empowering those who work in organizations to decide how
that work is organized. The logic of Bernstein's model is not restricted
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to an analysis of workplace democratization, however, and hints at the
dynamic nature of bureaucratization in alternative institutions as well.
More specifically, this perspective suggests that bureaucratization rep-
resents a vicious circle of increasing non-participation. The informal
but conventional arrangements which emerge to get work done and deci-
sions made in the absence of formal democratic structures lead to a con-
centration of responsibility in fewer and fewer individuals within the
organization. This concentration may affect other members in ways which
diminish their willingness to participate -- their participation seems
increasingly unnecessary in certain work and decisions. Reduced parti-
cipation on the part of these members, of course, leads in turn to both
a rationale for conventional arrangements and an apparent need for more
of them. Such dynamics, of course, set the stage for the emergence of
informal "managers" within the organization. As Holleb and Abrams
(1975, p. 145) point out, these "managers" experience a growing tension
between the amount of responsibility which they are accumulating and
their lack of formal, recognized authority. Given the informal capacity
of such individuals to wield power in the organization, it does not seem
surprising that this tension is commonly resolved in ways that meet
thei
r
parti cul ar needs -- by increasingly formalizing the informal
structure which led to their empowerment in the first place, with clear-
cut but conventional roles, titles, procedures, and the like. In this
way we can appreciate how informal but conventional structures in alter-
native institutions can actually serve as the vehicles of their own in-
creasing formalization. Such a recognition, of course, highlights once
again the crucial importance of "earlier choices" for alternative insti-
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tuitions -- choices which translate consensual/democratic ideals into
formal organizational structure. While this analysis of bureaucratiza-
tion clearly underscores the appropriateness of the conceptual side of
Bernstein's model for alternative institutions, we at the same time can-
not accept his model's practical implications uncritically. It is es-
pecially important, then, that we recognize that differences between
workplace democratization projects and alternative institutions may
place very real limitations on the applicability of his model for our
purposes. Two such differences strongly suggest that alternative insti-
tutions may require some components in addition to the six set forth in
Bernstein's work.
Differences of setting and ambition
. While workplace democratiza-
tion projects in conventional firms are set against a backdrop of estab-
lished and ongoing structures of both decision-making and work, alterna-
tive institutions are created within settings which usually have no pre-
existing structural definition. Largely as a consequence of this dif-
ference, the two movements initially pursue somewhat different objec-
tives. Democratization projects place primary emphasis upon alterations
of the structure of decision-making, and focus less on the existing
structure of work itself -- the division of labor, the definitions of
jobs, and the conventional mechanisms of coordination. The hope, of
course, is that workers will in time learn to use their formal influ-
ence to change the structure of their work, instituting job-rotation,
job-sharing, group pay systems, and other innovations. This initial em-
phasis upon alterations in governance is clearly reflected in Bern-
stein's model of democratization. He places participation in decision-
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making in the most central role, but relegates changes in the structure
of work itself, such as job rotation, to the category of "facili tative
components"
- helpful, but not necessary at first. Within alternative
institutions, on the other hand, the initial objectives are much more
ambitious. These organizations are typically begun with the notion of
sharing both decision-making and work right from the start. Given such
objectives, we find Bernstein's model somewhat inadequate -- it lacks
structural components which address the issue of participation in shared
work arrangements. At the same time, however, the structural analysis
which serves as the basis of Bernstein's model does provide us with
clear hints about what these additional components might be. In essence,
the two questions raised by Bernstein about participation in decision-
making -- what structures define this activity, and what structures are
required to maintain it -- can also be asked in regard to participation
in shared work arrangements.
From the Holleb and Abrarns (1975) scenario, it is clear that the
deterioration of shared work arrangements in alternative institutions is
very similar to, and often intertwined with, the decay of participation
in decision-making. Without early formal structure which concretizes
ideals of shared work, an informal division of labor soon develops,
tending to place those members with more time, skills, and knowledge in
important organizational roles (Mansbridge, 1973). Given the increasing
involvement and familiarity of these individuals with the work of the
organization, they tend to displace the participation of other members,
further encouraging the development of informal hierarchy. In time, it
is usually these same individuals who emerge as the informal managers
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within an alternative institution, not only performing more work, but
because of their increasing expertise and access to information, playing
a proportionally larger role in decision-making as well.
Formal structure which merely defines shared work arrangements
(e.g., clear schedules of rotation, functional and public job descrip-
tions, etc.) represents only a partial corrective for this scenario,
however. Informal managers often emerge because they perform a crucial
kind of work generally overlooked by the members of alternative institu-
tions -- coordination. Committed to some form of consensual/democratic
decision-making, members often attempt to make all major decisions in
large meetings attended by the entire membership. Due to the inherent
constraints of time and energy, however, these meetings rarely can occur
frequently enough or last long enough to meet the decision-making needs
of the organization. What results, then, is a structural gap between
large group decision-making and the decision-making performed by members
in the context of their individual roles -- an intermediate step of de-
cision-making which most often involves the day-to-day coordination of
the organization. Actually a hybrid of work and decision-making, coor-
dination is absolutely critical for an organization to function effec-
tively. Circumstances and conditions frequently change on a daily ba-
sis, creating unique situations for which organizational policy is ei-
ther impractical or non-existent. If the members of alternative insti-
tutions wish to create organizations in which work is shared, then it
seems necessary for them to develop formal structures for sharing coor-
dination responsibilities as well — perhaps a slowly rotated coordinator
position, or a steering committee which meets on a regular basis. Fail-
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ure to create such a mechanism not only encourages the emergence of un-
appointed, informal managers, but also appears to start in motion a more
general cycle of non-participation within alternative institutions.
Atthesame time, alternative institutions could also benefit from
the examples set by larger democratic workplaces in the area of coordina
tion. In these organizations, coordination, administration and other
"management" functions are often performed by one or more individuals
who are either hired or elected by the members of an organization or
their representatives. Such a mechanism may appear initially to be at
odds with one characteristic listed in Holleb and Abrams 1 (1975) descrip
tion of consensual democracy : "administrative and maintenance work
shared by all staff." We must remember, however, that Holleb and
Abrams' model is based upon an examination of relatively small work or-
ganizations. What the workplace democratization literature demonstrates
is that the election or hiring of individuals to perform "management"
functions is consistent with other aspects of consensual democracy
, if
and only if these special positions exist within a larger formal frame-
work of member authority and control (e.g., a constitutional democracy).
In such cases, the power and responsibility of individuals performing
"management" functions is formally delegated by the members of an orga-
nization or their elected representatives. Consequently, it appears ap-
propriate to expand Holleb and Abrams' description of consensual demo-
cracy to include this possibility. By making this small change, the
consensual democracy label can be otherwise faithfully applied to those
alternative institutions which employ the mechanism of hiring or elect-
ing of individuals performing "management" functions as an important
62
feature of their system of member control.
Recalling Bernstein's analysis, however, we should recognize that
formal mechanisms for sharing work by themselves are probably insuffi-
cient — that additional structural components may be necessary in order
to maintain these arrangements once they have been put in place. Job
rotation schemes, for example, often falter because individuals are in-
adequately prepared for a periodic shift in work roles. Lacking the
appropriate training for their new roles, members are easily frustrated
by the long periods of adjustment that accompany each new transition.
Continuity suffers and important tasks are performed poorly, if at all.
Given such a situation, we can understand why members of alternative in-
stitutions often conclude that job rotation is an unworkable ideal and
reluctantly accept more conventional work arrangements. One structural
component obviously needed in this case is a mechanism for preparing
members for job and role transitions. Possible structures fulfilling
this function might include training prior to rotation, or partial rota-
tions, in which a person considering a new role has an extended oppor-
tunity to work under the guidance of the person currently holding this
position. Federations of food coops in the Northeast, for example,
presently encourage the use of both of these mechanisms in order to
train food co-op coordinators and new members of boards of directors.
Other structural arrangements supporting job rotation might include fi-
nancial incentives, such as pay scales which are based upon the number
of jobs or roles in the organization that an individual member has
learned, release-time for training, and so on.
In any event, it is clear that the ideal of shared work in alterna-
63
tive institutions requires at least two structural components in addi-
tion to the six set forth in Bernstein's model: (1) formal structures
for sharing work; and (2) formal structures which are essential in order
to maintain shared work arrangements once they are put in place, like
training programs or innovative incentive systems. One other major dif-
ference between alternative institutions and workplace democratization
projects suggests still more components, however.
Membership differences
. Alternative institutions are usually char-
acterized by a high rate of turnover or "transiency" among their members
(Rothschild-Whitt, 1976; Hershberger, 1973). As Bernstein and others
point out, workplace democratization projects, on the other hand, are
generally known for turnover rates which are low by conventional manu-
facturing standards, a feature which is commonly highlighted as one of
their major selling points within traditional industries. Given that
the rate at which individuals enter and exit differs in these two set-
tings, it appears that the task of developing and maintaining a democra-
tic workplace may differ somewhat as well.
Although Bernstein does discuss some examples of how democratized
firms integrate new employees, this area does not play a prominent role
in his model. And in light of the relatively low turnover rates in such
projects, their size and structure, this inattention appears to be sen-
sible. New employees are low in frequency, and when they do enter a
project, the formal mechanisms which bring about participation them-
selves serve as implicit vehicles of orientation and training. Within
a large manufacturing plant, for example, lower-level participation is
often direct, but a new employee is confronted by strong norms and the
64
influential role-models provided by experienced employees of long stand-
ing. Upper-level participation, however, usually entails representa-
tives elected throughout the plant. Due to the nature of the election
process, new employees are effectively blocked from taking on major re-
sponsibilities until they have demonstrated their worthiness to older
employees over a course of time. And lastly, plant-wide meetings in-
volve so many individuals that the potential impact of a new employee
who may not fully understand the nature of issues or their implications
is minimal
.
Within alternative institutions we usually find the opposite pic-
ture to be the case. The high rate of transiency in these organizations
produces a low density of experienced members who might serve as role-
models and often results in vague and shifting norms as well. The lack
of formalized structures of participation frequently combines with the
prevailing consensual/democratic ideals to create a situation in which
new members are expected to participate immediately in major policy de-
cisions affecting the organization without the requisite knowledge or
experience. And given the typically small size of these organizations,
a single vote or voice can often have a major effect upon the decision-
making process. Although some alternative institutions have attempted
to circumvent these difficulties by establishing trial periods in which
new members are not allowed voting privileges for a specified period of
time, such solutions have their own inherent limitations. First of all,
high turnover rates mitigate against long trial periods -- if trial
periods are too long, then the organization may soon consist primarily
of trial members, an obviously awkward situation. Secondly, long trial
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periods may act as a disincentive in attracting new members, making it
difficult to maintain the appropriate number of members. On a more gen-
eral level, the transiency of members also tends to weaken the relation-
ship between organizational structure and consciousness, in that members
may not be members long enough to be affected by the structures of work
and decision-making. In short, alternative institutions have a unique
need in terms of maintaining themselves as democratic organizations, a
need to integrate new members rapidly and effectively. Stepping back
from the issue of turnover for a moment, however, gives us an opportun-
ity to appreciate just how critical this need really is.
In addition to the degree of political commitment, Holleb and
Abrams (1975) mention two other factors which seem to precipitate
bureaucratization initially -- lack of organizational structure consis-
tent with democratic/ consensual ideals and external pressures for more
conventional internal arrangements. Due to the fact that Bernstein's
model is explicitly concerned with the internal conditions necessary to
maintain a democratic workplace, we found it most relevant to the first
of these factors -- the lack of appropriate structure. At the same
time, however, Bernstein does point out that external factors are most
likely to affect the consciousness component. More specifically, he
cites cultural norms, political climates, and the past organizational
experiences of participants as influences that can help or hinder the
development of a participatory/ democratic consciousness. These external
influences are quite different from those mentioned by Holleb and
Abrams. They argue that banks, funding sources and governmental agen-
cies exert pressures on alternative institutions for more conventional
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internal arrangements. Siding with Bernstein, however, I believe that
we can show that Holleb and Abrams may have overlooked the major influ-
ence which impinges upon alternative institutions - the constant flow
of new members into the organization
.
While the influx of new members into an alternative institution may
appear as solely an internal problem at first, it is important to recog-
nize that they are the most direct and frequent vehicle by which pres-
sures for more conventional arrangements enter an organization. Prob-
ably the most poignant example of this can be found in food cooperatives
when new members complain about the quality and quantity of produce as
if it were the co-op's problem and not theirs also. The message of
these complaints is quite clear — if the co-op cannot offer them bet-
ter service, they will take their business elsewhere. What these new
members are doing, however, is more than merely raising complaints —
they are acting on the basis of a buyer-seller relationship which is ap-
propriate in the supermarket but not appropriate within food coopera-
tives, where, in theory at least, members share responsibility and labor
in exchange for lower food prices. If continually confronted with such
complaints, older members, especially those most central to the co-op's
operations, may be drawn into the conventional relationships upon which
the complaints are predicated, acting more and more like the managers
of small retail stores where concerns about the competitiveness of a
produce line and about "pleasing the customer" are foremost. Analogous
examples can be found in every type of alternative institution. New
members, drawn by their ideals initially, enter these organizations act-
ing on the basis of past relationships, roles and assumptions. These
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actions, often representative of work and decision-making in convention-
al settings, start as external forces, but can quickly mesh with the
internal pressures which both bring about bureaucratization and then
maintain it. What this line of reasoning suggests, then, is that al-
ternative institutions may require an additional component or components
in order to maintain themselves as democratic workplaces - formal
structures whose function is the integration of new members and perhaps
the retention of older members as well. At the same time, however, we
may begin to ask how alternative institutions would ever become aware of
the need for such functions, or, more generally, how would these organi-
zations learn about their problems in ways that would lead to corrective
action. We should recall that in Holleb and Abrams 1 scenario, for exam-
ple, the members of alternative organizations were generally unaware
that bureaucratization was taking place until its latter stages. Such
a late discovery of organizational difficulties suggests that another
function may be of particular importance in alternative institutions --
one which assures an organizational level of consciousness in addition
to an individual one. Let us now move to a final body of literature
which focusses on this topic.
CHAPTER IV
THE NECESSITY OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING
I have collected a great many examples of organizations orinstitutions that have fallen on evil days because of theirfailure to renew themselves. And I want to place before you
two curious facts that I draw from those examples. First Ihaven't yet encountered an organization or institution that
wanted to go to seed or wanted to fall behind in the parade
Second, in every case of organizational decline that I know
anything about, there were ample warning signals long before
trouble struck. And I don't mean warning signals that only a
Monday-morning quarterback could discern. I mean that before
trouble struck there were observers who had correctly diag-
nosed the difficulties to come.
Now if there are plenty of warning signals, and if no or-
ganization really wants to go to seed, why does it ever happen?
The answer is obvious: eyes that see not, ears that hear not,
minds that deny the evidence before them. When organizations
are not meeting the challenge of change, it is as a rule not
because they can't solve their problems but because they won't
see their problems; not because they don't know their faults,
but because they rationali ze them as vi rtues or necessities
(Gardner, 1965)7
Gardner's observations are based upon conventional organizations
but are clearly relevant to alternative institutions as well. All or-
ganizations need to be able to recognize their difficulties and short-
comings if they are to formulate and then implement corrective actions;
in turn, they also need to be able to evaluate the effects of those cor-
rective actions. In short, organizations in general require mechanisms
for learning. As we can see from Gardner's comments, however, organi-
zational "learning" may often be divorced from the level of "individual"
learning. Individuals may have knowledge of impending problems (and
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even solutions) but are often inhibited if not prohibited from translat-
ing that knowledge from the individual to organizational levels.
The Concept
Argyris and Schbn (1978) have recently proposed a theory of organi-
zational "learning" in which they postulate relationships between indi-
vidual and organizational levels of learning. Central to their theory
is a distinction between the espoused theories and the actual theories-
in-use employed by individuals within an organization. Quite simply,
espoused theories are the system of beliefs which individuals claim is
the basis of their actions toward others, while theories-in-use are the
belief systems that can be inferred from their overt behavior in an or-
ganization; one's interpersonal theory versus one's interpersonal prac-
tice. While the details of Argyris and Schbn' s theory are somewhat com-
plex, it should suffice to say that they trace many of the problems of
contemporary organizations to discrepancies between espoused theories
and theories-in-use at the individual level (e.g., the participatory
theory but autocratic practice of top managers). These authors argue
that the quality of organizational learning is largely determined by the
quality of theories-in-use guiding the behavior of organizational mem-
bers. If, for example, the interpersonal theory-in-use of organization-
al members prevents them from recognizing discrepancies between their
own personal theory and practice, then their behavior within the organi-
zation creates conditions under which certain forms of organizational
learning cannot occur (i.e., they will probably be unable to confront
effectively similar organizational discrepancies of theory and practice)
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In this way the actual behavior and resulting learning styles of indi-
viduals combine to set real limits on the capacity of the organization
to learn as a whole.
Modes, of Organizational Learning
Drawing upon the distinction between espoused and in-use interper-
sonal theories, Argyris and Schbn argue that there are three distinct
varieties of organizational learning. The first, "single loop learn-
ing," refers to the process by which an organization becomes aware of
the discrepancies between its objectives and activities, makes adjust-
ments, and then assesses the effectiveness of those adjustments by re-
evaluating the match between objectives and activities. The authors
liken this form of organizational learning to the action of a thermostat
-- a simple feedback mechanism. And like a thermostat, single loop
learning is noted for its unreflecti veness ; it represents corrective
action which is based upon an unquestioned set of objectives, norms and
assumptions. As such, it is an inappropriate vehicle for examining dis-
crepancies between theory and practice at either the individual or or-
ganizational levels.
"Double loop learning," the second variety, represents organiza-
tional learning in which the objectives, norms and assumptions of an
organization are themselves open to scrutiny, alteration and re-evalua-
tion. While Argyris and Schon note that most organizations are current-
ly incapable of employing this learning mode in a sustained way, Argyris
does point out elsewhere that double loop learning does often emerge
quite effectively during times of extreme organizational crisis, when
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the stakes are high and honesty is unavoidable (Argyris, 1976, p. 373).
Drawing upon a number of examples taken from a range of organizations,
Argyris and Schbn built a strong case for double-loop learning as a way
of preventing organizational difficulties from reaching crisis propor-
tions. In their view, the major preconditions for this form of organi-
zational learning lie in the capacity of individuals within the organi-
zation who hold "enlightened" espoused theories of interpersonal behav-
ior to translate these espoused theories consistently into actual behav-
ior. As we might expect, Argyris and Schbn argue that the route to ef-
fective double-loop learning usually demands extensive behavioral train-
ing of individuals and groups most influential in decision-making within
an organization.
And lastly, Argyris and Schbn mention briefly a third variety of
organizational learning which they label as "deutero learning," a term
which they borrow from Bateson (1972). This mode represents a step be-
yond double-loop learning and occurs when an organization engages in
learning about the ways in which it learns, subjecting these modes once
again to evaluation, alteration, and re-evaluation. For our purposes,
however, the distinction drawn by these authors between single-loop and
double-loop learning is most crucial.
Organizational Learning in A1 ternati ve Institutions
While Argyris and Schbn argue that most conventional organizations
could definitely employ double-loop learning to their advantage, it ap-
pears that for alternative institutions this mode of organizational
learning is absolutely essential. Learning which examines, modifies,
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and re-examines organizational objectives, norms and assumptions lies
at the very heart of the task of creating alternative institutions. As
Herbst (1976) points out, those who attempt to create alternative insti-
tutions can only succeed if they can escape from the basic assumptions
which generate the logic of bureaucratic hierarchy:
In the case of bureaucratic hierarchical organizations an at-
tempt to move out of this system may be perceived as going in
the direction of the opposite, that is a chaotic unstructured
state. Alternatively transition from say a centralized to a
decentralized system produces the converse without necessarily
changing the basic mode of operation of the organization.
Here again then, the process of social change can become locked
within and unable to go beyond the inherent organizational
logic. The steps required to find a way out are to: (1) iden-
tify the basic assumptions which generate the organizational
logic; (2) search for an alternative set of assumptions; and
(3) derive the characteristics of alternative types of organi-
zation (Herbst, 1976, p. 30).
The deliberately reflective activity outlined by Herbst can only occur
through what Argyris and Schbn define as double-loop learning. Further-
more, the absence of this type of organizational learning appears to be
a central feature of the developmental scenario of alternative institu-
tions depicted by Holleb and Abrams (1975). Within their sample, the
progression of the bureaucratization process is marked by organizational
inattention -- members appear as if they are largely unaware of the in-
creasing bureaucratization of their own organization. Recalling Gard-
ner's (1965) comments, however, we may suspect that this apparent lack
of awareness in fact represents the inability of members to express in
a public way their doubts and criticisms regarding the match of organi-
zational theory and practice. According to Holleb and Abrams, the con-
tradiction between consensual /democratic values and an increasingly
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bureaucratic structure continues unexamined until its blatantness preci-
pitates a major organizational crisis. Quite in keeping with Argyris'
view, then, the alternative institutions which move towards consensual
democrac
.y
d0 so onl y after a crisis which brings about an examination
and modification of organizational objectives, norms and assumptions.
What such an analysis suggests, of course, is the necessity of deliber-
ate double-loop learning much earlier in the development of alternative
institutions. Put in other terms, we might say that double-loop learn-
ing represents another "earlier choice" for alternative institutions.
While Argyris and Schon's diagnosis of the need for double-loop learning
may be appropriate for alternative institutions, however, their correc-
tive strategy can be shown to be quite inappropriate.
In their analysis, Argyris and Schon pinpoint individual shortcom-
ings as the cause of deficits in organizational learning; thus by train-
ing influential individuals to act and think in new ways, organizational
learning can be qualitatively improved. The key phrase here, of course,
is "influential individuals." As Argyris and Schon make quite clear,
this training in conventional organizations focusses primarily upon the
chief executive officers and the next one or two layers of top manage-
ment. The authors defend this practice on the basis of what they claim
to be the structural realities of conventional organizations -- that
significant change, if it is to be effectively sanctioned throughout an
entire organization, must begin with the top. In short, Argyris and
Schon's strategy takes conventional structural arrangements for granted
and focusses instead upon changing the individuals within them. What
these authors overlook, of course, is the likelihood that it is these
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very "structural realities" which inhibit double-loop learning in the
first place. The superior-subordinate relationship, because it sepa-
rates the work to be done from the decisions to be made about that work,
obviously creates a climate in which the structure of authority prohi-
bits goals, norms, and assumptions from being questioned or openly dis-
cussed in the first place. In some ways, then, Argyris and SchSn's
analysis reminds us of Holleb and Abrams' (1975) interpretation of the
role of political commitment in alternative institutions: individual
characteristics are seen as the key to organizational renewal, and the
relationship between organizational structure and individual character-
istics is ignored. While this similarity points to obvious shortcomings
in Argyris and Schon's strategy for encouraging double-loop learning in
conventional organizations, it also hints at the ways in which such
learning might be encouraged in alternative institutions.
The capacity and willingness of alternative institutions to cre-
atively alter their own internal structures suggests that the route to
double-loop learning within these organizations is markedly different
than the route proposed by Argyris and Schon. Given this inherent
structural flexibility, it appears that the equivalent of double-loop
learning can be brought about in alternative institutions by means of
formal structures which, over time, have the effect of "training" the
individual members of an organization. In my own experience, the cre-
ation of formal structures consistent with this end typically occurs
relatively late in the development of alternative institutions, if it
occurs at all, and is often incomplete. For example, some alternative
institutions formalize this reflective function to a degree by creating
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roles which are explicitly concerned with group process. Organizations
may begin large meetings with the assignment of both a chairperson and
a "process-person"; the expectation is that the chairperson will attend
to the content of the meeting, while the process-person will attend to
the concurrent group process, offering corrective comments and sugges-
tions. This "process" role is usually rotated among members from meet-
ing to meeting, but may also be formally assigned to one individual or
group on a continuing basis. The effect of such a role is to legitimize
the raising of issues regarding the meeting's goals, objectives, norms
and assumptions, in ways which often profoundly influence the quality
and direction of the meeting. Rarely does this role extend beyond meet-
ings, however, and thus larger but parallel issues of organizational
process frequently go unexamined. I am aware of only one organization
in which the "process" role is more broadly and formally defined to in-
clude issues of organizational process. In this case, one paid staff
position is explicitly allocated for a person who attends to group and
organizational process, and their relationship to organizational goals.
The individual who fills this position is expected to raise larger is-
sues for the organization particularly in the area of goal redefinition;
not to do so would be seen as a failure to adequately perform his or her
job. From this singular example it is possible to see one route to
creating formal structures which encourage double-loop learning within
alternative institutions: the domain of the "process" role is expanded
beyond the boundaries of meetings in themselves and then formalized as
an actual position within the organization.
Sarason (1972) points to a similar structure for formalizing re-
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flective functions in alternative institutions. Concerned with the more
general problem of "the creation of new settings," and then maintaining
them, Sarason suggests that unreflective tendencies can also be coun-
tered by a critic who is external to the organization but nonetheless
a formal appendage of it:
By external critic I refer to someone (or a group) who
at the earliest time possible, accepts the task of understand-
ing the responding to the purposes and values of the setting,
the consistency between words and actions, and the sources of
actual and potential problems. He is not a member of the set-
ting. He is an outsider, independent, knowledgeable about,
and sympathetic to the purposes of the setting. He makes a
long-term commitment and regularly spends time in the setting
in whatever ways he deems necessary to gain knowledge and un-
derstanding. His relationship to the setting is based on
agreement that his task is to contrast the reality as he sees
it with the way those in the setting see it, that his goal is
not to be loved or admired, and that his remuneration will not
depend on the cheeriness of his perceptions. He paints real-
ity as he sees it. He has no responsibilities except to ob-
serve, study, report. He is not someone who waits for problems
to be brought to him; he seeks them out. His obligation is
not to any individual, but to the purposes and values of the
setting (Sarason, 1972, p. 250).
Internal process roles and external critics clearly do not exhaust the
possible arrangements by which alternative institutions can formalize
reflective organizational learning. Other possible modes might include
study groups, structures for conducting formative research, or even
regularly scheduled meetings or retreats whose sole purpose is organi-
zational reflection. More important than the actual arrangements, how-
ever, is the way in which reflective organizational learning can be in-
tegrated into a larger scheme of organizational development for alter-
native institutions.
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Torbert 's Model
Building on Erikson's (1959) stage theory of individual development
and his own experiences within an alternative education program, Torbert
(1974/1975) has proposed an eight-stage model of organizational develop-
ment which is applicable to conventional organizations and alternative
institutions alike. As the title of his model suggests - "Pre-bureau-
cratic and post-bureaucratic stages of organizational development" —
Torbert conceives of alternative institutions as attempts to move beyond
the stage of development of which bureaucratic hierarchy is but one com-
mon example. In his view, then, alternative institutions represent the
attempt to create qualitatively different forms of organization rather
than merely oppositional ones. A brief outline of the characteristics
of the first six stages of his model helps us to appreciate this point:
Stage I -- Fantasies
(a) Dreams, fantasies about future, initial visions;
(b) informal conversations with friends, work associates;
(c) diffuse collaboration -- discussing or working with
others on occasional, related projects to explore
shared interests;
(d) episodic exploration of varied parts of the social
environment to see how they relate to fantasies,
where opportunities exist, what potential consequences
of action would be.
Stage II -- Investments
(a) Organizers make definite commitment of enterprise;
(b) "parent" organizations make financial, structural,
spiritual commitments to nurture;
(c) early relationship-building among potential leaders,
members, clients, advisors;
(d) leadership style negotiated;
(e) issues arise about the validity, reliability, and
depth of the various personal and institutional corn-
mi tments
.
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Stage III -- Determinations
(a) Specific goals, clients, staff, members determined
(hiring, admissions);
(b) recognizable physical territory delineated;
(c) first common tasks and time commitments;
(d) psychological contracts between parties and organiza-
tion defined implicitly or explicitly;
(e) persistence-unity exhibited in face of perceived pri-
vation or threat.
Stage IV -- Experiments
Alternative legal, governing, administrative, physical,
production, communication, planning, scheduling, celebra-
tory, and/or interpersonal structures-processes practiced
(modeled, role-played), tested in operation and reformed.
Stage V -- Predefined productivity
(a) Focus on doing the predefined task;
(b) viability of product = single criterion of success;
(c) standards and structures taken for granted (often
formalized, institutional ized);
(d) roles stabilized, job descriptions written;
(e) effort to quantify results based on defined standards;
(f) reality conceived of as dichotomous and competitive:
success-failure, leader-follower, legitimate-illegi-
timate, work-play, reasonable-emotional.
Stage VI -- Openly chosen structure
(a) Shared continual reflection about larger (wider,
deeper, more long term, more abstract) purposes of
the organization;
(b) development of open interpersonal process, with dis-
closure, support and confrontation on value-stylistic-
emotional issues;
(c) evaluation of effects of own behavior on others in
organization and formative research on effects of
organization on environment ("social accounting");
i.e., determining whether abstract purposes are being
realized in practice;
(d) direct facing and resolution of paradoxes: freedom
versus control, expert versus participatory decision-
making, etc.;
(e) creative, trans-conventional solutions to conflicts;
(f) organizational his-story becomes my-story [individuals
integrate organizational history with personal his-
tory]
(g) deliberately chosen structure with commitment to it,
over time, the structure unique in the experience of
the participants or among "similar" organizations;
(h) primary emphasis on horizontal rather than vertical
role differentiation;
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0) development of symmetrical rather than subordinate
relation with "parent" organization;
(J J gaining of distinctive public repute based on the
quality of collective action within the organization
(Torbert, 1974/1975, pp. 5-6).
Torbert's model does include two more stages, but they are largely irrel-
evant to our attempt to see how both conventional bureaucratic organi-
zations and alternative institutions are placed within his framework.
From Torbert's perspective, bureaucratic hierarchy "emerges as a
pathological expression of the 'predefined productivity' stage of orga-
nizational development" (Torbert, 1974/1975, p. 8). Torbert uses the
label, "pathological," because of the apparent inability of bureaucratic
hierarchy to address effectively either the particular needs of individ-
uals within it or changing external pressures:
. .
.the bureaucratic system cannot respond creatively to
these disequilibria
.
It is open only at the behavioral level
and not at the structural level. That is, it can take in new
inputs, plants, or personnel and produce some product or serv-
ice for the environment and it can expand its present struc-
ture, but it has no built-in process for restructuring the
quality of its goals and roles. It does not possess the 'ul-
trastabili ty
'
necessary to sacrifice a given structure without
chaos (Calwal lader, 1968). Consequently it tends to ignore
disequilibria, or to respond inappropriately, or to undergo a
traumatic crisis, or, the most recent popular tactic, to devel-
op a leadership which attempts to leapfrog over crises by con-
glomerating organizations (Torbert, 1974/1975, p. 7).
Torbert then goes on to link this form of organizational behavior with
behavior at the group and individual levels, much like Argyris and Schon
(1978):
The tendency of bureaucratic organizations toward struc-
tural closedness can be illustrated by observing in a micro-
scopic way how people characteristically work and make deci-
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cisions together. A decision-making process that reflects
structural closedness can be one which does not explicitly
acknowledge and experiment with alternative possible ways of
structuring problems, nor with alternative value systems that
alternative structures presuppose, and which does not confront
openly and resolve the emotional commitment, and reactions of
various participants to such alternatives. ... A decision-
making process reflecting structural closedness would also
create a climate encouraging conformity to implicit values of
the unexamined structure (Torbert, 1974/1975, pp. 7-8).
Alternative institutions, on the other hand, represent in Torbert's
view the attempt to move from "Predefined productivity" to the next
stage, "Openly chosen structure." Comparing the characteristics of
these two stages, we find that one major element absent in the former,
but noticeably present in the latter, is deliberate and reflective
learning on both individual and organizational levels. According to
Torbert, an organization in the "Openly chosen structure" stage is
"structured as to make goal reconsideration and redefinition of roles
and role relations a matter of regular, consensual negotiation. . ."
(1974/1975, p. 8). Put in Argyris and Schbn's (1978) terms, then, we
find that "Predefined productivity" is characterized by single-loop
learning alone, while "Openly chosen structure" also incorporates
double-loop learning. Examining the characteristics of "Openly chosen
structure" more closely, we can see that this stage parallels in a more
general way Holleb andAbrams 1 (1975) consensual democracy stage. There
is one major discrepancy between the two stages, however. While the de-
scription of consensual democracy does allude to structures for individ-
ual learning, it fails to mention organizational learning as spelled out
in characteristics (a) and (c) of "Openly chosen structure": "shared
continual reflection about larger purposes of the organization"; and
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"evaluation of organizational effects with regard to abstract purposes."
Torbert describes the essential nature of these two characteristics as
well as the eight others in terms very similar to those used by Bern-
stein (1976) in picturing the fully democratized workplace:
According to this stage theory, the ten characteristics of
Openly chosen structure' are mutually consistent with one an-
other and reinforce one another, creating a qualitatively dif-
ferent kind of structure or gestalt from the 'Predefined pro-
ductivity' kind of structure. If only some of the character-
istics of 'Openly chosen structure' are implemented, then the
organization will be unstable and will tend to regress back
to 'Predefined productivity.' At the same time, it would ob-
viously be a contradiction in terms to impose an 'Openly chosen
structure.' Indeed, what begins to become evident in the tran-
sition to 'Openly chosen structure' is that organizational
structures are precisely not external realities which can be
imposed, but rather internal realities which are either shared
or not shared (Greenfield, 1973). To say that 'Openly chosen
structure' is a qualitatively different kind of structure from
'Predefined productivity' is to say that persons come to
think, feel and behave in qualitatively different ways in such
an organization (Torbert, 1974/1975, p. 20).
In Torbert's thinking about alternative institutions, then, we see at
least one element shared with Bernstein's (1976) treatment of workplace
democratization. Torbert clearly argues for the simultaneity of the ten
characteristics of "Openly chosen structure" as a prerequisite for es-
tablishing a durable organization at this stage. Bernstein, of course,
used a similar argument to explain the conditions under which his seven
necessary components would lead to a fully democratized organization.
Despite Torbert's conceptual sophistication, however, his model leaves
much to be desired.
Evaluating Torbert's model . In terms of its practical application, Tor-
bert's model is not as useful as Bernstein's (1976), or even Holleb and
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Abrams' (1975). Little is said about other specific organizational con-
ditions which bring about a transition from "Predefined productivity" to
"Openly chosen structure." Similarly, Torbert provides few hints as to
the shape of formal structures which might produce the ten characteris-
tics he lists as essential to "Openly chosen structure." In addition,
Torbert's stage model suggests that alternative institutions need to
pass through some form of "Predefined productivity" while on their way
to "Openly chosen structure," but is somewhat vague about how this might
occur. While he does intimate that the organization need not be bureau-
cratic in form while in the "Predefined productivity" stage, he at the
same time fails to specify what other forms might be substituted. On a
more positive note, Torbert does identify organizational learning, par-
ticularly the double loop variety, as a structural feature which is
critical to the successful continuation of alternative institutions.
Without such a feature, according to Torbert, an alternative institution
will tend to "regress" back to a more conventional form of organization
typical of the "Predefined productivity" stage.
Summari zing Organizational Learning
Considering Torbert's work in conjunction with that of the other
authors reviewed in this chapter, it appears that we have identified
another variety of structural components necessary to keep alternative
institutions alternative -- those which ensure continued, shared reflec-
tion about an organization's goals and their relationship to both group
and organizational process. While this conclusion can be derived some-
what indirectly from the work of Argyris and Schbn (1978), Herbst
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(1976), and Sarason (1972), only Torbert (1974/1975) makes the case
straightforwardly. In addition, we have also seen that structural com-
ponents concerned with organizational learning are undoubtedly the least
concrete of those components discussed so far. Except for a few inno-
vative examples, the particular shape of structural arrangements neces-
sary for organizational learning is at this point still somewhat
clear. Still, we remain convinced of the necessity of the functions
which such arrangements represent. Given that we have seen the need for
organizational learning and placed this need within a developmental con-
text, it is now appropriate to place this particular component within
a larger, integrated structure for examining how to keep alternative
institutions alternative.
un- !
CHAPTER V
A RECAPITULATION
At this point, we have covered a considerable amount of territory
in attempting to gain some perspective on the central problem of keeping
alternative institutions alternative. A very brief summary of both the
literature considered and the accompanying analyses not only crystalizes
the essential elements of the preceding chapters, but also provides us
with an integrated view of the several structural components we have
di scussed
.
Revi ew
The work of Holleb and Abrams (1975) represents a singular attempt
to develop a detailed model of organizational development which is di-
rectly relevant to alternative institutions. The central feature of
their model is that it focusses primary attention upon the problem of
bureaucratization, the tendency of alternative institutions to slowly
replicate the bureaucratic and hierarchical structures which they ori-
ginally set out to avoid. The Holleb and Abrams model, despite its de-
scriptive generality, however, falls short on two counts. First of all,
the authors confuse a description of past organizational development
with a prescription for the future. By viewing bureaucratization as a
"basic step" of organizational development for alternative institutions,
their model precludes earlier attempts to maintain the "al ternati veness"
of these organizations. And secondly, their identification of members'
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political commitment as the single critical factor in the recovery from
bureaucratization provides a poor basis for predicating corrective stra-
tegies. Holleb and Abrams' person-centered interpretation of bureaucra-
tization not only ignores the possible effects of organizational struc-
ture over time, but also directs our attention away from structural so-
lutions to the problem. Bernstein's (1976) model of workplace democra-
tization points to a more sophisticated interpretation of bureaucratiza-
tion by emphasizing the relationship between organizational structure
and individual consciousness. In addition, his model specifies the
structural components which are necessary for maintaining a democratized
workplace, components often overlooked in alternative institutions.
From Bernstein's work it is possible for us to develop a sense of
bureaucratization as a dynamic process, understanding it as the inter-
play between members' declining participation in work and decisions,
and the increasingly conventional structure of the organization. Close
examination of the differences between workplace democratization pro-
jects and alternative institutions, however, suggests that the latter
may require structural components in addition to those described by
Bernstein, particularly in the areas of work organization and integra-
tion of new members. Focussing upon the work of Argyris and Schon
(1978), Sarason (1977), and that of Torbert (1974/1975), we can also
appreciate the unique requirements for organizational learning which
exist within alternative institutions. This literature points to yet
another formal structural component which appears necessary for the con-
tinued survival of these organizations. What emerges from the past
three chapters is more than a review of the relevant literature,
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however.
An Integration
On the basis of the literature, analysis and personal experiences
related in the past three chapters, we can begin to see the outlines of
a larger analytic framework for both conceptualizing and addressing the
problem of keeping alternative institutions alternative. In attempting
to identify and understand the forces which contribute to the bureaucra-
tization process, we have also generated a set of structural components
which point to specific areas of critical "early choices" for alterna-
tive institutions. These components fall into three general categories:
(1) Formal structures of work and decision-making consistent with
con sensual /democratic ideals. The need for formalized vehicles for
sharing work and decision-making is mentioned by Holleb and Abrams
(1975) and underscored as essential by both Bernstein (1976) and Freeman
(1972/1973). The absence of such structures creates a vacuum which in-
vites the reappearance of informal but more conventional arrangements,
the first step in the bureaucratization process. Such formal structures
are important not only because they define primary organizational activ-
ities in a public way, but also because their formality tends to make
any alterations of decision-making or work structures a deliberate (and
also formal) activity. Ranging from decision-making procedures to sche-
dules of job rotation, these arrangements are the consensual/democratic
counterparts of much of what is commonly considered to be organizational
structure in conventional organizations.
(2) Formal structures of maintenance. As Bernstein's (1976) work
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makes clear, structures of shared decision-making and work will decay if
other structural components are not also in place. In particular, Bern-
stein points to structural components which: connect participation in
work and decisions to the economic performance of the organization; pro-
vide "management" level information and expertise to members; insure in-
dividual political rights; and guarantee a fair resolution of disputes.
Recognizing the differences between alternative institutions and demo-
cratization projects, it also became clear that alternative institutions
may require formal structures in addition to those detailed by Bern-
stein. Given shared work arrangements in alternative institutions, such
as job rotation, we saw the need for formal training structures. And
finally, due to the high rate of member turnover in most alternative in-
stitutions, we also recognized the need for formal structures concerned
with the integration of new members into these organizations. Formal
structures of maintenance are critical to alternative institutions be-
cause they directly address the question of how to preserve consensual/
democratic forms of organization once they have been created.
(3) Formal structures of organizational learning . Torbert's
(1974/1975) model of organizational development suggests that alterna-
tive institutions must engage in deliberate, continued reflection re-
garding their goals, norms and assumptions, a type of learning which
Argyris and Schbn (1978) argue is conspicuously absent in conventional
organizations. Pressed by what an organization is doing, members of
alternative institutions can easily neglect how the organization is per-
forming, unless this activity is formalized as an ongoing activity. Fo-
cussing largely upon both group and organizational process and their re-
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lationship to organizational goals, these formal components may range
from process-observer roles to formative research or evaluation within
alternative institutions.
In essence, these three categories outline first-order, second-
order, and third-order varieties of formal organizational structure
which appear necessary to keep alternative institutions alternative.
In the simplest terms, the first spells out the modes of sharing work
and decision-making; the second variety is necessary to maintain the
first over time; and the third provides the means of examining the ef-
fectiveness of the first two as well as itself. While it is obviously
possible that other categories may need to be considered at a later
point, and that even these three may need some reordering, we neverthe-
less are provided with a more concrete basis for considering both the
problem of bureaucratization within alternative institutions and at-
tempts to counter it. The organizations examined by Holleb and Abrams
(1975), for example, initially lacked formal structural components in
all three categories. The onset of bureaucratization was marked by a
growing reliance upon conventional structures of work and decision-mak-
ing, the absence of maintenance structures and also by a general lack of
awareness (or admission) that anything was amiss. The organizations
which recovered from bureaucratization moved in the direction of con-
sensual democracy
, a stage of development which was characterized by
formal structures of work and decision-making, an emphasis upon mainten-
ance structures, and some concern for organizational learning.
Thus the three categories of structural components not only point
to areas of "early choices" for alternative institutions, but also rep-
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resent a paraphrasing of Holleb and Abrams' cojisensual democracx stage
in more structural terms. In this way these three categories frame both
an "ideal" for alternative institutions and also the means for obtaining
it. The important question at this point, however, centers around the
question of creating a method of action-research which incorporates this
larger analytic structure in examining the central problem of bureau-
cratization in alternative institutions.
CHAPTER VI
METHOD
Consideration both of the shortcomings of previous research and of
action-research strategies in previous chapters provides us with general
guidelines for conceptualizing how research concerned with bureaucrati-
zation in alternative institutions should proceed. The research should
be consistent with and directed at intervention activity which produces
three levels of knowledge: (1 ) knowledge regarding alternative institu-
tions generally; (2) knowledge internal to the organizations participat-
ing within the research; and (3) knowledge for the interventionist. In
addition, the research should be comparative, descriptive and analytic.
The research relationship should be a collaborative one, in that the re-
sources of the interventionist and the participating organizations
should be brought together in ways that ensure mutual control and bene-
fit throughout the research process. And lastly, the method of research
itself should emerge from the organizational phenomena under considera-
tion rather than being applied to them. The task of this chapter is to
further elaborate a method research which is consistent with these pre-
scriptions, but which also weds them to a logical system of inquiry.
The first step, however, is to examine some of the unique constraints
which affect research directed at intervention activity within organiza-
tions.
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Jhe Inte ryen ti on i st/ Researcher Dijemma
For the interventionist concerned with developing a more systematic
understanding of both bureaucratization in alternative institutions and
its contributing factors, conventional models of organizational research
are problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, these models
commonly presume that the research problem itself is well-defined:
. .
.the researcher is bound to start out with a set of
precisely pre-formul ated hypotheses. He then specifies the
variables he plans to measure: independent, dependent and
moderating. He develops measures of these variables and car-
ries out statistical analyses of the relationships found. He
concludes with statements regarding the confirmation or rejec-
tion of particular hypotheses.
. .(Whyte, 1976, p. 50).
As Whyte (1976) points out, this model is appropriate only
Where the researcher is on familiar territory, where the
variables are readily measurable, and where the variables one
can measure are also important.
. .(Whyte, 1976, p. 50).
Given the current state of our knowledge regarding bureaucratization in
alternative institutions, this research model is unsuitable largely be-
cause we are unable to specify "important" variables in the first place.
Although the degree of bureaucratization in an alternative institution
can be viewed as a major dependent variable, at this point we have only
the broad outlines of the categories of other variables that may affect
it. While conventional modes of social research often overlook the pro-
cess by which independent and moderating variables are initially con-
ceived (Knight, 1976), research which is concerned with organizational
intervention cannot afford such an oversight (Podgorecki
,
1975). From
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an interventionist perspective the only real "tests" of the potency of
factors which contribute to or inhibit the course of bureaucratization
are interventions which are predicated upon these factors (Argyris,
1970; Levinson, 1972). In these "real life" interventions, of course,
the stakes are quite high. The well-being of an organization and the
individuals within it, as well as the credibility of the intervention-
ist, all rest upon the adequacy of the factors considered within the in.
tervention. Consequently, the selection of critical variables for both
understanding and changing organizations constitutes an element of re-
search whose importance cannot be overlooked.
Secondly, the actual conduct of conventional organizational re-
search often mitigates against its useful application. As pointed out
at some length in previous chapters, research directed at intervention
must be able to identify parameters of a problem which are amenable to
alteration by the members of an organization. But there are other con-
straints, as well. To use an extreme example, we might consider a meti
ciulous longitudinal study of alternative institutions which takes ten
years to complete. Although this research may generate a host of valid
answers to the problem of bureaucratization, many of the organizations
for which the research was intended may either have disappeared or
changed drastically by the time the research results are eventually
available. The tension between conventional research methods and the
demands for workable answers to organizational difficulties also plays
itself out in another related way:
The technology of rigorous research works best when it
does not deal with real-time issues -- for example, when
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scholars take years to study a decision that took several
hours to make. This technology of rigorous research is based
upon diagnostic techniques that ignore or cannot cope with
the properties of effective action under real-time conditions-
data may have to be ignored, feedback from the environment may
be unavailable, and self-fulfilling prophecies may need to be
accepted — they may, indeed, be the essence of action (Arqv-
ris and Schon, 1974, p. 4).
The demands of real-time practicality arise not only from the in-
terventionist, but also from the client organizations who are justifi-
ably concerned about the benefits of investing time and effort in solv-
ing organizational problems. While in conventional research, partici-
pants are often "hired" to work for the researcher, within intervention
activity, the situation is generally reversed. The interventionist who
also wishes to conduct ongoing research may find client organizations
placing very real limits on the amount of time members of an organiza-
tion can devote to combined intervention and research efforts as a
whole, and when they can devote it. Consequently the interventionist
can often find that his or her ability to gather information is subor-
dinated to more pressing concerns of the organization. In addition, the
scope of the information-gathering is frequently restricted by its per-
ceived relevance to intervention activity. To complicate matters even
more, the organization usually determines in large part the timing of
both intervention and research, according to expected and unexpected
fluctuations of activity within the organization itself. Thus an inter-
ventionist is often "on call" with a particular organization, waiting
for the organization to either find some slack time or accord his or
her efforts a higher priority. The end result, of course, is that the
accumulation of cases relevant to the interventionist's interests occurs
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much more slowly than within conventional organizational research.
The fact that organizations often "hire" an interventionist can
have other major consequences for research activity as well. One possi-
bility is that this relationship leads to a redefinition of the direc-
tion and intent of the research itself. In alternative institutions,
for example, there is often interest in how and why bureaucratization
occurs, but the real concern revolves around attempts to inhibit or al-
ter its course. Fortunately, this present research effort casts the
problem in a way which is amenable to either emphasis — by pointing to
structural features whose absence seems to precipitate bureaucratization
and whose presence at the same time suggests corrective strategies.
Another major consequence of the interventionist/client relation-
ship revolves around the issue of sampling. While the conduct of con-
ventional research commonly requires the "selection of a proper sample",
the interventionist/researcher usually finds the sample itself doing the
selecting. True, different types of cases can be sorted out after the
fact, but the initial pool of organizations is largely self-defined.
Although this situation may create a "sample" in ways which are seen as
undesirable from the perspective of conventional research methods, it
nevertheless has certain benefits for research aimed at improving inter-
vention. Since it is usually the organization that contacts the inter-
ventionist, there is generally some reassurance that its members acknow-
ledge the need for self-examination. In this way, certain research ef-
forts can become a recognized and justifiable part of the solicited in-
tervention activity. From the interventionist's perspective, the self-
selection of organizations can in fact create a viable sample. In the
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case of alternative institutions, for instance, the sample may not be
characteristic of all alternative institutions, but is probably repre-
sentative of those alternative institutions which are concerned enough
about the state and direction of their "al ternati veness" to seek outside
assistance. For the interventionist who works with alternative institu-
tions, of course, this is precisely the population of concern - re-
search promises to benefit both the interventionist and the organiza-
tions in question by improving the quality of the intervention activity.
The notion of "sample" for the interventionist/researcher has at
least one other related characteristic as well. Until the intervention-
ist stops intervening, the "sample" remains open-ended. The research
which accompanies intervention by necessity must be able to guide future
intervention activity, but at the same time remain open to constant ad-
justment and refinement as new cases emerge and old cases become clear-
er. Due to the amount of time and energy required by intervention ac-
tivity, cases accumulate slowly; and furthermore, the time-lag between
intervention itself and the point at which its effectiveness can be
evaluated creates a climate of tentati veness regarding results and con-
clusions. In this sense, the research activity which accompanies inter-
vention is always formative in nature -- the seminal study based upon
intervention research is virtually an impossibility. While it is rea-
sonable to set arbitrary bounds on a given number of cases in order to
come to preliminary conclusions, it is essential that the research
method which is coupled to intervention activity also provides a sys-
tematic basis for including new cases in the future.
As we can see, research combined with intervention is subject to a
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number of constraints and concerns which are not generally considered
within conventional social research. While practicality in terms of
time and money stand as familiar research restrictions, we find that the
word takes on additional meanings when research is fused directly to ac-
tion. All these considerations, far from making systematic inquiry im-
possible, suggest the shape of a particularly appropriate research
method.
Diagnosis as Research
In order to develop a better understanding of both bureaucratiza-
tion in alternative institutions, its contributing factors and possible
remedies, an appropriate approach at this point is one of diagnosis ra-
ther than research £er se. Kwasniewki (1976) refers to diagnosis as:
. . .a methodology of purposeful procedure.
. .diagnosis
in its broad sense should consist not so much in explaining
the total causes of an existing state of affairs as in accur-
ately establishing the social, psycho-social and institutional
mechanisms which produce in a given social system phenomena or
processes desirable in respect of the axilology [values and
axioms] of planned change. It should be accepted.
. .that the
substantiation of hypotheses regarding the propriety and ef-
fectiveness of the means of realization (manipulative indepen-
dent variables) of planned change (dependent variables) should
be based chiefly on the generalized findings of diagnostic re-
search and not on theoretical knowledge (Kwasniewski
,
1976, p.
24).
The major advantage of diagnosis over most conventional research
strategies is that it is both consistent with and necessary for effec-
tive intervention activity. While conventional research models may
identify a particular set of variables which seem to affect organiza-
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Metal life, they at the same time fail to provide a coherent basis for
knowing whether or not this set of variables is relevant to the situa-
tion of a single organization. A diagnostic strategy, on the other
hand, itself models a procedure for evaluating its own appropriateness
in any particular organizational setting. Put another way, we might say
that a diagnostic approach begs to have its results revised by the same
method which originally produced them. Such an approach not only pro-
mises to result in the accumulation of general information relevant to
alternative institutions, but also encourages the re-examination of that
information with each new particular case. Given the fluidity of orga-
nizational phenomena over time, the resulting flexibility is both use-
ful and necessary. Holleb and Abrams' (1975) research, for example,
lacks this flexibility; it makes a statement regarding the organiza-
tional development of alternative institutions, but lacks any clear
route, other than disconfi rmation
, for including possible "earlier
choices" for these organizations. What a strategy of diagnosis allows,
then, is not a "test" of the Holleb and Abrams' model, but rather a
means to improving and elaborating it. Let us turn now to a more spe-
cific discussion of method based upon diagnostic strategy.
Method Overvi ew
The central feature of the diagnostic strategy employed in this re-
search is that it is built upon the diagnosis of individual organiza-
tions which then become an accumulated set of single cases amenable to
comparison (Seashore, 1976). The basic unit of analysis, then, is the
single organization. The first step in diagnosis is to assess the cur-
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rent state of the individual organization by means of generalized stages
derived from the Holleb and Abrams model. The second step requires the
reconstruction of the organization's structural development over time in
terms of the three categories of organi zational structure spelled out in
the previous chapter:
1. Formal structures of work, decision-making, and coordina-tion consistent with consensual/democratic ideals-
^.
Formal structures of maintenance; and
3. Formal structures of organizational learning.
As a third step, the structural development of the organization is com-
pared with that of the Holleb and Abrams model. Their model, in es-
sence, maintains that essentially no formal organizational structure
consistent with consensual/democratic ideals appears until after the
formal differentiation stage, if at all. As pointed out in previous
chapters, we have clear hints that contemporary alternative institutions
could now lie in one of two classes: (1) those which follow the stages
of Holleb and Abrams' model with regard to bureaucratization — "first
wave" alternative institutions; and (2) those which do not follow their
model due to earlier structural attempts to move toward consensual demo-
cracy prior to formal differentiation -- "second wave" alternative in-
stitutions. Of the organizations which fall into this second class, we
should assume that some have been able to inhibit if not avoid the
bureaucratization process, while others have failed in their early at-
tempts to move towards consensual democracy
. Put in these terms, we see
that there are three possible categories of alternative institutions
relative to the Holleb and Abrams model:
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Type 1. Organizations which have followed the Holleb andAbrams' model of development. These organizationshave no formal consensual /democratic structure unless
SphaV?h fl Hall- y - reaChed the consensual de^^'88stage The decision to move in~ThT~d^ctJcF^TTon-
figsual dejnpcracy_ occurs during the formal differedRation stage. -
Type 2: Organizations which do not fol low the Hoi leb and
Abrams model because of earlier structural attemptsto move toward consensual democracy but still evid-
ence a degree of bureaucratization.
Type 3: Organizations which do not follow the Holleb and
Abrams model because of early structure attempts to
move toward consensual democracy and which have been
relatively successful at either inhibiting or avoid-ing bureaucratization.
While the actual sorting of alternative organizations by their develop-
mental histories may not be as neat a task as the classification system
might imply, this tripartite division of organizations allows for the
development of a logical basis for asking questions of comparison re-
garding the organizations which fall in different categories.
Initially, we are concerned in a general way with the question of
structural features which separate Type 1 organizations from Types 2 and
3 — "first wave" from "second wave." That the development of organiza-
tions in these latter two categories initially diverges from the stages
outlined in the Holleb and Abrams model is significant. We are drawn
to ask what these divergencies were and why they emerged in the first
place. In essence, we are identifying the "earlier choices" made by
some alternative institutions, even though some of these "choices" may
not have been successful.
And secondly, we need to contrast Type 2 and Type 3 organizations
in order to examine the structural differences between alternative in-
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stitutions that were successful in their attempt to make "earlier
choices" (and avoid bureaucratization), and those that were not. Such a
comparison, when combined with the analytic framework articulated in the
previous chapter, should begin to reveal effective and ineffective ways
to move towards wnsjnsual democracy, early in the development of alter-
native institutions. Before we move to a more detailed description of
method, however, we need to also review very briefly the nature of the
research relationship which accompanies the diagnostic strategy.
Research Relationship
The research relationship in this study was developed in a way con-
sistent with actual intervention activity, an approach appropriate for
a number of reasons. First of all , one objective was to go about the
research with alternative institutions in a way which lent itself to
replication and refinement under conditions of intervention activity.
Secondly, this approach grew out of the recognition that the research
itself would represent intervention in a literal sense. Gathering in-
formation directly from members about an organization's inner workings
could easily spark volatile internal discussions and even alter the
course of an organization's affairs in major ways. Thirdly, this ap-
proach was consistent with both my past and present intervention activ-
ities within alternative institutions. These past activities in large
part legitimized my requests for research participation, both with or-
ganizations which were past clients and even with those which were not.
And lastly, as we shall see, the specific shape of the research rela-
tionship was also appropriate because the research efforts could easily
101
develop into intervention activity solicited by the participating orga-
nizations. Given all these considerations, it was essential that the
research relationship take a form consistent with organizational inter-
vention right from the beginning of contact with an organization.
Specif i c Methods
Now that we have an overview of both the general strategy of the
research and an appreciation for the potentially delicate nature of the
research relationship, we can look more closely at the specific features
of the research method.
Participating organizations
.
Assuming that a set of eight alternative
institutions would be sufficient for case-study comparison, I approached
organizations in the local geographic area with the following three
guidelines in mind:
1. that the eventual set of eight organizations would repre-
sent a variety of alternatives, not only in terms of their
organizational form (cooperatives, collectives, etc.), but
also according to the types of goods, services, or distri-
bution which constituted their major activity;
2. that the organizations had been in operation for a minimum
of two years; and
3. that the organizations could reach agreement regarding re-
search participation by means of their normal decision-
making procedures, whatever form that took.
In all but one case, initial contact with the organizations led
eventually to a meeting of myself and organizational members or their
representatives at which I briefly outlined the central research problem
-- keeping alternative institutions alternative — and the research me-
thods, time commitment, and overall time-frame. If meeting members in-
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dicated an interest in research participation, I then presented the fol-
lowing contract, emphasizing that I did not need or expect a final deci-
si on at the meeting itself:
1. That in exchange for the organization's participation in
research, I would offer my own skills and experience inthe area of alternative institutions on an hour-for-hour
basis equal to member involvement in research activities-
I. That I would provide timely feedback of the information
'
gathered from the participating organization to its mem-
bers if they desired it;
3. That the content of my half of the exchange would bejointly determined by the participating organization and
myself. (One obvious possibility was that I would work
with the organization if it decided to act on any of the
information resulting from the research activity.);
4. That the research relationship could be terminated'at any
point by either party provided a formal meeting was held
for this purpose;
5. That I would provide a presentation of the overall results
of the study when it was completed and make a final writ-
ten copy available to the organization; and
6. That the members of the organization would define the de-
grees of individual and organizational anonymity which
they felt were necessary.
In the single case where this procedure was not followed, members de-
cided that they had gleaned enough information from our initial contact
to bring the issue to a membership meeting, indicating that they saw no
need for my presence.
Initial contracting
. In general, my style of approaching the or-
ganizations worked well, with one major exception -- decision-making on
their part. In some cases, the organizations had a difficult time actu-
ally making a firm decision, often taking weeks before a final conclu-
sion could be reached. In other cases, the final decision fell to a
board of directors who met only once each month to discuss a very full
agenda. Consequently, it would often take one or two months before the
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topic could even be discussed, and in one case, two months more before
a decision could be reached. Otherwise, the formality of the contract-
ing process seemed quite appropriate. Two organizations turned down my
request for research participation after my initial meetings with them.
Members of one decided against participation ostensibly because of their
dislike of "researchers." Later discussions with one member, however,
revealed that this position was held only by a small number of influen-
tial members. In the second organization, a feminist collective, mem-
bers turned down my request explicitly because I was a male. And in a
third organization, research was discontinued after the first three in-
terviews, after two members aoproached me privately. They personally
liked the idea of the research at the start, but later felt that the in-
terviews had begun to raise issues of power and control which might
eventually "tear their organization apart. " In particular, they were
concerned that open discussion of these issues might possibly lead to
the loss of one central but controversial member whose skills were
largely irreplaceable within the organization. I reluctantly agreed
with their analysis, terminated our relationship, and sought out one
additional organization. In summary, then, ten organizations were ap-
proached initially, and two of these decided against research participa-
tion. Later on, research efforts were discontinued in one of the re-
maining eight, and one additional organization was located, bringing the
final total to eight participating organizations.
The exchange feature . One other facet of the research contract is
worth noting. The notion of an exchange between myself and the parti-
cipating organizations proved to be very valuable in terms of establish-
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ing rapport with their members. In two cases, organizations somewhat
reluctant about participation asked that I fulfill my part of the bar-
gain before they fulfilled theirs, explicitly testing my sincerity. In
both cases I am sure that the lack of such an exchange would have turned
the members against research participation. For four other organiza-
tions, my exchange occurred simultaneously with research efforts, allow-
ing me to become more familiar with members and with the internal dynam-
ics of their organizations. In the remaining two organizations, members
were openly appreciative of the exchange notion, but have yet to deter-
mine how it might best be put to use.
Data sources
.
The primary sources of information in this research were
interviews conducted with past and present members of participating or-
ganizations between July 1978 and May 1980, and materials such as or-
ganizational histories, by-laws, articles of incorporation, policy
statements, job descriptions and other pertinent documents. Three to
nine persons were interviewed in each organization, largely depending
upon organizational size and to a lesser degree, the success in obtain-
ing relevant information. Within any single organization, the effort
was made to interview individuals from a range of organizational roles
and membership categories who also represented differing degrees of
familiarity with the organization (old members, new members, etc.).
The interviews themselves were open-ended, lasting from one to two
hours in length. The interview format began with a clarification of my
own role and a brief restatement of the research problem and my interest
in it. Initial questions focussed on the person's present role within
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the organization and his or her opinions regarding its current state of
affairs
~ what seems to be working andwhat needs improvement or change.
Following a focus on the present, the interviews then moved to questions
about the person's past involvement within the organization, knowledge
of goals and history and significant changes in either over tire, and
organizational successes and failures. Throughout the interview the at-
tempt was made to ask specifically about various structural features of
the organization, when they were instituted or dropped and why, and the
apparent consequences that ensued. After the first two or three inter-
views, I decided to conclude each interview by showing the person a copy
of the Holleb and Abrams' stages and asking what stage best typified the
organization at present, and then, what other stages seemed to describe
the organization in the past.
Secondary sources of information often included direct observation
of organizational activities, and personal notes generated during my own
past membership or during consulting experiences.
Data presentation and diagnosis
. The information collected from each
organization was compiled into a summary along with the appropriate
analysis according to the following case study format:
1. organizational name,
2. background information,
3. current organizational practices,
4. membership,
5. informal structure,
6. additional notes,
7. research relationship,
8. interviews,
9. other sources of information,
10. current developmental state,
11. structural history, and
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12. categorization (Type 1, 2, or 3).
Taken all together, the eight case studies based on this format comprise
the basic data of research. Each case study not only describes the or-
ganization in detail, but also diagnoses its current developmental state
by employing a generalized version of the Holleb and Abrams' stages.
Then, after a detailed organizational history which highlights structur-
al changes, the last item of the case study categorizes the organiza-
tion as a Type 1 , 2, or 3 alternative institution.
Determining current developmental state. By applying a more general
terminology to the Holleb and Abrams 1 model, we found that their stage
model can be easily extended to organizations beyond those in the social
services. From Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 we can see that the item-by-
item effects of this change in terminology are generally minimal. In
essence, the term "staff" is changed to "member" in several places, and
terms like "clinical" and "services" are altered where appropriate. In
Table 5, however, there is one small but significant change in one of
the "Characteristics" items of the consensual democracy stage. In Chap-
ter III, it was argued that the item reading "administrative and main-
tenance work shared by all staff" should be broadened to include situa-
tions in which persons performing "management" functions were performed
by hired or elected by organizational members or their formal represen-
tatives. Consequently, this added possibility is included in the "gen-
eralized version" of consensual democracy . In condensed form, the Hol-
leb and Abrams 1 stages now look like the following:
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TABLE 1
ITEM CHANGES FOR CONSENSUAL ANARCHY STAGE
Holleb and Abrams version Generalized version
Characteristics:
1 -- fluid membership and minimal entrance
requirements
2 -- undifferentiated tasks (everyone does
everything)
3 -- highly ideological
4 -- response to crises rather than
planning
5 high energy
Leadership:
_
6 -- small group or single charismatic
leader
7 -- consensual decision-making with no
formal procedures
8 -- emphasis on individual autonomy
Rewards:
9 commitment to ideals
10 -- social contact
11 -- personal growth
12 -- autonomy in work
Problems and pressures:
13 -- little or no money
14 « decision-making procedures unclear
15 -- power struggles
16 -- membership unclear; potential
members continually unsure
whether they are in or out
17 — inconsistent delivery of services inconsistent delivery of services,
production of goods
18 -- important work does not get done
because tasks are too loosely
delegated
19 -- sloppy public relations
20 - - high staff turnover high member turnover
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TABLE 2
ITEM CHANGES FOR INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION STAGE
Holleb and Abrams version
Characteristics
:
1 -- de-emphasis of ideology
2 -- informal division of labor; first
job description
3 -- continued fluid membership but
informal boundaries tighten
4 -- membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"
\
b -- organization in period of rapid
expansion and implementation of
services
Leadership:
6 -- formation of the core group
7 -- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left
to entire membership
8 -- lack of formal decision-making
procedures
Rewards
:
9 -- increasing effectiveness and
competence as helpers (learning
through skil 1 sharing)
10 -- sense of family in core group
11 -- autonomy in work
12 -- personal growth
Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core
group and other staff; jockey-
ing for status and influence
14 -- core group feels responsibility
but none of the power
15 non-core staff feels left out of
important decisions
16 -- organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down
17 -- outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tigheter bookkeeping and
internal accountabi 1 i ty
18 -- clients and referral services demand
more consistent services
Generalized version
organization in period of rapid
expansion/impl ernentation
increasing effectiveness and
competence (learning through
ski 1 1 -sharing)
non-core members feel left out
of important decisions
clientele/customers demand more
consistent services
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TABLE 3
ITEM CHANGES FOR FORMAL DIFFERENTIATION STAGE
Holleb and Abrams version
Characteristics
:
1 -- creation of administrative hierarchies
2 -- staff positions filled by "qualified
outsiders"
3 « administrative and clinical staff
differentiated
4 — volunteer and client status and power
dimi ni shed
5 -- energy directed toward service rather
than organizational experimentation
6 -- lower staff turnovers-
Leadership: .
7 -- program leadership formalized in core
group or one or two administrators
8 — more efficient decision-making
procedures
Rewards
:
9 -- career training
10 -- more clearly delineated power relations
11 — more clearly defined work
12 -- more recognition from outside world
Problems and pressures:
13 loss of iedological purity
14 -- loss of family
15 « breakdown of interpersonal and
intergroup communications
16 -- decreasing autonomy in work
General ized version
new member positions filled by
"qual ified outsiders"
administrative members differentiated
from production/service members
volunteer or customer status and
power dimini shed
energy directed toward service/
production rather than organizational
experimentation
lower member turnover
no
TABLE 4
ITEM CHANGES FOR BUREAUCRACY STAGE
Holleb and Abrams version
Characteri sties
:
1 staff responsibilities and power
clearly defined
2 differential salaries
3 — minimal involvement by volunteers
4 -- jobs filled by professionals and
highly trained non-professionals
5 -- hiring and firing done by
administrators
Leadershi p
:
6 -- administrators become Unquestioned
leaders and decision-makers on all
programmatic, financial and public
relations issues
7 -- individual staff members exercise
autonomy only in their specific job
areas and are carefully monitored
by supervisors
Rewards
:
8 -- job security ^
9 -- competitive salary
10 --recognition from outside world
Problems and pressures:
11 -- decreasing autonomy in work
12 -- loss of personal commitment to job
13 -- formalization of relationships
14 -- staff excluded from organizational
deci sion-making
15 -- competitive pressures from other
social service agencies
Generalized version
employee responsibilities and
power clearly defined
individual employees exercise autonomy
only in their specific job areas and are
carefully monitored by supervisors
employees excluded from organizational
decision-making
competitive pressures from conventional
organizations
TABLE 5
ITEM CHANGES FOR CONSENSUAL
m
DEMOCRACY STAGE
Holleb and Abrams version
Characteristics
:
1 — return to consensual forms
2 - constitutional democracy with clear
rules and procedures
clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements
structures for sharing work and
feel ings
5 -- administrative and maintenance work
by all staff
6 work contracts for staff
Leadershi p
:
7 -- leadership informal, shifting and
shared
v
8 -- subgroups, program components given
wide latitude in decision-making
9 -- representative groups employed for
overall program planning
10 all major decisions referred to
total staff
Rewards: ^
11 -- autonomy
12 -- involvement in planning and
deci sion-making
13 -- community and support
14 increasing effectiveness and
competence
Problems and Pressures:
15 -- low salaries
decision-making slow and cumbersome
difficulty in hiring and firing
16
17
18 -- loss of clinical time doing
administrative work
19 -- difficulty in obtaining funding
20 — licensing laws and other threats from
professional establ i shment
21 limitations in scope of services and
target population
22 -- difficulty in getting referrals from
and tying in with established agencies
Generalized versi on
administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring
explicit contracts for members
all major decisions referred to total
membershi p
difficulty in accepting and removing
members
loss of directly productive time doing
admini strati ve work
licensing laws and other threats from
con vent i onal establ i shment
limitations in scope of services,
products or customers
difficulty in getting referrals from and
tying in with conventional organizations
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1. Within consensual anarchy, we find no managers, only mem-
bers. Decision-making is consensual, but lacks formal
procedures. Labor is undifferentiated, in that everyone
within the organization performs all the organizational
tasks at one time or another.
2. Bureaucratization begins with informal differentiation
,
where a core group of informal managers forms without of-
ficial recognition. Day-to-day decisions are made by the
core group, and major policy decisions are still left to
the entire membership, although there are no formal deci-
sion-making procedures. At this stage there is informal
division of labor and usually the appearance of the first
job description. This division of labor occurs initially
between members who perform "management" functions and
those who produce goods or services. Individuals perform-
ing in managerial roles are sometimes given increased fi-
nancial compensation.
3. Within formal differentiation, managers are officially recog-
nized as such. They not only hold legitimate responsibil-
ity for day-to-day operations, but also exert considerable
influence in broader policy issues as well. Decision-
making procedures become somewhat formalized, but in ways
that clearly reduce employee power and influence. In both
decision-making and work, there is a recognized separation
of manager and member roles, resulting in the first appear-
ance of explicit managerial hierarchies. Managerial "posi-
tions" emerge, and are often filled by "qualified out-
siders."
4. Within bureaucracy
,
managers are unquestioned in both day-
to-day operations and overall policy. Decision-making for-
mally excludes employees or is limited to their minor in-
volvement. Division of labor is clear and distinct, with
managerial responsibilities formally separated from work
performed by members (who at this point have been fully
transformed into employees). This division of labor is
emphasized by differential salaries, not only between
managers and "employees," but also within the well-defined
managerial hierarchy.
5. Consensual democracy is marked by formal member control of
policy-making which may extend to the organization's day-
to-day operations as well. Decision-making is consensual,
but with formal rules and procedures (a constitutional
democracy). All major decisions are left to the entire
membership. "Management" work (administration, coordina-
tion, etc.) is either shared by all members, or is the re-
sponsibility of one or more members who are formally hired
or elected by the membership. Division of labor is other-
wise minimized by means of clear structures for sharing
work such as job rotation.
m
In order to evaluate the current developmental state of an organi-
zation, the descriptive material in each case was examined in light of
the generalized versions of the Holleb and Abrams' stages, on an item-
by-item basis. While no organization was characterized by alj_ the items
in a single stage, it was possible in six of the cases to assign them to
one stage, explaining discrepancies in some detail. In two of the
cases, however, the organizations evidenced features of two stages si-
multaneously, although the direction of development was clear for both.
Special considerations. In the process of evaluating organizations
on an item-by-item basis according to the Holleb and Abrams 1 stages, a
few minor inadequacies of their model became apparent. First of all,
the language of some of the items is slightly awkward, in that it im-
plies a change from a previous stage (e.g., "formation of the core
group", "return to consensual form," etc.), in addition to a particular
organizational state. For the sake of simplicity, most of these over-
tones were ignored in the item-by-item analysis, unless the implications
were strictly incorrect. Secondly, a few of the items listed in the
various stages were clearly less important features than others. For
example, items dealing with member autonomy and member competence appear
in both the informal di fferentiation and consensual democracy stages.
Since these items and occasional others were poor discriminators and
since they usually refer to structural effects rather than structural
features, such items were often referred to as "minor features" of a
given stage. Conversely, other items (e.g., "constitutional democracy",
"explicit contracts for members", etc.) were considered "major features"
of a given stage, since they referred to clearly discriminating charac-
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teristics; consequently, they are frequently labelled that way in the
case studies. And finally, there were also instances where the "major
features" of a stage were absent, due to unique organizational circum-
stances, but an organization was nevertheless typical of the particular
stage. Whenever any of these discrepancies took on special signifi-
cance
,
however, they were explained in detail within the case studies.
Categorizing organizations . In sorting organizations into the final
three categories -- Type 1, Type 2, or Type 3 -- two basic discrimina-
tions were used. As pointed out previously, the first discrimination
occurs between Type 1 and Types 2 and 3: organizations which appeared
to develop along the lines of the Holleb and Abrams' scenario versus
those which did not. The basic difference, of course, is that "first
wave" organizations in the Holleb and Abrams 1 scenario did not begin to
move towards consensual democracy until they reached a choice point in
the formal differentiation stage, while "second wave" organizations move
in this direction from an earlier developmental stage. In categorizing
the case study organizations, the criterion of formal consensual/demo-
cratic structure prior to the formal differentiation stage was used ini-
tially to separate Type 1 from Type 2 and 3 organizations, but proved
too vague. It was possible, for instance, for an organization to have
a formalized job rotation system early in their development, but still
not be clearly member-controlled. Instead, then, a stricter criterion
was devised: Type 2 or Type 3 organizations were required to have clear
evidence of actions or procedures prior to formal differentiation which
represented formal attempts on the part of members to exercise final
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authority within the organization.
The criterion for separating Type 2 from Type 3 organizations
proved much more difficult to define, however. In essence, this dis-
crimination attempted to separate the less successful from the more suc-
cessful "second wave" alternative institutions. Although in most of the
cases the consequences of early attempts at formal consensual/democratic
structures were evident from the structural histories, a principle of
discrimination can only be stated in general terms. "More successful,"
Type 3 organizations were defined as those which showed continuing evi-
dence of moving in the direction of consensual democracy. As the struc-
tural histories show, however, some of this judgment is based on progno-
sis as well as diagnosis. "Less successful," Type 2 organizations, on
the other hand, were then defined as those which demonstrated continuing
evidence of not_ moving in the direction of consensual democracy --al-
ternative institutions still caught in the bureaucratization process for
one reason or another. From these basic definitions, then, it is clear
that "success" was defined in organizational rather than financial
terms. While it was obvious that a certain minimal level of financial
success was a requirement for the continuation of an organization, be-
yond this point financial success and organizational success were as-
sumed to be relatively independent of one another.
Comparative analysis . The different "types" of alternative institutions
were then subjected to comparisons based upon their structural features.
Of general interest were the differences between Type 1 and Types 2 and
3 organizations -- the instances of early formal structure which set
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"second wave" organizations apart from their "first wave" counterparts.
Of particular interest, however, was the comparison of Type 2 and Type
3 alternative institutions, trying to tease out the reasons for relative
success of Type 3 organizations in moving toward consensual democracy.
In these comparisons, two types of factors were considered: essential-
ly, the analysis of earlier chapters suggested that three different
categories of structural components are necessary to keep alternative
institutions alternative. Prior to the collection of data, examples of
each type of formal structure were defined, with the expectation that
more specific instances of formal structures would emerge from the re-
search :
1
.
Formal structures of work, decision-making and coordina-
tion consistent with consensual/democratic i deaTIT
— formal written procedures, policies and guidelines
--schedules of work, explicit job rotation systems
--by-laws which specify decision-making procedures, repre-
sentation schemes, length of terms, etc.
—written job descriptions, functional descriptions of
work groups, etc.
--formal "management" (administration, coordination) posi-
tions filled by persons through election or member-con-
trolled hiring
2
.
Formal structures of maintenance .
--deliberate and regular mechanisms for providing members
with information regarding the economic performance of
the organization (reports, scheduled meetings, etc.)
--communication structures which provide members with
"management"- level information and expertise (newslet-
ters, inservice skill training for members, etc.)
--clear formal statements of the rights, duties and obli-
gations of membership (in by-laws, contracts, public
statements, etc.)
--formal mechanisms for resolving disputes within the or-
ganization (a judiciary, special meetings, etc.)
--regular orientation and training program for new members
--trial periods for new members
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--clear statements of membership boundaries
.
Formal structures of organizational learning
.
—presence of legitimized process roles
--written task and process goals
--procedures by which goals are reviewed
—presence of ongoing research or evaluation activities
within the organization
—deliberate and specific attempts of the orqanization to
compare itself with other similar organizations
—specific, regular meetings set aside for reflective con-
sideration of the state and direction of the oraaniza-
tion (retreats, workshops, etc.)
--formal use of external critics
--existence of study groups within the organization expli-
citly concerned with organizational self-analysis
Comparisons of Type 2 and Type 3 organizations were based upon these
general categories of structural components, and also upon secondary
features of the organizations which emerged during the course of re-
search.
CHAPTER VII
RESULTS
Introduction
A few comments are necessary prior to the actual presentation of
the eight case studies. First of all, the cases are presented in no
particular order other than that which will hopefully maintain the
reader's interest. Secondly, the level of detail varies somewhat from
case to case, largely depending upon the "al ternati veness" of the or-
ganizations. In cases where the particular arrangements of an organiza-
tion might be generally uncommon or unknown, extra effort was taken to
explain them at some length. In addition, cases in which the process of
bureaucratization was particularly evident were often expanded in order
to elaborate upon crucial turning points and the specific dynamics in-
volved. In the third place, the reader should be warned to pay special
attention to the definition of "membership" in each case, since the use
of the term varies somewhat from case to case. Fourth, two literary
devices were applied throughout the eight cases in order to give the
reader the best sense of each organization and its past. The cases are
described in temporal terms, eliminating the feeling of timelessness
which is often typical of case studies. This device allows the reader
to place the development of these eight organizations within the chang-
ing cultural and political context of the last decade. In addition,
brief quotes and phrases drawn from the interviews are periodically
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inserted within the cases in order to provide a sense of how members
perceive the internal dynamics and events in their organizations.
Fifth, several non-essential features of each case study were delib-
erately altered in order to assure a degree of anonymity for the sample
organizations. In particular, the pseudonyms assigned to the organiza-
tions bear little relation to their actual names. And finally, the
case studies are accompanied by "structural history" tables which re-
quire a brief explanation. In these tables, a cross (+) marks the
approximate date at which an event occurred or a particular activity
began. If the event or activity continued beyond the words that de-
scribe it in the table, this continuation is indicated with a dashed
line ( ). If the continuation was irregular or partial, a less
frequently dashed line is used (- — -). With these comments in mind,
we can now examine each of the eight sample organizations in detail.
The Case Studies
Grocery Collective . Staffed by students at a New England college, the
Grocery Collective (GC) operates a small store which is dedicated to
providing high quality food items at the lowest possible cost. The
$200,000-per-year business currently employs 22 part-time members
throughout the two semesters of the school year. During the summer,
when the local student population diminishes considerably, GC reduces
its store hours and operates with a skeleton staff of only five or six
members. At present, members are required to work a minimum of ten
hours each week, and earn slightly above minimum wage. In order to keep
costs low, GC also encourages volunteers to donate their time by offer-
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ing them a discount on their purchases at the store. Due to its status
as a student organization, GC is able to obtain space for its store on
a rent-free basis, an important financial feature which is reflected in
its extremely low food prices.
Current organizational practices
. Work at GC falls into three gen-
eral categories: (1) "floor work" consisting of receiving shipments,
restocking, cleaning and cashiering; (2) ordering from vendors, which
also includes inventory; and (3) "clerk work," which refers to a number
of specific financial tasks which include bookkeeping, handling the pay-
roll, and making deposits of daily receipts. "Floor work" is informally
divided between those members who are scheduled for two-hour shifts
throughout the workweek. The actual number of members allotted to a
particular shift can vary from two up to six, depending upon the time
of day and patterns of customer traffic. Ordering is assigned to indi-
vidual members on a one-member/one-wholesaler basis. In this fashion,
a specific individual is held responsible for maintaining the stock of
each wholesaler. "Clerk work" is assigned to five willing individuals
elected at the beginning of each semester: two bookkeepers; one person
responsible for payroll matters; and two members who make deposits of
the daily receipts. The five members who perform these financial tasks
do so in addition to ten hours of required "floor work," although they
are paid the same hourly rate for their extra tasks. The intended pur-
pose of this arrangement is to prevent the clerks from becoming "tradi-
tional managers." By keeping these individuals involved in the day-to-
day work of the store, the theory goes, they will be prevented from de-
veloping a "managerial" mentality, even though they perform administra-
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tive tasks. Due to these requirements, however, the clerks usually
spend two to three times as many hours as other members at the store.
At the urging of a college official, several members recently began
work on a procedural manual for GC which clearly outlines the financial
tasks of the five clerks as well as other areas of GC operations. Al-
though the clerks' duties are defined by very minimal job descriptions
currently no written procedures describe either the work of clerks or
other members.
Once each week, GC holds a meeting of the entire membership for the
purposes of information-sharing, problem-solving, and coordination of
scheduling of member work shifts. Decision-making is by informal con-
sensus, but occasionally switches to majority rule, particularly with
volatile issues; no recognized procedures exist for this transition,
however. Rotated meeting roles include a facilitator who sets the
agenda, a co-facilitator, a notetaker, and occasionally, a timekeeper.
GC has two standing committees, one concerned with new products, the
other responsible for consumer education, but their meetings are held
infrequently. Other than periodic social events, GC holds no other
meetings of the entire membership.
Hiring of new members occurs at the beginning of fall semester and
to a lesser degree, at the beginning of the spring semester. Following
past written procedures, GC publicly advertises its openings, screens
applicants, and selects its members, all in a one-week period. On the
weekend following the hiring process, new members attend a brief orien-
tation session and then begin work the next week. Once during each
semester all members undergo a simple but formal review process which
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begins with written self-evaluations. These self-evaluations are circu-
lated to all other members, who add written comments if they wish. Of
the entire membership, however, only the five clerks have rudimentary
job descriptions. A crude firing procedure does exist, but has so many
pitfalls that it has been invoked once in the memory of current members.
Membership
.
All GC members are undergraduate students with little
or no prior experience in either food retailing or collective work-
places. While GC would like to maintain a balance between men and
women, over 80% of its applicants are women, creating a membership where
women outnumber men two to one. In addition, some members are third-
world individuals, reflecting a progressive hiring policy. Members are
required to work a minimum of ten hours per week and also to attend
weekly meetings. Other than these two obligations, which are stated on
the hiring notices, there are no formal definitions of membershiD or
member contracts. Turnover at GC is consistently high, usually falling
in the range of 65-75% annually.
Informal structure
. At present, GC is "informally managed" by a
core group of two of the five clerks, a reality which runs against the
organization's ideological grain. In interviews, one of these clerks
was quite open and articulate about being "trapped" into a position of
informal power as one of six members returning for a new school year.
Faced with incoming members who knew nothing about the most basic work
at the store, this clerk found himself immediately drawn into the posi-
tion of training the newcomers and overseeing the more complex tasks.
Once this "managerial" relationship was begun with new members, however,
it seemed impossible to stop. Confronted by problems or difficult tasks
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the new members would quickly seek out the clerk for direction, some-
times even leaving the situation for the clerk to resolve. As the cen-
trality of this member increased, so did the criticism of other members
regarding his "acting like a manager." What this situation and others
revealed is that there are several major tasks, such as training new
members, negotiating with college officials, etc., that are never as-
signed as anyone's responsibility at GC. Since the clerks spend more
time at the store than other members, their availability during the day
places them in the position of performing these essential tasks on a
self-selected basis. Given the taboo against "acting like a manager,"
however, clerks who perform these functions soon learn to do many of
them in a behind-the-scenes way. What results is a situation in which
incoming clerks almost never know what essential tasks were performed by
previous clerks until they actually accept the job.
Additional notes
.
Other features of GC worth mentioning include
the following:
1. High member turnover at GC obviously sets the stage for
the emergence of informal managers, a situation which is fur-
ther encouraged by the lack of adequate orientation and train-
ing for new members. Quite often, those members on GC's sum-
mer skeleton staff become prime candidates for members of a
core group the following fall. Working within the small sum-
mer staff, these members develop close ties with each other,
as well as a detailed knowledge of GC's operations.
2. Although the clerks at GC are in theory chosen by the mem-
bership at the beginning of each semester, the organization's
high turnover rate turns this selection process into a per-
functory affair. New members, who inevitably constitute the
organization's majority each fall, can never know very much
about the individuals they are selecting, or the nature of the
actual work these clerks will perform. Consequently, even the
selection process is heavily influenced by the minority of re-
turning members. Once installed, the same clerks are usually
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re-elected for the second semester, due to the lack of time orinterest on the part of other members.
3. One of the specific dynamics which encourages clerks tobecome informal managers is particularly evident at GC Since
clerks spend much more time at the store and unofficially per-form several essential tasks and functions, they generally
v el °P
k
a ^nse of responsibility for the organization not
shared by the other members. As the school year proceeds, and
academic pressures mount, this division becomes even more pro-
nounced. Pressed by exams and papers, members periodically
fail to show up for their work shifts, and often skip the
weekly membership meetings. Due to their heightened sense of
responsibility, clerks are often tempted to fill in these
gaps, performing extra floor work and making an increasing
number of pressing decisions without the consent of all mem-bers. From the clerks' perspective, the only other choice is
to leave important tasks undone and crucial issues undecided,
both difficult options for members so invested in the success
of the organization.
4. Issues of power and control at GC are occasionally dis-
cussed in weekly membership meetings, usually in the form of
member criticism of clerks who are acting "too much like
managers." While these sessions have resulted in periodic
modifications of the clerk roles, members usually conclude
that in the final analysis, the conflict between worker and
student roles at GC stands as the major source of continuing
organizational difficulties.
5. With the exception of a few senior individuals, it appears
that most GC members have only weak process skills. In years
past, a "process-person" role was rotated among members at
weekly meetings, but the innovation faded quickly. None of
the current members interviewed knew what this role consisted
of, or what its function was.
6. With the exception of the hiring procedure, few written
records exist at GC, obscuring past practices and minimizing
continuity from one year to the next. Last year for example,
an outgoing bookkeeper never communicated to the new book-
keeper that GC had a deficit of $3,000, a fact that remained
undiscovered for almost a year. In a similar fashion, members
recently began work on a procedural manual for GC, not realiz-
ing that one had already been developed four years previously.
7. Current members at GC, especially new members, are quite
vocal in their opposition to "too much structure" within their
organization. "Structure," as they see it, typifies the col-
lege bureaucracy which engulfs their lives as students. Past
members, on the other hand, particularly past informal mana-
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gers, usually take a pro-structure position, indicating thatthey now think that the presence of more formality at GC wouldhave probably prevented them from "burning out." From their
perspective, the lack of structure at GC creates a vacuum ofpower and responsibility at the middle of the organization
which they unwisely allowed themselves to enter.
Research relationship
. Members of GC willingly agreed to research
participation. In exchange for their involvement, I assisted several
members in the development of more formal recruitment and hiring proce-
dures in the summer of 1979. Previously, GC had employed a very general
hiring notice which highlighted the part-time income earned by members.
Usually 500 applicants would respond, making the screening and inter-
view process a week-long nightmare. In essence, the hiring notice was
made more explicit, listing member responsibilities as well as benefits,
and a set of prioritized hiring criteria was established. The refined
hiring notice was first used in the fall of 1979, and reduced applica-
tions by a factor of six. With this large reduction of the applicant
pool, the entire hiring process went much more smoothly, allowing GC to
be much more careful about the members they finally selected. In addi-
tion, the incoming members had more realistic expectations regarding GC
membership, reducing short-term turnover considerably.
Intervi ews . In all, nine past and present GC members were inter-
viewed: four past members, two men and two women, all of whom had be-
come informal managers; one woman member who is currently emerging as
an informal manager; two members with about one year's experience; and
two new members. No founding members could be located.
Other sources of information . Supplementary information was ob-
tained from newspaper clippings in an organizational scrapbook, hiring
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documents, occasional meeting records found in GC's files, and one mem-
ber' s personal journal
.
Current developmental state. Despite some discrepancies, the
Grocery Collective is best described by the irrfonnal differentiation
stage. From Table 6, we can see that of the 18 features Holleb and
Abrams use to describe this stage, 15 apply to GC. Two of the excep-
tions fall in the areas of membership boundaries (ID-3) and membership
criteria (ID-4). Individuals become members after a formal hiring pro-
cess; when members are no longer paid by GC for working hours, their
membership terminates. In addition, the hiring process established
criteria for evaluating applicants, thus diminishing the influence of
"friendship or 'good vibes'" in the selection of new members. Both of
these exceptions to informal differentiation
,
however, arose as a direct
consequence of my consultation with GC in the summer of 1979. The
third exception concerns rapid expansion (CD-5). For the past three
years, GC's volume has increased steadily, but slowly -- its period of
rapid growth is long past.
One other matter deserving attention is the organization's unsuc-
cessful attempts to prevent the emergence of informal managers. In
brief, GC places three restraints on the five persons who perform ad-
ministrative tasks. First, these members go through the "election" pro-
cess explained earlier. Secondly, the designation of "clerk" is chosen
very deliberately so as to avoid connotations of "coordinating" or
"managing." And thirdly, the clerks are required to perform their ad-
ministrative work in addition to the normal floor work shared by all
other members, an attempt to keep them in touch with the day-to-day work
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TABLE 6
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE GROCERY COLLECTIVE
Characteri sties
:
1 — de-emphasis of ideology
2 — informal division of labor; first job
description
3 -
4
5 -
continued fluid membership but infor-
mal boundaries tighten
membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"
organization in period of rapid expan
s i on/ i mp 1 erne n ta t i on
Leadershi p
:
6 -- formation of the core group
7 -- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membership
8 -- lack of formal decision-making proce-
dures
Rewards
10
11
increasing effectiveness and compet-
ence (learning through skill-sharing)
sense of family in core group
autonomy in work
12 -- personal growth
Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and influence
14 -- core group feels responsibility but
none of the power
15 — non-core members feel left out of
important decisions
16 -- organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down
17 -- outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookkeeping and inter-
nal accountabi 1 i ty
18 — clientele/customers demand more con-
sistent services
yes
yes; basic job descriptions for
"clerks"
no; clear boundaries determined by
hiring process
to some degree
no longer
yes, yearly
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes, with the exception of the hiring
procedure
yes
yes
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of the store. As we have seen, however, these measures are evidently
insufficient to prevent the rise of informal managers. While the delib-
erate member selection of individuals performing administrative tasks is
typical of consensual democracy rather than informal differentiation
, we
can see how this process fails at GC - the core grouo typically emerges
from wi thin the group of five chosen clerks. In other words, GC members
do not choose their "managers"; in reality they only narrow the pool of
senior members from which informal managers will emerge.
Structural history. Due to the unavailability of any founding mem-
bers, the first two years of the Grocery Collective were reconstructed
primarily from newspaper clippings and other documents kept in a scrap-
book since the founding days. These accounts indicate that GC was ori-
ginally started by two politically active undergraduate women in Febru-
ary of 1973, following six months of research, planning, and bickering
with college administrators. By establishing GC as a student organiza-
tion, they were able to obtain space for the store on a rent-free basis.
During the first semester of operation, it appears that the two found-
ers were the only paid staff (see Table 7). Designated as coordinators
in basic job descriptions, the two founders operated the store with the
aid of several regular volunteers. Meetings were held periodically and
were open to any interested parties. Although the store was closed for
the summer, financial records indicate that the first semester of opera-
tions was a success. With the aid of a loan from the college's student
association, GC added equipment necessary to expand the line of food
items and remodeled the store over the summer. After a whole summer of
planning, the two coordinators were able to hire several of the previous
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year's volunteers on a part-time basis when the store re-opened in Sep-
tember of 1973.
Throughout the 1973-74 and 1974-75 academic years, both the volume
of business and the number of members grew rapidly, even though the
store remained closed throughout the summers. During these two years,
open meetings were held weekly, but voting rights were eventually re-
stricted to the paid staff. Although exact dates are impossible to de-
termine, GC did evolve a fundamental work structure during this two-year
period. Day-to-day work was divided into several "departments" as the
product line was expanded: cheeses; grains; dairy; yogurt; canned
goods; and breads. When new members were hired at the beginning of each
semester, they "joined" one of these departments, learning the necessary
tasks while on the job. In each department, the tasks of ordering from
wholesalers, keeping inventories, and restocking were informally di-
vided among two to five other members throughout the workweek. All ad-
ministrative tasks (e.g., bookeeping, paying bills, etc.) were performed
by the coordinators who also filled in where needed at the store. With
the graduation of the two women founders in the winter of 1975, the
first coordinator elections were held, followed some time later by the
first revision of their basic job descriptions.
While the decentralized "department" structure of work was far from
perfect, it was durable, remaining in essentially the same form until
the fall of 1979. During this period of stable work arrangements, other
features of GC did change, however. The weekly meetings slowly evolved
a regular format and rotated meeting roles. By 1978, business volume
increased to the point where GC was able to operate their store continu-
131
ously throughout the summer for the first time. Then, in the fall of
1978, two other new elements were added. GC experimented with a verbal
review process held twice each semester for all members. And secondly,
the organization established the ten-hour work requirements for members
apparently an attempt to establish a minimum level of member commit-
ment.
According to members, the period from 1975 to 1979 was marked by
one central problem which continued to plague the organization: at-
tempting to keep the coordinators from "acting like managers." From a
member perspective, the coordinators would become largely administra-
tors, elevating themselves from the actual day-to-day work of the mem-
bers, but "bossing them around" at the same time. From the perspective
of the coordinators, on the other hand, it was quite a different situa-
tion. They found themselves overburdened by the combination of adminis
trative work and the need to fill in for members who either neglected
essential tasks, or performed them poorly. For example, if the members
of the yogurt department neglected to reorder as stocks ran low, angry
customers would confront the coordinator, who was usually at the store.
Unable to locate any members of the department, the coordinator would
place a new order on his or her own. When members of the department
learned later of the coordinator's actions, they would feel that he or
she had "stepped in" inappropriately the reordering had not occurred
when it should have, but that was their problem. Similar incidents
would inevitably recur, precipitating major conflicts between the coor-
dinators and other members. Exhausted, frustrated, and "burned out,"
coordinators would rarely last more than one or two semesters, usually
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quitting GC altogether. Another set of coordinators would be elected,
and the cycle would begin again. Throughout this entire span of time
(1974-1979), the membership repeatedly attempted to remedy this central
problem by increasing the number of coordinators. The theory, of
course, was that with more coordinators, responsibility would be dis-
tributed among more individuals, keeping any one from assuming too much
power. This assumption proved wrong, however. One or two central fig-
ures would continue to emerge among the coordinators, repeating the same
cycle
.
During the summer of 1979, GC members decided to implement its cur-
rent system, relabeling coordinators as "clerks" and requiring them to
perform their administrative duties only in addition to ten hours of
floor work. As explained earlier, however, these changes still have not
solved GC's central problem and may have only compounded it. At the
same time, GC members also made two other changes. First, they altered
their personnel review process, starting the current system based upon
members' written self-evaluations. And secondly, they discontinued the
longstanding department structure of ordering, inventory, and restock-
ing. Convinced that this structure did not adequately distribute re-
sponsibility for re-ordering stock from wholesalers, they instituted a
new "vendor system," in which one particular member is responsible for
one and only one wholesaler. Now, for instance, if the yogurt runs out,
the problem belongs to a specific individual, and tends to fall to the
"clerks" less frequently. In summary, then, we see that with the excep-
tion of some small alterations, GC has really changed very little since
1974. Although it is too early to assess the impact of the new "vendor
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system" and the attempt to create procedural manuals, it seems reason-
able to assume that GC will continue as it has in the past. Despite the
relabeling of the coordinators as "clerks," little has been done to ef-
fectively address the central issue of re-emerging informal managers
within the organization.
Categorization
.
As we shall see, the Grocery Collective is a Type
2 organization. Its developmental path deviates significantly from that
described by Holleb and Abrams, but these differences have still resulted
in a recurrent process of bureaucratization from which GC has been unable
to escape.
One striking feature of GC's development is that the organization
seems to have begun with a mix of features from both the consensual
anarchy and informal differentiation stages. During the first semester
of operation, membership was entirely fluid, meetings were open to any-
one, and there was to be no differentiation of tasks among the volun-
teers who staffed the store. At the same time, however, GC also began
operations with two paid coordinators who had basic job descriptions.
These two coordinators (also the founders) were clearly self-appointed
informal managers. Over the next eighteen months, GC moved further into
informal differentiation . The boundaries of the organization came to be
synonymous with the paid membership, and both non-members and volunteers
lost voting rights in the weekly meetings. In addition, GC developed
its first work structure, an arrangement of departments which formally
delegated work to groups of members, but not to individuals. Within de-
partments, the work of ordering, inventory and restocking was informally
divided among members.
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The second, and more significant, aspect of GC's development in-
volves the start of semester elections for coordinators in the winter of
1975. Holleb and Abrams 1 scenario would lead us to expect that within
i nformal differentiation
, informal managers emerge in a self-appointed
fashion, but are never deliberately selected by the membership. In
fact, the periodic election of persons performing administrative tasks
represents a step in the direction of consensual democracy
, in that it
is an important vehicle by which members can assert their right to final
authority in an organization. As we have seen in GC's case, however,
the "election" of coordinators (and more recently, "clerks") has not
worked very well at all -- even in one or two semesters these elected
individuals have tended to accumulate an excess of power and responsi-
bility. In addition, coordinators and clerks have never been "voted out
of office," apparently because the membership is highly dependent upon
their skills, knowledge, and willingness to put in long hours. Instead,
these individuals typically "burn out" in one or two semesters and re-
sign from the organization, setting the stage for the next set of infor-
mal managers. Largely because of this recurrent pattern, GC has been
frozen in the informal differentiation stage for several years now.
Warehouse Collective . The seven members of the Warehouse Collective
(WC) provide bulk-food purchasing, warehousing and trucking for an in-
corporated Federation of over one-hundred food cooperatives located in
a predominantly rural region of New England. In addition, the WC also
administers a food co-op loan fund and is partially responsible for the
expansion of the Federation, both in terms of the number of member co-
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ops and gross business volume. Technically, the members of the Ware-
house Collective are the "employees" of the Federation; the warehouse
operations are managed by WC, but "owned" by all the member co-ops in
the Federation. A representative board of directors (BoD) oversees all
the activities of WC, as well as other Federation activities. Four sub-
federations of co-ops and WC select two representatives apiece, creating
a ten-member BoD. This BoD is assisted by a half-time information coor-
dinator (not a member of WC) who is responsible for correspondence,
governance communications, and educational programs within the Federa-
tion. Specifically, the BoD is empowered to make decisions in the areas
of bulk food pricing; employee salaries, benefits and new positions; fi-
nancial expenditures; and loans to member co-ops. WC is directly answer-
able to the BoD, but at the same time maintains a high degree of autonomy
in the areas of day-to-day operations and internal personnel decisions.
Thus WC is a small, salaried working group located within a much larger
cooperative organization. Through BoD representation and functional
autonomy in certain areas, however, the Federation and WC are able to
strike a balance between cooperative control of a 1.5 million dollar
business and worker control of the workplace. WC members all earn the
same salary: $10,000 plus benefits including two-weeks paid vacation,
for a four-day work week.
Cirrent organizational practices . All the tasks at the Warehouse
Collective are rotated among the members with the single exception of
bookkeeping -- a complex task for a 1.5 million dollar business. Book-
keeping is performed by one member of WC who does not participate in
other rotated tasks. One major set of job areas is composed of truck-
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ing, warehousing and cleaning. These are shared among the members (ex-
cept the bookkeeper) on a day-to-day basis by means of an informal but
deliberate rotational schedule. Truck-driving is limited at present to
the four members who hold the appropriate license, but WC encourages all
members, especially women, to learn this skill and obtain the necessary
licensing. A second job area involves purchasing and inventory control.
Every member but the bookkeeper performs a particular subset of these
tasks on an ongoing basis; rotations are formalized by specific areas
and are calculated in terms of months, according to staff vacations and
leaves, and the arrival of new members. Lastly, there are a number of
routine daily tasks (e.g., making deposits, emptying the trash, etc.)
which are formally rotated among the members on a weekly basis by means
of a "job wheel" located in the warehouse office.
Decision-making occurs in four different types of meetings. The
most central meeting for WC is their weekly staff meeting, which is de-
voted to the coordination and allocation of tasks, scheduling of work
and information-sharing. Decision-making is consensual but without
written procedures, but the meetings are particularly well -organized for
seven people -- a prioritized agenda with time limits, a notetaker and
a facilitator. For issues that transcend day-to-day operations, the
members employ a second type of forum, the monthly meeting, which is
held in the evening at members' homes in order to create a setting dis-
tinctly different from the workplace. These monthly meetings are delib-
erately employed to resolve interpersonal issues, conduct formal person-
nel evaluations, develop policy proposals and engage in long-range plan-
ning. Despite the different purposes of the monthly meetings, they are
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organized in the same manner as the weekly meetings. The third type of
meeting is that of the BoD, also held monthly. As explained previously,
two of the ten directors are representatives chosen by WC members. The
BoD makes all major decisions involving policy and finances, but is not
involved in WC personnel decisions, an area where the WC has a large de-
gree of autonomy. The meetings of the BoD are also structured in the
same manner as the weekly staff meetings -- well
-organized, but without
formal decision-making procedures. The fourth and last category of
meeting is an annual meeting of representatives from all the co-ops who
are members of the Federation. The annual meeting serves as a forum for
decisions deemed too important or controversial to be made by the BoD
(e.g., a change in the by-laws). Decision-making is conducted by means
of formal consensus procedures, and if they fail, by majority rule (two-
thirds for by-law changes). Detailed minutes are kept and distributed
for both the BoD and annual meetings; for the weekly and monthly WC
meetings, minutes are kept in a notebook, but not distributed. At pres-
ent, WC is developing summaries of all policy decisions that have been
made in past weekly and monthly meetings. Previously, members relied
largely on oral history, but with the passage of time and the influx of
new members, it has become evident to them that a more formal statement
of policies and procedures is necessary.
WC employs a one-month trial period for new members which ends with
the first personnel evaluation in an ongoing cycle. New members undergo
a formalized orientation and training period during the first two months
of working as a member. Through normal rotation of job areas, a new
member will have learned to perform most jobs in an additional six to
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nine months. Older members wishing to change or enlarge job areas are
supported in their efforts to learn new skills (e.g., truck-driving, or
a complex part of inventory control), a workplace feature made possible
by the flexible rotational arrangements.
Membership
.
WC members range in age from early twenties to early
thirties, with a balance of men and women. Turnover of members is low
— about one person a year for the past four, on the average. No found-
ing members remain, but three of the members are entering their fourth
year with WC.
Informal structure
. Although it appears on paper that the Ware-
house Collective is subordinated to the BoD in the areas of policy, new
positions and major expenditures, it is very clear that WC takes a very
active leardershio role in the Federation. Part of this situation is
due to historical reasons — the BoD has existed for less than a year at
this point. The WC is wary of the degree of informal power and respon-
sibility which it has held in the past, and, in an attempt to remedy this
situation, played a dominant role in developing the proposal which es-
tablished the present BoD. Secondly, it is evident that senior members
of WC, by virtue of their accumulated knowledge and experience, wield a
considerable amount of informal power. This informal "hierarchy by
seniority" is openly acknowledged by members, and while recogizing its
value in certain matters, they have attempted to minimize its negative
features by increasingly improving the training and orientation process
for new members, by more extensive use of job rotation arrangements, and
by formalizing policies and procedures in a written form which can be
easily distributed to members.
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Additional notes_. The following comments are also relevant:
li^
TheJ eVel ° f Process skil ls is particularly high in WC.Although no formal process role exists in meetings it is
evident that their informal use is openly supported The
structure and conduct of weekly meetings is clearly a direct
result of the application of these skills.
2. WC has expanded its staff rapidly over the past three
years, adding one member per year on the average. According
to the members, this increase in size has recently led them to
recognize the need for more formal structure in all facets of
the warehouse operations -- from more explicit systems of job
rotation to efforts to create written summaries of procedures
and policies — as aids to the effective integration of new
members
.
3. The development of WC as a workplace is confounded by the
fact that it is a small organization nested within (and respon-
sible to) a larger organization. For example, issues of inter-
nal accountability which are often resolved through the formal
articulation of the rights, duties and obligations of members,
in this case are resolved in part by the direct accountability
of WC to the larger Federation. In this way, some issues com-
mon to an autonomous workplace take a different form for WC,
particularly in governance areas.
4. The unrotated position of the bookkeeper is somewhat of an
anomaly in a collective workplace, but a common practice in
other Federation warehouses. In the case of the WC, this spe-
cialization was the consequence of: (1) growing organizational
demands for consistent bookkeeping; and (2) the reluctance of
the person filling the position to participate in other tasks
when bookkeeping itself represented such a major responsibil-
ity. In larger warehouse operations elsewhere, an "accounting
department" often emerges, with a number of skilled members
hsaring accounting tasks according to a slow rotational sys-
tem. In this way, an area of specialization eventually be-
comes a "sub-collective" within the larger warehouse opera-
tions, mirroring the earlier development of the warehouse when
it was staffed by only one or two individuals.
Research relationship . The Warehouse Collective was enthusiastic
about research participation, noting that their daily contact with food
co-ops in the Federation had convinced them of the critical need for
more information and knowledge regarding the development of alternative
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institutions. In exchange for their participation, I helped plan and
then facilitate a general (now annual) meeting attended by approximately
fifty representatives from member co-ops. At that meeting, I introduced
a formal procedure for consensual decision-making in large groups, a de-
vice which the meeting employed in changing its by-laws to establish the
first foard of Directors for the Federation.
Interviews
.
Five current members, ranging from most to least sen-
ior, were interviewed, as well as one founding member who had left the
Collective two years previously after becoming disillusioned about the
political viability of the food co-op movement.
Other sources of information
. Supplementary materials include the
minutes of crucial meetings, various revisions of the by-laws, descrip-
tive brochures and flyers, and two early attempts to capture the history
of both the Federation and the warehouse operations.
Current developmental state . Currently, the Warehouse Collective
is best characterized by the consensual democracy stage, although some
features typical of informal differentiation still linger. Examining
Table 8, we find that WC lacks some elements of a "constitutional demo-
cracy with clear rules and procedures" (CD-2), especially in those areas
not covered by the Federation governance procedures. While the Federa-
tion is a formal constitutional democracy, WC, strictly speaking, is
not -- there is no set of by-laws or workplace agreements which forma-
lizes the internal rules and procedures of the Collective. In this re-
spect we find WC still retains at least one feature of informal differ-
ent ation : "organizational rules and regulations apparent, but not for-
mally recognized or written down" (ID-16). Given the overall structure
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TABLE 8
CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY ITEMS FOR THE WAREHOUSE COLLECTIVE
Characteristics
:
1 « return to consensual forms
2 -- constitutional democracy with clear
rules and procedures
3 clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements
4 -- structures for sharing work and
feel in gs
5 -- administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring
6 -- explicit contracts for members
Leadershi p
:
7 --
8 —
9 —
10 —
Rewards
:
leadership informal, shifting and
shared
subgroups, program components given
wide latitude in decision-making
representative groups employed for
overall program planning
all major decisions referred to
total membership
11 — autonomy
12 -- involvement in planning and deci-
cision-making
13 -- community and support
14 -- increasing effectiveness and com-
petence
Problems and pressures:
15 -- low salaries
16 -- decision-making slow and cumbersome
17 -- difficulty in accepting and removing
members
18 -- loss of directly productive time do-
ing administrative work
19 -- difficulty in obtaining funding
20 -- licensing laws and other threats
from conventional establishment
21 -- limitations in scope of services,
products or customers
22 -- difficulty in getting referrals from
and tying in with conventional orga-
ni zations
yes
yes, but somewhat external to the
workplace
yes
yes
yes, with the exception of the
bookkeeper
no
yes
yes
yes , but enti re group
yes, and then to BoD
yes
yes
yes
yes
no, $10,000/yr.
only when it goes before the BoD
no
no
no, self-capitalizing
n'o
yes
no
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of the Federation governance system, however, the lack of formalization
in WC is less of a problem than it might appear at first. WC's current
decision-making powers only lie in two areas - operations and person-
nel. Decisions regarding major expenditures, policy and new positions
fall to the BoD, two of whom are WC members. In this way the constitu-
tional democracy of the Federation supplants WC's need for separate
rules and procedures in several significant areas. Furthermore, WC has
generally recognized procedures in the areas of personnel and opera-
tions, but until recently there was little interest in committing these
to written form, probably due to the small size of the group. In a re-
lated area, WC also lacks "explicit contracts for members" (CD-6) other
than the general job description which is applicable to all warehouse
workers. There are, however, shared, informal expectations which form
the basis of the personnel review process -- once again explicit, but
not in writing. Despite some vestiges of informal differentiation
,
the
WC shows no evidence of internal power struggles between core and non-
core members which are the hallmarks of this stage (ID-6, 7, 13, 14, and
15). In fact, the Collective has even circumvented most of the "pro-
blems and pressures" common to consensual democracy
,
particularly in
areas of funding (due to a unique capitalization program) and salaries
($10,000/year).
Structural history . The origins of the Warehouse Collective can be
traced to 1974, a time of rapid development and expansion of food co-ops
in the region. During this period, the coordinators of five established
co-ops began to meet informally to plan joint purchases in food areas
such as grains and cheeses, where large volumes are an absolute require-
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ment for low wholesale prices (see Table 9). Through these pooled pur-
chases, a "co-op of co-ops" developed which sought not only to create an
alternative to the conventional wholesale distributors (by eliminating
the need for their services), but to expand the number of regional food
co-ops as well. Spurred by the availability of federal funds to begin
their own warehousing operations, this group began to formalize itself
as a "federation" of co-ops in the latter half of 1974, holding "general
meetings" of representatives from the co-ops involved in the joint pur-
chases. In order to generate "up-front" funds for these purchases, and
to develop a revolving loan fund for newly established but under-capi-
talized food co-ops, the federation established a "co-op equity fund" in
the fall of 1974. This fund was financed by a small surcharge added to
the cost of each individual co-op's purchases from the federation. Dur-
ing this period, all of the labor required for coordinating and distri-
buting the bulk purchases was donated by member co-ops. In 1975, how-
ever, the volume of purchases grew to the point where this arrangement
was no longer satisfactory. First of all, it became necessary to borrow
warehouse space from the larger co-ops. And secondly, with the acquisi-
tion of warehouse space, it became evident that the operations required
regular (but part-time) staffing. Initially, the operations were divided
between two groups, a warehouse staff of two individuals partially sup-
ported by VISTA volunteer funds, and a Bulk-Buying Collective of volun-
teers from local co-ops who rotated the task of ordering from whole-
salers.
As the volume of joint purchases continued to grow throughout the
winter of 1975-76, two major changes became necessary. First of all,
145
the members of the Bulk-Buying Collective began to be reimbursed for
their increasing work- load by means of a $25 brokerage fee for each or-
der they negotiated with a wholesaler (March). And secondly, the fed-
eration rented its own warehouse space for the first time in May. In
June of 1976, the Federation was incorporated as a non-profit corpora-
tion, with by-laws which formalized officers, decision-making and mem-
bership. This formalization did not extend to the warehouse staff, how-
ever, and set the stage for recurring conflict between the staff and the
co-ops who were Federation members. Although the Federation was governed
democratically through regular general meetings (one co-op, one vote),
the warehouse workers were essentially its employees, with no formal
mechanism of representation of their own in the general meeting. Thus
the warehouse staff felt that they had little control over their work-
place, control which they believed to be a democratic right.
By September of 1976, the brokerage fee system of reimbursing mem-
bers of the Bulk-Buying Collective proved too unwieldy, and first sala-
ries ($25/week) were paid to three part-time staff located at the ware-
house. These paid staff began to perform the bulk ordering work previ-
ously done by the volunteer Bulk-Buying Collective, and continued with
warehousing, bookkeeping and deliveries to member co-ops. In creating
salaried positions, the Federation thoughtfully tied the salary levels
to the total dollar volume of the warehouse operations, making it possi-
ble to gradually expand the positions to full-time, at a higher rate of
remuneration. In addition, the Federation also developed the first gen-
eral job descriptions and a rudimentary personnel review procedure for
the staff. In the summer of 1977, this procedure received its first
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test as one staff member resigned as the consequence of a negative per-
sonnel evaluation. This resignation left the two remaining staff (full-
time, by then) short-handed in the face of ever-increasing business
volume, and in the late summer and fall of 1977, three new full-time
staff and a half-time bookkeeper were added. During this period one of
the two original staff resigned, leaving a total of four and one-half
staff positions at the warehouse.
The addition of new staff was significant in two related ways. The
job announcements for these new positions identified the warehouse staff
as a "collective" for the first time, a factor which had a considerable
impact on the workplace expectations of the new staff members — they
assumed that shared work and decision-making would be central features
of the warehouse operations. Secondly, the warehouse experienced almost
a complete turnover in membership, and more than doubled its staff size
at the same time. Throughout the latter half of 1977, the new members
were instrumental in establishing a number of workplace structures which
were demanded by the increased size of WC. Weekly meetings of WC were
begun and job rotation was initiated in several areas of the warehouse
operations. In addition, a hiring and firing procedure was implemented,
along with a one-month trial period for new members. Despite the new
structures and procedures, however, the gap in skills and experience be-
tween the one remaining (male) founding member and the new arrivals was
di ffi cul t to close.
The founding member functioned as an informal manager of the ware-
house, apparently unable, and at times unwilling, to share his power,
expertise and responsibility with the others. As a result, power strug-
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gles developed between the founding member and the newer members. One
new woman member was particularly upset by the degree of informal influ-
ence held by the remaining founder. According to other members, she
"wanted to write things down on pieces of paper all over the warehouse
walls in order to reduce [his] power." These conflicts were interrupted
by WC's move to a larger warehouse in December of 1977, but resumed
shortly thereafter. In the move, all the procedures written down on the
walls of the old warehouse were lost, the conflicts continued, and the
woman member resigned two months later. Despite her short tenure, cur-
rent members of the Collective attribute much of the initial discussion
of workplace issues (and their eventual resolution) to the impact of
this own woman member.
During 1978, conflicts over informal power continued, and WC began
related discussions of the need for a formal system of orientation and
training for new members., During the same period, as the Federation
hired a non-warehouse staff member in charge of educational programs, WC
defined its membership to include only those staff who worked directly
with the warehouse operations. And in the Spring of 1978, WC members
"discovered" their first monthly meeting when all the members of a Feder-
ation personnel committee failed to appear for a personnel evaluation of
a WC member. The resulting meeting allowed WC members to air interper-
sonal issues in a setting away from the warehouse for the first time;
the results were so dramatic that WC immediately institutionalized the
monthly meeting. The conflicts regarding the founding member's informal
power were aired extensively in these meetings, although their final
resolution did not appear to occur until his resignation in December
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1978. As the monthly meetings continued, they moved beyond interper-
sonal issues and began to include long-range planning and discussions of
major policy issues. In particular, WC used this forum to plan the
structure of workplace in such a way to circumvent the emergence of in-
formal managers in the future. Eventually, in the spring of 1979, the
monthly meeting also became the formal forum for personnel matters, as
WC members gained autonomy in this area (previously a Federation con-
cern). During the summer of 1979, WC expanded job rotation possibilities
and made its first attempt at formal orientation and training for a new
member. And in October of 1979, at a general meeting of the Federation,
the member co-ops approved major by-law changes that had been suggested
by WC. The most significant feature of these changes involved the crea-
tion of a BoD for the Federation which would largely replace the general
meeting. The BoD, consisting of ten members, has eight co-op members
and two members from WC, a feature which formalized the participation of
WC in Federation affairs for the first time by means of their formal
representation in the Federation's constitutional democracy.
Ca tegori zation . The Warehouse Collective stands as a Type 3 or-
ganization: it follows the Holleb and Abrams scenario as far as infor-
mal differentiation but then skips formal differentiation
,
and moves
clearly in the direction of consensual democracy .
In more detailed terms, we can see that WC began with the consen-
sual anarchy stage in 1974 with the informal joint purchases of the five
co-op coordinators. The informal differentiation stage began with the
first salaried positions and job descriptions, and fully emerged in 1977
and 1978 as power struggles developed between the sole founding member
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and newer members. The end of this stage and the beginning of consen-
sual democracy is more difficult to define, however. The resignation
of the last founding member certainly represented a symbolic turning
point, in that it signalled the end of major power struggles character-
istic of informal, d ifferentiation. The actual implementation of exten-
sive job rotation, WC autonomy in personnel matters, and the first for-
mal orientation and training did not occur until the middle of 1979,
however. Taking the most conservative view, we might argue that the
change of the Federation's by-laws in October 1979 officially marked the
beginning of consensual demoxracy_. These changes allowed the Collective
to formally enter into the constitutional democracy by which the Federa-
tion is governed. As pointed out previously, WC has only recently en-
tered consensual democracy
,
and still needs to take further steps to
ensure continued development along these lines. In particular, it ap-
pears that explicit member contracts, more extensive training and orien-
tation programs, and more formal rules and procedures are still neces-
sary, especially in light of the probable increase in the size of the
warehouse operations in the future.
Literature Collecti ve . The Literature Collective (LC) is a self-pro-
claimed "alternative business" which sells books and periodicals related
to social change both by mail order and by means of portable bookstores
set up at college campuses, food co-ops, fairs and conferences. Gross-
ing close to $40,000 per year, LC has three part-time, paid members and
is assisted by several volunteers who earn a 20% discount on their own
book purchases in exchange for their labor. The organization currently
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operates out of a small office, but is planning to rent the space neces-
sary for an actual bookstore in the near future.
Current organizational practices
. The basic work flow of LC in-
volves acquiring books and periodicals, evaluating the literature and
preparing catalogs, and, finally selling the literature. By breaking
these general areas into discrete tasks and adding other specific ad-
ministrative duties (e.g., bookkeeping), the three members of LC have
developed an elaborate job rotation system. Based on "tours of duty" of
two, three, or six months, this rotation system includes some job areas
shared by two members at a time, although one member is deliberately as-
signed major responsibility. Volunteers usually work in a few well-
defined job areas, such as ordering, writing book reviews, and staffing
the portable bookstores. In addition, work-study students from local
colleges occasionally serve as interns at LC, usually performing tasks
that are more complex than those done by volunteers.
The three LC members hold weekly staff meetings which are, in theo-
ry at least, open to volunteers and other interested individuals from
the surrounding community. Since these meetings are held during working
hours, however, attendance by non-members is usually infrequent. The
staff meetings are highly organized and include a prior agenda, facili-
tator, and notetaker. Each meeting begins with time set aside for shar-
ing feelings, followed by a business meeting. After a short break, the
second half of the meeting deliberately focuses on matters other than
day-to-day business, such as planning, personnel, or workplace issues.
Finally, the meeting concludes with a criticism/self-criticism session.
Decision-making is consensual, with recognized but not written procedures.
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Detailed minutes of each meeting are typed and distributed to members
and other interested parties.
LC has formal search and hiring procedures for new members, and a
parallel but more informal process for admitting new volunteers. On the
other hand, there are no trial periods, personnel review procedures, or
firing procedures for members or any equivalent steps for volunteers,
although all of these areas are the subjects of current planning discus-
sions. Formal orientation and training programs are provided for both
new members of the collective and new volunteers, and in both cases, LC
employs a considerable amount of excellent written materials.
Membership. The three members of LC, two men and a woman, range in
age from early twenties to early thirties. The four or five volunteers
active within LC fall within the same age bracket. Two factors compli-
cate an estimate of member turnover: 1) the current definition of mem-
bership is only two years old; and 2) LC has steadily expanded during
this period. Starting with only one paid member two years ago, the or-
ganization soon added second and third members, eventually replacing the
third individual. Turnover among volunteers, on the other hand, is more
straightforward. Volunteers usually remain associated with LC for only
six to eighteen months, resulting in a 60-70% annual turnover rate.
Rudimentary written contracts are used to explain rights, duties and
obligations to volunteers, but no similar document has been developed
for paid members as yet.
Informal structure . The presence of the founding member at LC
creates a potential for his informal influence in the organization, a
factor which he readily acknowledges as a problem in the past. The
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founder started the business, created many of the prevailing business
procedures, and developed the first contacts with publishers and book
wholesalers. This issue continues to be an open topic of discussion
within LC, but the founder and other members are determined to distri-
bute his knowledge and skills throughout the organization. Both the
elaborate rotational system and the training and orientation documents
represent deliberate steps in this direction. At the same time, how-
ever, the founding member's leadership at LC is recognized and valued by
the other members.
Additional notes. Other facets of the Literature Collective worthy
of mention include the following:
1. The high degree of work structuring at LC is atypical for
such a small organization. Although the members now see this
formalization as a way to promote member equality in skill and
knowledge areas, they suggest that the initial impetus for
these innovations can be traced to the recurring necessity to
explain LC operations to volunteers and work-study students,
and the larger size of LC when it was a volunteer organiza-
tion .
2. Salaries are low at LC because members see low salaries as
an essential device for capitalizing the organization. The
only other option open to LC would be taking on commercial
bank loans to build their stock of literature, a path fraught
with demanding financial responsibilities that members would
like to avoid.
3. The process skills of LC members are well developed, a
feature which appears to be intertwined with the sophisticated
format of their weekly meetings. Members claim that the
criticism/self-criticism sessions at the end of their meetings
have served as the major vehicle for improvement of meeting
structure over the years. They maintain that this device also
encourages members to acquire and practice individual process
skills. The time for sharing feelings at the beginning of
meetings also appears important in this regard as well, in
that it allows conflicts and issues to be named and often re-
solved early on in the meetings.
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4. The separation in weekly meetinas nf Haw +n a* u •
he?rX^ftL^ir5 ; anticipate ch" « * » yweir organizational structure on an ongoing basis.
Research rejationshi^. LC members were very open to research par-
ticipation, indicating that the central question of the research was one
which was very important to themselves as well. Members could not pro-
pose an appropriate exchange at the time of interviewing, but indicated
that they would certainly take advantage of the arrangement at a future
date.
Interviews
.
Three past and present members and two volunteers were
interviewed. The members consisted of: the founding member; one member
who had been at LC for one year; and one member who recently left the
organ iza tion.
Other sources of information
. Supplementary materials include sev-
eral written documents, minutes of significant meetings, job rotation
charts, and written volunteer contracts.
Current developmental state. The Literature Collective is an or-
ganization in the process of moving from Holleb and Abrams' informal
differentiation stage to consensual democracy
. From Table 10, we can
see that LC still has several features common to informal differentia-
tion
,
but lacks dominant features such as the "core group" (ID-6, 7),
associated power and inclusion conflicts (ID-10, 13, 14, and 15), and
fluid membership boundaries (ID-3). Traces of informal differentiation
still remaining include: rapid expansion of services (ID-5); the ab-
sence of formal decision-making procedures (ID-8); issues of external
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TABLE 10
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR
Characteristics
:
1 -- de-emphasis of ideology
3 -
4
5 --
informal division of labor; first job
description
continued fluid membership but infor-
mal boundaries tighten
menfcership based on friendship or
"good vibes"
organization in period of rapid expan
sion/implementation
Leadership:
6 -- formation of the core group
7 -- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membership
8 lack of formal decision-making proce
dures
Rewards
:
9 — increasing effectiveness and compet-
ence (learning through skill-sharing)
10 -- sense of family in core group
1 1 -- autonomy i n work
1 2 personal growth
Problems and Pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and i nfl uence
14 -- core group feels responsibility but
none of the power
15 -- non-core members feel left out of
important decisions
16 -- organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down
17 -- outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookkeeping and inter-
nal accountability
18 -- clientele/customers demand more con-
sistent services
THE LITERATURE COLLECTIVE
no; re-emphasis guiding development
of elaborate job rotation system
no; formal division by rotation
no; membership no longer fluid, but
not yet formal ized
t(0 some degree; commitment to orga-
nizational goals more important
yes
none
no
yes, but highly organized meetings
yes, strikingly
no, within whole collective
yes
yes
no
no
true of volunteers to a small degree
work areas, no; decision-making and
membership boundaries, yes
yes
yes
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accountability (ID-17); and counts about inconsistent services (ID-
18). Examining Table 11, on the other hand, we see that LC also has
-any of the features of consensual dejnocracy., especially explicit struc-
tures "for sharing work and feelings" (CD-4) and for sharing administra-
tive and maintenance work (CD-5). Some important components of consen
sual democracy do not exist, however. The organization lacks an expli-
cit, democratic governance system (CM), formal definitions of member-
ship (CD-3), and explicit member contracts (CD-6), although these latter
two items do exist for volunteers. Nonetheless, LC is certain to ad-
dress these deficient areas in the near future. Currently members are
on the verge of incorporating LC as a non-profit, educational organiza-
tion, an action which usually precipitates the creation of formal by-
laws. If these by-laws are written in a fashion consistent with current
practices at LC, the result is sure to be a "constitutional democracy
with clear rules and procedures" (CD-2), which formally defines members-
rights, duties and obligations (CD-3).
Structural hjstorx. The original business operations of the Liter-
ature Collective were begun in February 1976 (see Table 12) by one indi-
vidual who was concerned about the lack of public access to a range of
social change literature. By purchasing literature at wholesale rates
and re-selling it at local campuses, conferences and fairs, the founder
was able to recover his business expenses and then reinvest in an ever-
increasing stock of literature. By not drawing a salary, the founder
established a financial precedent which was to later prove essential to
the capitalization of the business. In June of 1976, the founder was
joined by a second individual, and the two of them established the busi-
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TABLE 11
CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY ITEMS FOR TF
Characteri sties
:
1 — return to consensual forms
2 -- constitutional democracy with clear
rules and procedures
3 — clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements
4 — structures for sharing work and
feelings
5 — administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring
6 -- explicit contracts for members
Leadership:
7 — leadership informal, shifting and
shared
8 -- subgroups, program components given
wide latitude in decision-making
9 — representative groups employed for
overall program planning
10 -- all major decisions referred to
total membership
Rewards
:
1 1 -- autonomy
12 -- involvement in planning and deci-
ci sion-maki ng
13 -- community and support
14 increasing effectiveness and com-
petence
Problems and pressures:
15-- low salaries
16 -- decision-making slow and cumbersome
17 — difficulty in accepting and removing
members
18 — loss of directly productive time do-
ing administrative work
19 -- difficulty in obtaining funding
20 — licensing laws and other threats
from conventional establishment
21 -- limitations in scope of services,
products or customers
22 -- difficulty in getting referrals from
and tying in with conventional orga-
ni zations
LITERATURE COLLECTIVE
yes
no
yes; recognized but not written
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes, but entire group
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes, but deliberate
not really; very structured meetings
yes, but only removing
not really
NA; sel f-capital ized
yes
not yet
no
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ness as a formal partnership. As the business volume and inventory con-
tinued to grow over the next eighteen months, several other individuals
would periodically donate their time to the operations as well. In or-
der to attract these volunteers, the initial members of LC developed a
system by which volunteers could earn discounts on book purchases and,
eventually, formal equity in the business. Although the discount part
of the system functioned well, the equity component required volunteers
to keep detailed records of their work hours, a feature which led to the
eventual demise of the equity incentive in the fall of 1977.
In February of 1978, the two partners called a meeting of volun-
teers and others associated with the business in order to assess their
interest in a more formalized Literature Collective. The new organiza-
tion would consist of volunteer members coordinated by a part-time, paid
staff member. Twenty persons attended the meeting, much to the surprise
of the two original partners. Those present voted to establish the new
version of LC and also agreed to hire the founding member as the organi-
zation's coordinator (at $100 per month). Weekly meetings of the 20
members soon began, but promised to be unworkable because of their size.
During a criticism/ self-criticism session at the end of one of these
meetings, members responded to this problem by deciding to develop a
meeting format and introduce facilitator and notetaker roles. The de-
mands of the weekly meeting gradually proved too much of a burden for
several members, however, resulting in their eventual departure from LC.
Nonetheless, LC business thrived during the spring of 1978.
At a meeting which followed one particularly successful weekend at
a large conference, the membership decided to suspend operations for the
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summer in order to develop both an internal structure and m0 re coherent
business procedures. During this deliberate planning period, members
met at least once each week, delegating tasks to be done in between work
sessions. By the end of the summer, however, the long series of meet-
ings had further reduced the membership, finally leaving only five mem-
bers (including the coordinator). As a partial solution to their de-
clining numbers, the remaining members decided to redefine LC as a
smaller, but more committed group. At the end of the planning period,
they limited the size of LC to no more than ten members and began work
on a formal membership agreement, which among other things, would speci-
fy a minimum time commitment of one year for incoming volunteer members.
By the fall of 1978, work on the membership agreement had been com-
pleted, and LC members publicly advertised for five new members. After
a formal screening and "hiring" process, five new volunteer members were
added to LC bringing the total membership to ten.
Later in the fall, LC rented its first office space and also pur-
chased a schoolbus which was converted into a mobile bookstore. But by
February of 1978, it became distressingly obvious that LC was not func-
tioning very well as a volunteer organization. LC had taken on major
financial commitments and the coordinator felt that he could no longer
rely upon the irregular efforts of volunteers to perform the growing
number of day-to-day business tasks. In addition, power struggles be-
tween the coordinator and the unpaid members began to surface more fre-
quently. Members felt that the coordinator tended to make too many
crucial decisions that should have been resolved in members' meetings.
In an attempt to relieve the overworked coordinator of some of his re-
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sponsibilities, LC hired another one of its meters on a part-ti^ basis
to attend to the financial affairs of the business, especially bookkeep-
ing. Rather than improving the situation, however, the new hiring made
things worse. Now two paid members were making an increasing number of
decisions, and volunteer energies waned even further.
At one point in the spring of 1979, it became evident to all LC
members that the paid staff reaJJx constrt^ a reali _
zation which led to a major revamping of both the organization and the
notion of membership. What had begun as a volunteer collective coordin-
ated by one paid member became a collective of paid members only. "Vol-
unteers" remained a category of association at LC, but persons in this
category no longer held voting rights. Although volunteers were ex-
pected to participate in the regular meetings, the two members consti-
tuting the "redefined" collective were to make all final decisions re-
garding the business. Shortly after these changes, a third part-time
member was added and bi-weekly staff meetings of the three members began.
With the introduction of staff meetings, the longstanding tradition of
regular meetings of paid staff and volunteers quickly faded due to vol-
unteer disinterest.
Early in the summer of 1979, the three LC members implemented their
first job rotation system with mixed results. Inspired by an article in
the alternative press on workplace organization, they also began to fur-
ther formalize the procedures and roles of the work process in written
form, creating basic documents which were to form the core of later ori-
entation programs for volunteers and new members. Early in the spring
of 1980, LC members gave their job rotation system a needed overhaul,
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creating the elaborate system currently in place. Facing the need to
replace one member who was resigning, the members also developed a for-
mal orientation and training program which they later implemented with
the hiring of another new member. And finally, efforts to incorporate
LC, begun in the fall of 1979, have currently neared the stage of actual
fi ling.
Categori zation. Since the Literature Collective has inhibited the
process of bureaucratization, and followed a developmental path differ-
ent from that suggested by Holleb and Abrams, it qualifies as a Type 3
organization. By attempting to move directly from the informal differ-
entiation stage to consensual democracy
, LC has avoided the formal dif-
ferentiation stage of the Holleb and Abrams' model. Although the or-
ganization has not yet fulfilled all of the requirements of consensual
democracy it is quickly moving in that direction.
In more detail, we can see that the first two years of LC can be
characterized as consensual anarchy
.
Membership boundaries were very
fluid, few tasks were differentiated, and one or two individuals pro-
vided the initial leadership. At the February 1978 meeting, LC entered
the informal differentiation stage. As a result of this meeting, the
first job description (and salary) appeared, as did the first concrete
efforts aimed at tightening membership boundaries. While the hiring of
the founding member may have looked as if the membership had formally
chosen their leadership, there was in fact little choice in the matter
-- he played a large part in creating the proposal and was definitely
the most qualified applicant give his experience with LC business. In
reality, then, his hiring only brought a degree of formality (and a
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salary) to a situation which had been in place for some time.
With the creation of an explicit coordinator position, the stage
was set for power conflicts between the coordinator and the unpaid mem-
bers. Over time, as a growing business volume increased the responsi-
bilities of the coordinator, unpaid members began to question his grow-
ing decision-making authority. Due to the centrality of the single co-
ordinator, however, a consistent core group did not emerge until very
late in the informal differentiation stage, a factor which diminished
issues of inclusion and exclusion within LC. With the hiring of the
second part-time member, however, these issues suddenly flared as un-
paid members felt excluded from the inner workings at LC. Issues of
inclusion/exclusion and the ongoing power conflicts were quickly ended
by the transformation of LC from a volunteer collective to a collective
of Daid staff. While such a resolution might appear to be the grand
finale in an ongoing power struggle, as far as it can be determined,
this decision seemed to be agreeably accepted by all parties involved --
based on the practicalities of a growing business and the limitations
of volunteer labor. Defined as an organization of paid members, LC soon
began to move in the direction of consensual democracy
. The members de-
veloped a job rotation structure and further refined their meeting
structure. Later, a more elaborate rotational system and formal orien-
tation and training programs were implemented. In short, then, we find
that LC is still attempting to develop its organization based on the
consensual ideals of earlier days.
Restaurant Collective
. Located at a large New England university, the
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Restaurant Collective (RC) strives to be an "alternative" in two ways:
by serving nutritious vegetarian meals in a setting where only bland in-
stitutional fare is normally available; and by structuring its restau-
rant as a worker collective. Throughout the two semesters of the aca-
demic year, RC serves about 350 lunches per weekday, grossing over
$50,000 annually. The members of RC consists of 25 to 30 undergraduate
students who schedule their working hours in between their classes in
order to earn a part-time income and frequent free meals. Due to a
unique arrangements with school officials, RC avoids paying rent for
their kitchen and serving areas, a savings which is passed on to custo-
mers in the form of very reasonable prices. In addition to serving
weekday lunches, RC also periodically caters conferences, concerts, and
other large public events.
Current organizational practices
. The work of RC falls into two
major categories: 1) daily work, consisting of preparation and cooking,
"running" prepared food from the kitchen to a nearby serving area, serv-
ing, dishwashing, and cleaning; and 2) ongoing committee work, performed
in the areas of ordering and menus, finances, administration and public
relations, and personnel. In theory, daily work is rotated among mem-
bers, but there is no formal vehicle for rotation. In practice, the
specific work of members is highly determined by their individual course
schedules. Preparation and cooking, by necessity, must begin early in
the morning and continue until lunch time, when "running" and serving be-
come the major jobs, followed by dishwashing and cleaning. Consequent-
ly, members with heavy loads of morning courses never cook, while those
with afternoon labs rarely wash dishes or clean. Scheduling of avail-
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able member hours with the job slots throughout the week is established
at the beginning of each semester and adjusted as needed on a weekly ba-
sis. Preparation and cooking are the only jobs for which any procedures
have been formally established. Located in the ki tchen are time-tested
recipe manuals which detail the large-scale preparation of each lunchtime
meal offered at RC. Committee work is also divided between the members
at the beginning of each semester, on a combined basis of skills, inter-
est and experience, with the expectation that members will continue on a
committee for at least one semester's duration.
Once every week the members of RC hold a two-hour staff meeting in
order to share information, discuss current problems, and make both poli-
cy and operational decisions. Formal meeting roles rotated from one
meeting to the next include that of a facilitator and also a notetaker.
Decision-making is consensual without recognized procedures or back-up
provisions should members fail to reach consensus. Special meetings for
planning or retreat purposes occur only very rarely, although RC social
events occur four to five times each semester.
Hiring is conducted at the beginning of each semester, tending to
be more of a task at the beginning of the school year when a large num-
ber of members need to be replaced. Job notices are publicly posted de-
scribing the nature of work and obligations at RC, and after screening
and interviews, those accepted by RC undergo a one-day orientation just
before the first day of operations. This entire process occurs within
the first two weeks of each semester. A rudimentary firing process does
exist, but is awkward to initiate; in the entire history of RC, only one
member has ever been fired by this procedure. There are no trial peri-
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ods, job descriptions, or formal personnel review procedures.
Membershi P
-
Almost a11 RC members are undergraduate students rang-
ing in age from eighteen to twenty- four. They represent a wide spectrum
of academic majors and backgrounds, and generally have little or no pri-
or food service experience or experience with other collectives. Most
members were drawn initially to RC because of the promise of part-time
employment, and only secondarily because of their interest in a collec-
tive workplace. Turnover is extremely high, ranging from 60-80% each
year. As a result, the small number of members remaining from the pre-
vious school year must hire a majority of their membership each fall.
While an attempt is made to hire only new members who can work at least
two semesters, some invariably leave after one semester, necessitating
another, smaller hiring in January. Largely because women applicants
outnumber men, two-thirds of the members are usually women.
Informal structure
. According to those members interviewed, the
Restaurant Collective "has no managers," but it is obvious that a few
senior members, predominantly men, perform most of the day-to-day deci-
sion-making and coordination. The reality of this informal hierarchy is
largely denied by members publicly but admitted in private. The typical
informal manager is a male with some restaurant experience prior to
joining RC, a factor which tends to channel him into a cooking role.
Together, the informal managers form a fairly distinct core group in the
organization, taking on a lion's share of responsibility but lacking
formal power. Members of the core group are usually scattered among the
various committees at RC, where they also play dominant roles. The cur-
rent core group is entirely composed of individuals who are returning
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members from the previous school year.
Additional notes. The Restaurant Collective has a number of other
characteristics worth mentioning:
Ir
the me?6rS interviewed indicated that working atKL fulfills more than financial needs. Membership not only
al lows
#
them to meet a large number of like-minded people but
also gi ves them a needed sense of "belonging" on a large cam-pus. Some members commented that their involvement has re-
sulted in important personal development, largely because it
experiences in filling leader-
ship positions. Still others pointed out that the organiza-
tion gives them a very concrete educational experience, in
that they are able to try out their social ideals in a "real-
nfe business organization.
2. For most RC members, academic obligations clearly have
more priority than their obligations to the organization, a
factor which sets real limits on their organizational involve-
ment. For members who serve as informal managers, on the
other hand, these priorities are often reversed, an inclina-
tion which they refer to as "commitment" to RC.
3. The high degree of public denial surrounding the informal
hierarchy at RC is remarkable. The topic is never discussed
in weekly RC meetings, although the conflicts precipitated by
the informal structure are evident to most members. Since the
"managers" are usually men and the majority of members are
women, these conflicts are seen by several women members as
examples of sexism at RC. Even this perspective has never been
publicly aired within the organization, however.
4. The high turnover rate at RC is obviously linked to the
emergence of the core group of informal managers. As one
women member expressed it, being one of the few returning mem-
bers "puts you in an automatic position of authority relative
to the new members." This woman felt "trapped" into an infor-
mal manager role -- if she didn't use her skills and experi-
ence, she felt that important tasks would be done poorly if at
all. In order to eventually escape this "trap," she felt that
she had no choice but to resign from the organization altoge-
ther.
5. The emergence of the core group at RC also seems related
to the lack of written records and policies within the organi-
zation. For new members, the major source of information re-
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garding past practices is the informal oral history carried hvmembers returning from the previous school year This sense
*
of the past is rarely communicated directly, however Usually
^
trickles out from senior members in com^nts like', "we've
'
always done it this way," or, "we tried that two years ago andit never worked." In point of fact, most current RC membersknow very litt e about the organization's history prev^us totheir membership. For example, I found the founding statementof RC s mission and goals while leafing through their filesone day, a document that only one or two current members were
tlZT re^;, N««"ess to say, this sta tenant was somewhatat odds with the prevailing oral history.
Research relationship. The membership at RC was generally open to
research participation with the exception of several of the informal
managers, who were reluctant to become involved in the actual interviews
My guess was that they were concerned about being questioned about the
apparent contradiction between the organization's collective ideals and
the reality of their actual roles, a suspicion partially confirmed in a
later interview with one of these individuals. My exchange with RC con-
sisted of aiding a group of members plan and implement a problem-solving
meeting for the entire organization and assisting in the development of
recruitment and hiring procedures.
Intervi ews
.
Nine interviews were conducted: one founding member
no longer with RC; three past members who had functioned as informal
managers; one current informal manager; two members of longstanding; and
two more recent members.
Current developmental state . The current state of the Restaurant
Collective is best described by Holleb and Abrams' informal differentia-
tion stage, although there are some deviations worth noting. From Table
13, we can see the central features of this stage -- a "core group" of
informal managers and inclusion/exclusion issues -- are very evident at
TABLE 13
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE RESTAURANT COLLECTIVE
Characteristics
:
de-emphasis of ideology
informal division of labor; first job
description
continued fluid membership but infor-
mal boundaires tighten
membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"
organization in period of rapid expan
sion/implementation
Leadership:
6 -- formation of the core group
7 -- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
entire membership
lack of formal decision-making proce
dures
Rewards
:
Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and influence
14 -
15 -
16 -
17 -
18 -
core group feels responsibility but
none of the power
non-core members feel left out of
important decisions
organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down
outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookeeping and inter-
nal accountability
clientele/customers demand more con-
sistent servi ces
yes
yes; but no job description
no -- distinct boundaries
to some degree
no longer
yes
,
yearly
yes
yes
9 - increasing effectiveness and compet-
ence (learning through skill-sharing)
yes
10 -- sense of family in core group yes
11 -- autonomy in work yes
12 - personal growth yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
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RC (ID-6, 7, 10, 13, 14, and 15). RC has no formal decision-making pro-
cedures (ID-8), and the few rules and procedures which do exist (e.g.,
weekly meetings, meeting roles, committee structure, etc.) are main-
tained solely by means of oral history (ID-16). In addition, school of-
ficials continually raise issues of internal accountability (ID-17),
while customers periodically complain about the quality and quantity of
the lunches (ID-13). There are, however, four inconsistent character-
istics. Membership boundaries are fairly distinctly drawn on the basis
of paid members, although some volunteers do take an active interest in
the organization (ID-3). Division of labor is informal, but no indivi-
dual job descriptions exist at present (ID-2). In addition, membership
is based upon more than "friendship and 'good vibes'" (ID-4). Though
these tendencies do color the hiring process to some extent there is a
very recent emphasis upon restaurant skills and interest in collective
workplaces. And finally, the organization no longer appears to be ex-
panding, having reached a peak of growth about two years ago (ID-5).
These exceptions to informal differentiation seem relatively minor,
however, and may become more understandable as we look at RC's histori-
cal development.
Structural history . The idea of the Restaurant Collective was
originated in the fall of 1975 by a group of undergraduate friends con-
cerned about the total absence of vegetarian lunches on the school's
large campus. After lengthy and complex negotiations with school offi-
cials, this group was finally able to begin serving light lunches in the
last month of the 1976 spring semester (see Table 14). Composed of a
combination of paid workers and volunteers, RC first functioned in a
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state of hectic confusion. At the end of this first month of operation,
the new organization held a short series of evaluation meetings, at
which it was determined that they had both made money and demonstrated
the demand for vegetarian lunches. It also became evident, however,
that if the RC was to continue the following fall, it would require more
structure in order to avoid the chaos of their opening month. After
lengthy debates about the pros and cons of more organization, the group
finally decided to elect two coordinators who would each take one major
area of day-to-day responsibility - the financial side on one hand, and
ordering and menus on the other. The two coordinators would perform
these duties in addition to their normal paid hours at RC. At the time
of this election, members stressed that the coordinators would not be
"traditional managers," however. All major decisions were to be made by
the entire membership at weekly meetings to start in the fall. It was
also decided that only paid members could vote in the future, although
volunteers and other interested individuals could attend meetings. In
the fall semester of 1976, the new structure was implemented and even
formalized to some degree in a document required by school officials
(who wanted to identify "responsible" individuals for fiscal and insur-
ance reasons). Submission of this document also required RC to define
membership boundaries, leading to the first formal statement that voting
rights in the organization were limited to paid members. At the same
time, a very basic firing procedure was devised, as well.
In general terms, the two-coordinator structure worked fairly well
that fall, with the important exception that the coordinators, both men,
periodically overstepped the bounds of their authority, performing tasks
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and making major decisions which should have been reserved for the week-
ly meeting. At issue, it seems, was the definition of a "major deci-
sion." The membership was predominantly women, however, and the result-
ing tensions quickly divided the organization between men who backed the
notion of coordinators, and the majority of women who found the arrange-
ment oppressive. Although the issue was actually phrased as one of "bad
intepersonal dynamics," the membership finally concluded at the end of
the fall semester that the coordinator idea was not working. In its
place they created a "core group" (their term) of five elected individu-
als who would each take responsibility for a major area of RC operations
ordering, menus, personnel, finances, and public relations. The theory,
of course, was that by diffusing responsibilities between more individ-
uals, power-accumulating tendencies would be diminished. This "core
group" structure was employed throughout the spring semester of 1977,
but fared no better than the "coordinator" system which it replaced.
The "core group" continued to be staffed largely by men who overstepped
their bounds in the same ways. Late in the spring, the RC membership
decided to try a third system, this time based on five committees which
would cover the same areas performed by the five "core group" members.
Implemented in the fall semester of 1977, this structure remains to the
present day.
Unfortunately, the committee structure has never worked as planned,
either. In theory, the committees would simultaneously spread major re-
sponsibilities among the entire membership and prevent a small group of
members from "running the show." In practice, however, the major share
of committee work has almost always fallen to a small number of return-
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ing members. Since committee work is above and beyond the paid hours at
RC, and because time is at a premium for undergraduates, attendance at
committee meetings usually falls off quickly after the beginning of each
semester, usually leaving one or two senior members to perform important
committee tasks. As these senior members devote more time to the organ-
ization, they inevitably begin to make decisions which infringe upon the
perceived but not explicit decision-making powers of the weekly member-
ship meeting (e.g., changing a pricing policy, etc.). The result, as we
might expect, is growing conflict throughout the year between the core
of informal managers and the other members of the organization, conflict
which is only resolved by the departure of most of the core group at the
end of the school year. At the same time, however, it should be pointed
out that not all returning members fall prey to automatic membership in
the core group. Some recognize the problem of being "trapped" at RC,
and resolve to minimize their involvement, even if it means that crucial
tasks go undone.
Recognizing that part of the problem with the committee structure
stems from new members' lack of knowledge and information, several mem-
bers attempted to develop a detailed orientation program and a more or-
ganized meeting format in the fall of 1978. Both of these innovations
worked very well throughout the 1978-79 academic year -- new members
were integrated into RC more quickly and the quality of weekly meetings
improved considerably. The members who originated these innovations all
left RC in the spring of 1979, however, and both practices largely dis-
appeared over the summer.
Since the fall of 1977, then, little has changed at RC except the
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faces of its members. For the past three years the sarre basic pattern
has repeated itself -
. sub-group of returning members emerge as a core
of informal managers for about one year and then leave the organization,
usually due to academic pressures, graduation, or frustration. The only
noteworthy change since 1977 was an attempt to revise the recruitment
and hiring process in the fall of 1979. Prompted by a consultant who
facilitated a problem-solving meeting, RC went to great lengths to de-
scribe the obligations of membership in hiring notices and also formal-
ized its hiring process. As a result, the number of applications for
the fall hiring plummeted, but the quality and "commitment" of appli-
cants improved greatly over past years. In the short run, these new
procedures seem to have had some impact upon the turnover rate as well
— a large proportion (50%) of new members plan to return to RC in the
fall of 1980. At this point, however, it is difficult to assess other
effects of the new recruitment and hiring procedures or even know if
they will be continued in the future.
Categorization
.
The Restaurant Collective is a Type 2 organiza-
tion, one whose development diverges significantly but unsuccessfully
from the Holleb and Abrams" scenario. In this case, RC members made
early attempts to structure their organization along consensual/demo-
cratic lines, but these efforts did not inhibit the process of bureau-
era tization.
Reviewing RC's development in more detail, it is clear that the
planning and first month of operations had all the earmarks of consen-
sual anarchy
.
Energy levels were high, tasks were undifferentiated, and
membership boundaries were fluid. On the basis of the model described
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by Holleb and Abrams, we would expect RC at some point to move next to
infgnnajdi fferentiation, a stage marked by the emergence of a core
group of informal managers. In the case of RC, however, the organiza-
tion evaluated its initial performance and then ejected two copxdina
-
tors_> deliberately choosing those members who were to perform basic
management functions. As we have seen, this deliberate arrangement
still led to power struggles, as did its successor, the elected "core
group." In both instances, it appears that the necessary functions were
performed, but that the membership was dissatisfied with the power- and
task-accumulating behavior of the individuals (predominantly men) who
held the elected positions. Rather than refine these coordinating
structures, the membership chose instead to abandon them altogether,
creating a less- defined system of committees to perform the same set of
tasks. The committee structure, of course, has resulted in the same
problems regarding power and control in the organization, but has at the
same time made it more difficult to hold specific individuals account-
able for their actions. In essence, then, RC initially attempted to
control its leadership by election, but later created a committee struc-
ture which resulted in the emergence of informal managers on a self-
selected basis. In this way the organization moved briefly towards con -
sensual democracy
,
but later stabilized in the informal differentiation
stage, where it has remained for the past three years.
Magazine Group . One of several projects within a larger non-profit or-
ganization known as Umbrella, the Magazine Group (MG) publishes a peri-
odical every two months which has combined paid and unpaid circulation
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of about 50,000 copies. The central theme of MG's magazine is self-
reliance, especially in the areas of energy, agriculture, work and the
environment. Currently MG is rebuilding its operations after a combined
financial and organizational crisis reduced the ten-person staff to
three full-time and three part-time workers. In order to weather the
continuing financial pinch, the remaining staff members often forego and
share salaries, both common practices when operating funds are low. The
present plight of MG is not all that unusual - publishing a magazine is
a risky business. Competition with other publications for a stable
readership is both fierce and never-ending. Considerable "up front" fi-
nancing is required, both for the business as a whole and for each issue
that is published. At the same time, the invested funds trickle back
slowly, as paid circulation and advertising accounts hopefully grow.
The result, of course, is an irregular and often unpredictable cash
flow, a factor that is undesirable in any business. Currently, the
three full-time staff members are completing a detailed business plan so
that they approach both investors and donors interested in financial
publication of the magazine in the future. The staff members are confi-
dent that they will raise the needed funds, and although work on the
current issue has been halted, they plan to resume publication during
the next two-month cycle.
Current organizational practices
. Since the recent staff reduction
at the Magazine Group, the work has been divided into three major areas:
1) editorial; 2) production; and 3) business, which includes advertis-
ing, circulation, distribution and finances. Functioning as a "manage-
ment team," each of the three full-time staff members has both primary
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responsibility and considerable autonomy in one of these three areas.
Part-time staff members, along with occasional stringers, fill in as
needed throughout the two-month publication cycle. Although there may
be some informal job-sharing at times, the present system does not in-
clude job rotation. In fact, work at the MG promises to become even
more specialized of late, largely as a consequence of the tripartite
division of general responsibilities.
Decisions regarding policy and financial planning are made, almost
exclusively, by the three full-time staff members at weekly meetings.
In theory, major changes in finances or policy should go before the
Board of Directors of Umbrella, after consultation with the staff mem-
bers from other projects associated with Umbrella. In practice, how-
ever, the Umbrella Board tends to play an advisory role, usually ratify
ing decisions made by combined staffs of Umbrella projects. The meet-
ings of all staff members from Umbrella projects are held irregularly;
decision-making follows a rudimentary but unwritten consensus procedure
Previous to the recent staff reductions, MG was characterized by a
small degree of formalization. Each staff member had a basic job de-
scription, decisions were made by means of a simple consensual proce-
dure, and the entire staff held periodic planning and problem-solving
retreats, often facilitated by paid consultants. In addition, MG also
had a trial period for new members. At this point, however, it is un-
clear whether these formal structures will continue to be used at MG.
Members hi p . The full- and part-time staff members of the Magazine
Group are men and women ranging in age from mid- twenties to the early
thirties. Only one of the current members had prior magazine experi-
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ence. The full-time members currently remaining all have limited finan-
cial commitments which allow them periodically to work without pay.
Despite the apparent clarity of membership boundaries, no formal defini-
tions or membership agreements exist. Turnover of staff members is dif-
ficult to assess. In the three years preceding the recent staff reduc-
tion, only one member left the organization, while slightly over one
half of the organization resigned in the past six months.
Informal structure
.
In brief, the informal structure of the Maga-
zine Group is largely synonymous with the organization as described
under "current organizational practices." The three full-time staff
members who remained wield the most influence in the organization, a
situation which they justify on the basis of the large amount of unpaid
time and effort they have recently invested in MG.
Additional notes
.
Other features of the Magazine Group include the
fol lowing:
1. The remaining staff members at MG presently have serious
reservations about the viability of "collective" workplaces
given their experiences over the last three years. All three
have begun to express a common desire for some of the more
positive aspects of conventional corporate structure -- clear-
ly defined lines of communication and authority, more effici-
ent decision-making, and so on.
2. One striking feature of MG in the recent past has been the
degree to which the organization is dominated by its two-month
publication cycle. Just after rushing the last issue to the
printer, work on the new issue begins, slowly at first, but
then quickening in pace in order to meet a multiple set of up-
coming deadlines. By the last two weeks of the cycle, the
press of deadlines and the need to attend to innumerable small
details creates an ever-dizzying amount of activity right up
to the trip to the printer. Needless to say, the frenzied side
of the cycle is hardly conducive to creating an ideal working
environment. In addition, this publishing cycle affects pri-
marily the editorial and production ends of the organization,
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since much of the business tasks occur at the start of the
5? d^fp
C° nf different ends of the organization areat ifferent levels of activity at any one time, creating aninternal uneveness that is very evident at meetings and day-to-day interpersonal exchanges between staff members Forexample, in the past it has been nearly impossible to schedule
a planning session for the entire organization in which all
staff members could be relaxed and reflective.
3 Process skills and meeting skills are generally lacking inMG, and attempts to introduce them usually are either unsup-ported or unrecognized. p
4 Largely because Umbrella and MG developed simultaneously
and have periodically shared personnel, the boundary between
the two organizations is difficult to define. This lack of
clarity also extends to the financial area, since their ac-
counts have been co-mingled historically. Boundaries between
the MG and the other, smaller projects within Umbrella, on the
other hand, are quite distinct.
Research relationship
.
My first formal contact with the Magazine
Group occurred in the spring of 1979, when one member contacted me about
possible consulting work with the organization. Later in the fall, a
colleague and myself facilitated a series of retreats and meetings for
MG which continued until January 1980. Research participation came
about as a partial exchange for my consulting services. In retrospect,
this arrangement gave me a detailed view of the inner workings of the
organization, but also created a slightly negative side-effect. Members
participated primarily in order to pay a debt, rather than because of
their inherent interest in the research itself. Consequently, their
concern and involvement during interviews was somewhat less than in the
case of other organizations. It should also be noted that much of the
formal structure which developed at MG during the early winter of 1979-
80 came about as a direct result of our consultation.
Interviews . In all, six past and present members were interviewed:
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two founding members no longer with the organization; two more recent
part-time managers, one of who has left MG; and two of the three remain-
ing full-time staff.
0^ sources of information. Supolementary materials include *
notes from several consultations, internal planning and organization
documents, and notes from conversations with members who were not for-
mally interviewed and other individuals familiar with the organization.
Current developmental state. At present, the Magazine Group ap-
pears to be midway in a move from informal differentiation into formal
differentiation, a situation which gives MG characteristics of both
stages. From Table 15, we can see that many of the major features of
informa1 differentiation no longer exist at this time. The power strug-
gles characteristic of this stage (ID-7, 13, 14, and 15) largely disap-
peared with the recent resignations of five staff members. In addition,
the boundaries of the organization are now drawn much more sharply than
previously (ID-3). Still, other features of informal differentiation
remain. Most organizational rules and regulations are not written down
(ID-16), issues of accountability to outside funders and customers con-
tinue to emerge (10-17 and 18), and most of the staff rewards still seem
present (ID-9, 10, 11, and 12). From Table 16, however, we can see that
many of the major features of formal differentiation have begun to take
shape. The three remaining full-time staff members have self-appointed
themselves to head the organization, referring to their triumvirate as
"the management team." What they have created, of course, is the orga-
nization's first administrative hierarchy (FD-1) and many of its associ-
ated consequences (FD-3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 13). At this point MG is
181
TABLE 15
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR
Characteristics
:
1
2 -
- de-emphasis of ideology
informal division of labor; first job
description
continued fluid membership but infor-
mal boundaries tighten
membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"
5 -- organization in period of rapid expan
sion/implementation
Leadershi p
:
6 -- formation of the core group
7 -- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membership
8 lack of formal decision-making proce
dures
Rewards
:
9 -- increasing effectiveness and compe-
tence (learning through skill-sharing)
10 -- sense of family in core group
1 1 -- autonomy in work
12 -- personal growth
Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and i nfl uence
14 core group feels responsibility but
none of the power
15 non-core members feel left out of
important deci si ons
16 -- organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or wri tten down
17 -- outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookkeeping and inter-
nal accountability
18 -- clientele/customers demand more con-
sistent servi ces
THE MAGAZINE GROUP
yes
no, formal; no job descriptions at
present, but probably soon
no; much tighter boundaries
much less so
no; leveling off
yes, and formalized
no; most decisions made by core
group alone
yes
much less now
yes
yes , but less
yes
no longer
no; feels both
no; left out by general agreement
yes
yes
yes
TABLE 16
FORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE MAGAZINE GROUP
Characteristics
1 creation of administrative hier
archi es
new member positions filled by
"qualified outsiders"
yes
too early to tell
3 -- administrative members differentiated yes, to a large deqreefrom production/service members
4 — volunteer or customer status and power too early to tell
diminished
5 -- energy directed toward service/pro-
duction rather than organizational
experimental on
6 lower member turnover
Leadership:
7 program leadership formalized in core
group or one or two administrators
8 — more efficient decision-making pro-
cedures
Rewards
:
9 -- career training
10 — more clearly defined power relations
11 -- more clearly defined work
12 -- more recognition from outside world
Problems and pressures:
13 -- loss of ideological purity
14 -- loss of family
15 -- breakdown of interpersonal and
intergroup communications
16 — decreasing autonomy in work
yes
too early to tell
yes, three
yes
not yet
yes
yes
not yet, but promising
yes
not yet
too early to tel
1
too early to tell
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largely finished with collective experimentation and has become solely
concerned with the creation of a viable business (FD-5 and 13). i n
short, the organization is rapidly developing along the lines of formal
differentiation, but at present it is too early to tell if the other
features associated with this stage will in fact emerge (FD-2, 4, 6, 9,
12, 14, 15, and 16).
Structural history_. In the spring of 1977, the founders of Umbrel-
la submitted their first proposal for a one-year federal grant to begin
publication of a regional newsletter concerned with appropriate tech-
nology. After the proposal was accepted in midsummer of that year, Um-
brella's founders hired two staff members to produce the newsletter, but
without explicit job descriptions. Unfortunately, the funds did not ar-
rive until March 1 978 (see Table 17) but the promise of funding allowed
both Umbrella and its newsletter project to locate themselves in a rent-
free office at a local college during the fall of 1977. In the meantime,
however, the two designated but unpaid staff members generated consider-
able interest in the project, attracting several volunteers who were
willing to invest considerable amounts of time and energy. One volun-
teer in particular became more involved than others in the project, and
by the time funds actually arrived he was established as a third (un-
paid) staff member. Given all the preparation which preceded grant
funding, the project was well underway by the time money finally arrived
in March 1978, and produced its first issue two months later. During
this period the third staff member was able to generate additional funds
to cover his own salary.
Throughout the summer of 1978, the newsletter was produced every
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two months, attracting considerable attention and a growing readership.
Due to the increasing workload, the project added a fourth staff member
in the fall who also worked for a few months before funds for her salary
materialized. Her hiring actually signalled the beginning of an infor-
mal division of labor within the project. Two staffers came to be asso-
ciated primarily with the production of the newsletter (which was quick-
ly becoming a magazine in size and appearance), while the other two be-
gan to spend more of their time attending to the other business of Um-
brella, including the development of additional projects. In essence,
the two staffers concerned with the newsletter first started to become
identified as the Magazine Group at this time; the remaining two staff
members were seen as personnel shared by MG and Umbrella. As MG devel-
oped an identity separate from Umbrella, it also began defining itself
as a "collective" more and more explicitly. As the "collective" iden-
tity solidified, MG began its first regular meetings, usually held every
two weeks. This regular meeting, however, constituted the only formal
structure at MG. No minutes were kept of the meetings, and although
agreement was developing in regard to the division of job responsibili-
ties, no formal job descriptions existed.
As publication of the newsletter continued through the winter of
1978-79, it became more and more of a magazine, with an increased number
of pages and more professional-looking covers. During this period, a
growing number of interested volunteers and part-time stringers (paid
for periodic production assistance) became associated with MG. In March
of 1979, the original grant funding expired, but with the support of a
variety of other funding sources, publication was continued and MG added
same
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a third full-time staff member to its collective. At roughly the
time, Umbrella began another project - a resource center - and hired
a librarian for the center whose time was to be shared to some degree
with ML In April of 1979 weekly staff meetings were begun and major
questions arose about who was "in" MG and who was not, leading to sever-
al awkward exchanges where some volunteers and stringers were deliber-
ately and even forcibly excluded from MG meetings. By this point, Um-
brella and all of its projects were evicted from their rent-free offices
provided by a local college for the duration of the original grant.
New, larger office space was rented by Umbrella early in the sunmer of
1979, allowing its individual projects to have their own physically dis-
tinct work areas, a development parallelled by the reduction of shared
personnel between the various projects.
Located in a more spacious office and armed with several CETA sal-
aries, MG began to rapidly expand its staff, adding four more full-time
and one half-time members. As in the past, the new members were largely
friends and acquaintances, and no formal job searches were held. With
the addition of several new members, MG organized itself into a series
of departments: editorial, advertising, distribution, circulation, and
finances. The three senior full-time members became the editorial de-
partment and quickly began to function as the "core group" of the or-
ganization, usually referring to themselves as the "editorial sub-col-
lective" within the larger MG collective. This concentration of infor-
mal power in the editorial department led to major conflicts over or-
ganizational power and control in the fall of 1979. Typically, the com-
batants were the three members of the editorial department and various
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combinations of newer staff closer to the business end of MG. At the
heart of the conflict was the direction of the magazine, and the degree
to which that direction was to be shaped by editorial policy, perceived
financial realities, or both.
The rapid expansion of staff also highlighted the question of coor-
dination within the magazine, a thorny problem which was to plague the
organization for several months. Despite the increased number of mem-
bers, MG continued to hold weekly staff meetings which were lacking any
sense of organization. As expected, the resulting meetings lasted too
long and accomplished too little, leading rapidly to a decline in at-
tendance. By October of 1979, tensions had reached an unbearable point,
and MG called upon local consultants to plan and facilitate the organi-
zation's first formal retreat. During the retreat, staff members vented
their frustrations publicly for the first time. One obvious problem was
the lack of clearly defined work responsibilities, a deficit which led
to frictions among the staff, particularly among those with overlapping
roles. A process of developing coherent job descriptions was begun at
the retreat, a step which greatly clarified expectations, but surfaced
the problem of coordination once again. Also during the retreat meet-
ing, the founding male editor made an explicit bid for a job description
that would have essentially formalized his informal role as a "general
manager" of MG. The other staff members resisted his proposal and in-
stead proposed that a "publishers' group" -- composed of one representa-
tive from each of the five departments -- should coordinate the affairs
of the magazine through weekly meetings. This latter proposal was
adopted and the publishers' group was quickly established following the
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retreat. In fact, the proponents of the "publishers' group" were at-
tempting to create a formal structure of coordination within MG that
would counter the informal power of the three senior members in the
editorial department. Since the other four departments consisted of
only one person apiece, the "representative" feature of the "publishers'
group" was in effect a way to eliminate two of the three editors from
coordination meetings. In other words, the "publishers' group" con. ;
sisted of all the full-time members of MG, with the exception of two of
the three editors. This formal mechanism of coordination did prove to
be somewhat effective, but never resolved the underlying power struggles
at MG.
In November of 1979, MG held another retreat with outside consul-
tants to examine issues of power in the organization, a topic which
proved too awkward to really discuss meaningfully, both for MG and for
the consultants. Forced by a financial crunch to relocate to a cramped
office in December, tensions at MG soon flared again. A large donation
temporarily relieved the financial pressures, and allowed the organiza-
tion to hire a financial consultant and a part-time business manager,
in an attempt to improve their long-term financial situation. Through-
out this period, power struggles continued -- over the magazine's direc-
tion, the location of a new office, and financial strategy. Decision-
making fell apart, as it became unclear which issues could be decided by
the representative "publishers' group" and which needed to be referred
to the entire staff. By March of 1980, little had improved and the "pub-
lishers' group" meetings fell apart. In desperation, two members pro-
posed a "dictatorship" plan to get MG through a series of difficult de-
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cisions and still continue publication of the magazine. MG literally
stopped work for five days as the staff struggled with the proposal,
weighing their collective ideals against the need to create an efficient
organization. For some of the staff members, this long series of meet-
ings represented the final straw in terms of their tolerance for the
"collective process" at MG. In the end, a "management team" of two mem-
bers was established. Together with the business consultant, the manage
ment team would have authority for all day-to-day decisions at MG. The
founding editorial manager was deeply disappointed by the fact that he
had not been chosen as a member of this "team"; his bid for power, ini-
tially made five or six months before, had been rejected by the other
members, leading him to consider resignation. At the same time, MG mem-
bers established a "planning and policy committee" consisting of every
member not on the "management team" plus one member from the "management
team." The purpose of this group would be to make all final policy and
financial decisions, thus counterbalancing the power of the "management
team." The new arrangement did result in the publication of the next
issue, but little else. A new office was found, but finances were so
low by the end of April that it was evident that money for salaries
would run out in May. Frustrated and disillusioned by the state of MG
financial affairs, several members soon resigned, led by the founding
editorial member. Although many of them had weathered payless paydays
in the past, the combination of organizational and financial difficul-
ties proved too much for them. Of the three full-time members who re-
main, two were elected as members of the "management team" prior to the
resignations. As detailed earlier, these three full-time members are
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the current "management team" at MG, making most decisions and dividing
the essential work among themsevles and three part-timers.
CltejpjMzaJion. The Magazine Group is a Type 2 organization - its
development diverges from the Holleb and Abrams' scenario, but the
bureaucratization process has continued. The early days of MG were
typical of wnjensuai ajiarchy_. It was difficult to know at that time
who was part of the organization, energy was high, and the essential
work of the organization was shared by everyone. By the spring of 1979,
the informal differentiation stage had begun. A "core group" started to
emerge and issues of inclusion and exclusion surfaced for the first
time. By the fall of 1979, this stage had developed fully. With the
addition of several new members, the "core group" was firmly established
as the "editorial sub-collective" within the staff. The power struggles
associated with informal differentiation reached a peak first in October
of 1979, when MG members established the "publishers' group" as a formal
mechanism of shared coordination. This action on the part of MG members
is an anomaly in terms of the Holleb and Abrams' model — by creating a
representative mechanism of coordination, MG was beginning to shift
towards consensual democracy which still located within the informal
differentiation stage. In March of 1980, MG members made a second at-
tempt in this same direction. Dissatisfied by the performance of the
"publishers' group," they deliberately chose two members for the "man-
agement team," a group whose day-to-day power was balanced by the final
authority of the "planning and policy committee." While this reorgani-
zation clearly represented another step in the direction of consensual
democracy
,
in that a member-controlled organization selected its day-to-
191
day managers, the whole arrangement was soon undone by an impending fi-
nancial crisis. Due to the lack of funds (and dissatisfaction with num-
erous attempts to remedy the situation), several members resigned from
MG, essentially leaving a "management team" without a membership to con-
trol it. These resignations, in effect, signalled the end of past power
struggles over the direction of MG. Two of the three members remaining
at present are past members of the previous core group represented by
the "editorial sub-collective." In addition, the three full-time mem-
bers composing the current "management team" are in essential agreement
about the need for a more conventional structure at MG, and appear de-
liberate about moving further towards formal differentiation
.
Although the financial and organizational crises are somewhat dif-
ficult to disentangle in this case, it appears that the major debate at
MG about consensual or bureaucratic versions of the organization occur-
red at the end of the informal differentiation stage, contrary to Holleb
and Abrams' model. They argue, of course, that the critical choicepoint
occurs during formal differentiation
. At the Magazine Group, however,
it seems that continuous financial pressures may have accelerated the
timing of this choicepoint.
Studio Collective
. The Studio Collective (SC) is an incorporated organ-
ization of 16 craftspeople and artists located within a New England re-
sort area. The major goal of SC is to provide its members with stable
and reasonably-priced studio space in an area where seasonal demand for
rental space creates fluctuating prices throughout the year. In pursuit
of this goal, the organization rents a large building which is subdi-
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vided into individual studios and a gallery. Individual studios are
then sublet to members for a flat monthly fee and a small additional
charge per square foot. Financial benefits are not limited to inexpen-
sive studio space, however. The Collective also offers its members re-
duced gallery fees and a group insurance plan. In addition, members are
able to sublet their studios to non-members during periods of prolonged
absence, subject to the agreement of the membership.
Cuj^rent organizational practices. Although most of the members of
the Studio Collective pursue their own crafts and arts as individual
businesses, the organization as a whole requires a considerable amount
of ongoing work which is attended to by elected officers, committees and
designated individuals. The most central role in the organization is
that of the treasurer, who is reimbursed for his or her efforts by means
of a $20 monthly rent reduction. In addition to maintaining up-to-date
books, paying bills and projecting financial needs, the treasurer is al-
so responsible for the all important tasks of negotiating with the land-
lord and building good relationships with the local banks who occasion-
ally make loans to SC. The other offices consist of a secretary, who
keeps records and handles correspondence, and a president, who fills a
largely honorary position. The positions of these three elected offi-
cers are deliberately but slowly rotated (1-2 years) among the member-
ship, with special attention given to the training of incoming treasur-
ers. When the terms of these officers are about to expire, the member-
ship looks for willing and capable volunteers to fill the offices and
then formally elects them. There are also a gallery committee, a safety
committee which monitors compliance with insurance requirements through-
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out the building (e.g., wood stove installations, use of dangerous sol-
vents, etc.), and certain individuals who have been given other formal
responsibilities (e.g., maintaining the health insurance plan, monitor-
ing and maintaining the heating plant). Major maintenance projects like
landscaping or renovations are often carried out by means of "work par-
ties" which involve the entire membership, or are contracted to non-
members. The day-to-day general maintenance of common spaces, hallways,
and bathrooms is rotated on a weekly basis among the membership accord-
ing to a formal schedule. Staffing of the gallery during the business
season is currently contracted to two members of the collective who
manage the gallery for a three-month season as their own separate busi-
ness, returning a certain percentage of the receipts to the organiza-
tions .
The formal rules of decision-making are set forth in the by-laws of
the incorporated organization and specify that most decisions are made
by majority rule, while certain types of decisions require a two-thirds
majority. These decision-making rules, however, are only applied when
informal consensus among all members cannot be reached within a reason-
able amount of time. Meetings of the entire membership, currently held
every week, provide SC with a forum for information-sharing (especially
regarding finances), operational and policy decision-making, and sharing
of feelings; meeting roles include a chairperson (rotated), and a secre-
tary. If interpersonal issues arise between two or more members, they
are encouraged by others within the meeting to resolve differences on
their own, but if this remedy fails, the weekly meeting often becomes
the forum for final resolution. Once or twice a year, the entire mem-
ng
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bership holds a special retreat with the explicit purpose of reflecti-
on the state of their organization and planning for the future. Al
though no formal history of the organization exists, all the minutes of
past member meetings are kept by the secretary in a notebook which is
accessible to the members; these minutes are frequently consulted, par-
ticuarly when issues of past and present policy arise.
And lastly, the unique rental arrangement of SC deserves mention.
By design, members with large space requirements (e.g., weavers) are
subsidized to an extent by those with smaller space needs. By moderating
the costs of studio space in this fashion, SC not only ensures that a
broad range of artists and craftspeople are drawn to it, regardless of
their individual space requirements, but also emphasizes the cooperative
nature of its organization. In essence, members view their monthly rent
as regular "membership fee" which is affected somewhat by the size of
their individual studios. In addition to subletting studios to members,
SC also realizes income from the rental of its gallery space and peri-
odically sponsors courses and workshops which are open to the surround-
ing community. The resulting income from all these activities, about
$18,000 per year, is used to rent the building, pay utilities and asso-
ciated maintenance, and cover insurance costs. After all these expenses
are deducted from the income, a small "slush fund" remains for occa-
sional and extraordinary expenses. If incidental expenses arise which
cannot be covered by this cushion in any particular month, members may
be subject to a surcharge in addition to their monthly "membership fee"
(rent). This rental arrangement combined with the weekly membership
meetings, not only insures that all members are kept up-to-date regard-
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ing the financial status of the organization, but also creates a timely
and effective feedback loop for decision-making, since the effects of
policy and financial changes are quickly reflected in members' monthly
fees
.
e^mbershi P - Within th * Studio Collective, there is presently only
one class of membership - the full, voting members who rent studios.
The ages of members range from the middle twenties through the fifties,
with the majority clustering in the middle thirties; most members have
had prior experiences with other cooperative and collective ventures.
Turnover of members is low - about 10% to 15% per year; of the original
seven founding members, five still remain. When members leave SC, the
entire membership then interviews applicants for the available studio
space and examines samples of their art or craft. When an applicant is
accepted as a new member, he or she enters a three-month trial period
(without voting rights), which can be extended another three months if
deemed necessary. At the end of the trial period the total membership
must agree (by at least a two- thirds vote) before full membership rights
can be extended to the new individual. If either the organization or
the trial member feels that there is insufficient information upon which
to base a final decision, the trial period can be extended by the mem-
bership for another three months. The formality surrounding entry into
the organization is also present in the exit procedure. A full member
who neglects mandatory duties and obligations can be expelled by a two-
thirds vote. And finally, individuals who sublet a studio from a member
are encouraged to participate in meetings of SC, but are not members,
and consequently have no voting rights.
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Informal structure
.
Although the formal structure of SC gives an
equal vote to each member in meetings, every member interviewed empha-
sized that the founding "elders" of the organization exert a measure of
informal influence which is generally acceptable to the rest of the mem
bership. The "elders" are most familiar with the history and mechanics
of the organization, and often take informal leadership roles, especial
ly in the areas of resolving intragroup conflicts, planning and public
relations. In meetings, in particular, several of the "elders" also
tend to assume informal "process roles" -- raising issues of goals,
group process, and procedure -- roles which are clearly valued by other
members
.
Additional notes. Other items of interest regarding the Studio
Collective include the following:
1. A majority of founders and current "elders," who fill both
formal and informal leadership roles, are women.
2. As an organization of artists and craftspeople, SC is
somewhat atypical in that it is firmly opposed to taking
grants from state, federal or foundation sources (despite
several offers). SC does, however, obtain bank loans period-
ically.
3. SC shares its building with a restaurant, a physical ar-
rangement which encourages members to have lunch or coffee
with one another frequently. The result is often a continuous
but informal meeting of various combinations of members
throughout the day, where organizational and personal concerns
are the common topics of discussion. It is clear that the
restaurant offers an ongoing forum regarding the SC's activi-
ties; some members remarked that without the restaurant, SC's
membership meetings would certainly need to be held more fre-
quently and last considerably longer.
4. Most of the members who were interviewed strongly empha-
sized the positive emotional aspects of membership in SC.
They felt bound to the organization by close personal and so-
cial ties, and generally agreed that the personal and profes-
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sional support that they received as members was a large factor in their continued membership.
"
5. Most members came to SC with past experiences in other alternative institutions. Members interviewed ind cated thatthei r prior learning in these organizations was very beneficialto their attempts to make SC a workable organization.
6. Several of the members who were interviewed indicated that
a type of goal redefinition had taken place since 1977 Bv
Inl'rnl? P****** 9oa J " that of providing stable'andlow-cost studio space - had been largely met, and a secondarygoal emerged to play a larger part in the organization's deci-
sion-making. Although not formally articulated (though clear-
fni?n Tn)i thiS s ^ condary 9^1 might be paraphrased asfollows: To promote the individual and professional growth
of members. Interviews revealed numerous examples of deci-
sions regarding both general policy and individual members
where this secondary goal was applied, sometimes to the detri-
ment of the primary goal of inexpensive studio space. To thebest of everyone's recollection, the secondary goal first sur-faced in discussions at a SC retreat.
Research relationship
.
This organization is one with which I have
consulted occasionally since 1975. My efforts involved role-playing
rent negotiations with the landlord and providing specific suggestions
regarding the structure of the organization and the boundaries of mem-
bership. Given the ongoing nature of our relationship, members willing-
ly agreed to my interviews and saw no need for a specific exchange at
that time.
Interviews
.
In all, seven members of the Studio Collective were
interviewed: three founders who have served in various officer roles at
one time or another; one founding member who had only recently taken an
active role in the organization; two recent members; and one founding
member who was finally in the process of leaving the organization after
repeatedly expressing doubts about the organization's long-term future.
Other sources of information . Documents include by-laws, written
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member and non-member agreements, written liability releases, and min-
utes of several meetings.
Curi^deve^^ According to the developmental stages
outlined by Holleb and Abrams, the current state of the Studio Collec-
tive is clearly categorized as one of c^ensual democracy,. Examining
the description of this stage (Table 18), we find that all the items
under "Characteristics," "Leadership," and "Rewards" generally describe
SC with one small exception - explicit contracts for members (CD-6).
Although signed membership agreements were instituted in 1975, no new
members signed them after 1978 (although they were sometimes shown the
contract prior to becoming members). As of the spring of 1980, however,
SC was in the process of revising and reinsti tuting these written agree-
ments, convinced by recent experiences that they represent a necessary
device for defining member rights, duties and obligations. In other
areas, SC actually exceeds the requirements of consensual democracy
.
Overall program planning is generally performed by the entire member-
ship, not just by representative groups (CD-9). In addition, many of
the "Problems and Pressures" related to this stage have been either rem-
edied or minimized. While the absence of some of these can be attri^
buted to the nature of the organization's activities (i.e., CD-I
5
9 low
salaries, is largely irrelevant, since only one partial salary is paid),
SC has no diffi cul ty in obtaining funding (CD-19), has specific and time-
tested procedures which facilitate the acceptance and removal of members
(CD-I 7), and maintains an excellent reputation with governmental and
arts agencies. And finally, the presence of formal voting rules in-
creases the speed and effectiveness of decision-making (CD-I 6 ) . Al-
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TABLE 18
CONSENSUAL DEMOCRACY ITEMS FOR
'
Cnaracteristics
:
1 — return to consensual forms
2 — constitutional democracy with clear
rules and procedures
3 -- clearly defined boundaries and
entrance requirements
4 — structures for sharing work and
feelings
5 — administrative and maintenance work
shared by all or by election/hiring
6 -- explicit contracts for members
Leadershi p
:
7 -- leadership informal, shifting and
shared
8 subgroups, program components given
wide latitude in decision-making
9 -- representative groups employed for
overall program planning
10 -- all major decisions referred to
total membership
Rewards
:
11 -- autonomy
12 involvement in planning and deci-
cision-making
13 -- community and support
14 increasing effectiveness and com-
pe tence
Problems and pressures:
15 -- low salaries
16 -- decision-making slow and cumbersome
17 -- difficulty in accepting and removing
members
18 -- loss of directly productive time do-
ing administrative work
19 difficulty in obtaining funding
20 licensing laws and other threats
from conventional establishment
21 limitations in scope of services,
products or customers
22 difficulty in getting referrals from
and tying in with conventional orga-
nizations
: STUDIO COLLECTIVE
not a return really, but yes
yes
yes
yes
yes; administered by slow rotation
of officers
presently being reinstituted
yes, but "elders" play important and
acknowledged role
yes
sometimes, but more often by entire
membershi p
yes
yes, but with accountability
yes
yes
yes
NA; only one small salary paid to
treasurer
not really, due to back-up rules
not really; clear procedures faci-
litate
some, but seen as member obligation
no; several loans from banks
yes; complications with insurance
regulations on occasion
yes; courses and workshops for the
communi ty rare now
no; excellent reputation
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though most decisions are made by informal consensus, the knowledge that
a two- thirds rule can be invoked has a moderating effect upon those mem-
bers with strong objections to a decision - they would tend to compro-
mise on an issue sooner than in a situation of pure consensus, knowing
that their position would be lost altogether if the lack of agreement
led to a formal vote.
Structural history_. Examining Table 19, we find initial discus-
sions regarding the formation of the organization occurring in the fall
of 1973; the bankruptcy of a local business had left a large building
vacant and stirred the imaginations of a friendly group of artists and
craftspeople seeking joint studio space. After several weeks of some-
what disorganized but energetic discussions among themselves, and final-
ly, with the landlord, this group decided to create an organization
which could rent a large portion of the building and then sublet indi-
vidual studio spaces to its members. In a fortunate but somewhat ironic
turn of events in 1974, the members of this group discovered an ideal
organizational form for their purposes -- a defunct non-profit corpora-
tion originally incorporated in 1934. Among other activities, this cor-
poration had also leased studio space for its members. In the spring of
1974, the founding members of SC reactivated the corporation, paid its
back taxes, and proceeded to conduct their business according to the old
corporation's original by-laws, holding member meetings every week.
These by-laws defined the structure of offices (spelling out the essen-
tial "work" of the organization and who was to perform it), clearly de-
marcated full and associate membership categories, and specified deci-
sion-making rules for a range of circumstances (e.g., 2/3 vote for re-
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moval of members). In essence, then, SC was formally defined as a "con-
stitutional democracy with clear rules and procedures" (CD-2) right from
the start, even before it actually began operations. Later in 1974, the
incorporated SC obtained a lease for the vacant building and began sub-
letting to members.
In 1975 SC developed written contracts which both outlined member
responsibilities and released SC from certain areas of liability (theft
of tools, personal injury, etc.). At the same time, similar contracts
were also developed for guests and students. The creation of these
signed agreements reflected more than a concern for legal liability,
however — they represented deliberate attempts within the organization
to clarify expectations regarding the rights, duties and obligations of
members and other individuals associated with SC. Also in 1975, SC re-
vised its by-laws, attempting to solidify their organization even more.
First of all, the members substituted a two- thirds vote in some areas
previously subject to majority rule. According to members, this change
not only insured that controversial decisions would require strong
agreement for acceptance, but also guaranteed that no sizeable minority
would remain after such a decision to dispute the policy once it was put
in place. Secondly, the category of associate membership was eliminated
-- it was felt that SC should be an organization of full members only.
During the period in which the by-law changes and membership agree-
ments were instituted (1975), SC was composed of two major groups of
members. One group, a majority, saw formal structure as a necessary
route to defining both the organization and the accountability of mem-
bers within it. The second, siicYlilor group of members were generally
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opposed to the increasing formalization of the organization, arguing
that additional structure of any kind was both unnecessary and oppres-
sive. In the following year, 1976, the continuing conflict between
these two groups grew into the greatest internal crisis of SC's history.
A significant sub-group of those members opposed to increased structure
and formalization repeatedly and deliberately failed to honor the mem-
bership agreements ratified in the previous year. Just prior to the
signing of the first five-year lease on the building, the crisis came to
a head. After a long series of traumatic meetings, SC utilized the two-
thirds vote specified in its by-laws and expelled the offending members.
With this major conflict and its resolution foremost in their minds, the
remaining members of SC continued to formalize their organization. For-
mal training of new treasurers (by outgoing treasurers) was initiated in
the fall of 1976, as was the rotation of general maintenance among all
members. In 1977 members began to insist upon written contracts between
SC and non-members who occasionally performed work for the organization
(e.g., major landscaping, renovations, etc.). In the same year, SC in-
stituted formal procedures for reviewing new applicants for membership
and a three-month extendible trial period for new members. During the
three months, the trial member is expected to attend all membership
meetings, but does not hold voting rights. This trial period procedure
proved itself very effective over the years, frequently resulting in
negative decisions about membership, on both the part of the organiza-
tion and trial members. Also in 1977, two other formal features of the
organization emerged. The first of what were to become periodic future-
planning retreats was held. And secondly, member meetings began to be
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be employed as explicit forums for resolving interpersonal conflicts be-
tween members
.
Little of structural importance has changed at SC since 1977, with
two small exceptions. Both the rotation of general maintenance and the
use of formal member contracts lapsed in 1978. After considerable de-
liberation, the rotation scheme was reinstituted in the summer of 1979.
The need for renewed member contracts re-emerged in the fall of 1979,
and efforts are underway to revise this document for use again in the
spring of 1980. At this point, the members feel that they have devel-
oped an organization which is both durable and viable. Most founding
members who were interviewed indicated that they felt much more at ease
in recent years than they did prior to 1977, noting that it was now pos-
sible for them to take an extended leave of absence without worrying
about the organization's capacity to carry on without them.
Categorization. The Studio Collective is clearly a Type 3 organi-
zation
— it did not follow the developmental scenario of Holleb and
Abrams, and it appears to have entirely avoided the process of bureau-
cratization. From the structural history we saw that very early on the
organization became a rudimentary consensual democracy
,
creating a pro-
cess which allowed continued refinement of the organization in ways con-
sistent with consensual ideals of shared work and decision-making.
Given the extensive period of planning which preceded the formal start
(incorporation) of SC, it appears that the organization moved directly
from consensual anarchy
, which characterized the planning process prior
to incorporation, to a form of consensual democracy
. Informal differen-
tiation was either totally absent, or so brief in passing, that no found-
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ing member who was interviewed could recall a period of the organiza-
tion's history which reflected the characteristics of this stage.
Mechanic' Collective. Grossing approximately $50,000 each year, the
Mechanics" Collective CMC) actually consists of two different organiza-
tions sharing the same staff and facilities. For the first three days
of the workweek, MC operates as a collectively-run car reoair shop, but
on Thursday and Friday, MC becomes a car repair "cooperative," where in-
dividuals can obtain space and tools for $2/hour, and, if needed, the
assistance of MC staff for $6/hour. Currently MC has two full-time and
one half-time collective members who earn from five to six dollars per
hour. Cooperative members pay a $15 yearly fee, which entitles them to
low-cost space, tools, and expertise, as well as discount prices on
automotive parts.
The car repair "coooerati ve" operated by MC members is a coopera-
tive in name only. Cooperative members gain privileges by paying annu-
al dues, but are not involved in any formal way in the internal affairs
of MC. In essence, the car repair "cooperative" is merely a service
offered by MC to a group of individuals who pay an annual fee. On occa-
sion, collective members at MC also offer inexpensive auto repair work-
shops which are open to the public.
Current organizational practices
. The Mechanics 1 Collective oper-
ates with an absolute minimum of formal structure. In addition to shar-
ing the scheduling of customers, the repair of cars, and the supervision
of cooperative members, the two full-time collective members divide up
the administrative tasks on MC on an informal basis. One member over-
sees the inventories of parts and supplies, and performs general shop
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maintenance, while the other full-time
.ember takes care of the finan-
cial side of the business, which includes bookkeeping, paying bills and
making deposits. The part-time member as yet performs none of the ad-
ministrative or financial tasks.
Meetings of collective members are held only when needed, which
tends to be at most once or twice each month. At these meetings, deci-
sion-making is by informal consensus, except in the case of admitting
new members, where absolute agreement is required. MC is incorporated,
an action which is usually followed by the creation of by-laws outlining
a governance process. In MC's case, however, no by-laws were ever
filed.
Membershi P-- The a 9 es of MC members, two men and a woman, range
from the mid- twenties to early thirties, while "cooperative" members
tend to cluster in the early and middle twenties. At this point, no
founding members of MC remain, but one member has been with MC for three
of its four years. Turnover among MC members is difficult to pinpoint
due to the lack of records and fluid membership boundaries in the past,
but seems to lie in the 40-50% range on an annual basis. Currently
there are no trial periods, members contracts or personnel review proce-
dures at MC.
Informal structure
.
The two full-time members at MC both serve as
the informal managers of the organization, largely because of their
seniority and complementary skill areas. The male member derives his
influence from his mechanical skill, while the woman's basis of informal
power appears to lie in her knowledge of the financial side of the busi-
ness. To call them a "core group" at this point sounds a bit grandiose,
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since there is only one other member, who works half-time. In the event
that MC were to take more mentors
, n the future, however, it is very
likely that these members would continue in their current roles, raking
the use of the term more appropriate.
Additional notes. Other aspects of HC worth noting include the
followi ng:
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snip at MC. In the past, members often took extended leaves
of absence, expecting that they could find work at MC oncethey returned. The current MC members have recently stoppedthis practice, recognizing that it creates both a large degree
of uncertainty about their pay levels and considerable confu-
sion about who s in and who's not." In addition, MC has
started enforcing a longstanding but often ignored policy
which prohibits past and present members from using MC facil-
ities to perform repair work for private customers (thus using
collective resources for private gain). Both of these actionshave angered past members who claim that this sort of "tight-
ening up" is contrary to the old "spirit" of MC. These ac-
tions, and others, point to an increasing desire for more for-
malization on the part of current MC members, particularly in
the areas of membership boundaries and accountability. At
this point, however, these concerns still remain at the level
of informal discussion.
2. The emergence of the two full-time members as the infor-
mal managers of MC is largely due to the fact that they were
the only two members who remained at one point. Consequently
they were forced to take over the various administrative tasks
if MC was to continue at all as a business.
3. Once a car repair business reaches a certain volume level,
the appearance of a "service manager" function performed by
one person appears inevitable. At present, according to MC
members, this point has not been reached for them, although it
has in the past. Evidently, when a garage's business attains
this point, mechanics feel that they could do a better job if
their work was not interrupted by a constant stream of phone
calls, customers, and orders for new parts. In other collec-
tive garages, the service manager position is often slowly ro-
tated between member mechanics, usually on a yearly basis.
208
Research re^tionshi^. When I first approached MC, there were six
meters, most of whom were very skeptical of research participation, due
to several negative experiences with researchers in the past. After the
members finally agreed to participation, they decided that my half of
the exchange would consist of buying them a case of beer. Over the
course of my repeated visits, the membership gradually dwindled to two
individuals, one of whom became particularly interested in the research
because of its relevance to events at MC.
Interviews
.
In all, five past and present members of MC were in-
terviewed: one founder, now dissatisfied with his exclusion from the
organization; three members who left within the past year; and the one
full-time male member who remains. In addition, two "cooperative" mem-
bers were also interviewed.
Other sources of information
. MC has no historical records or do-
cuments that could be located. All information was obtained from the
intervi ews
.
Current developmental state. The present state of the Mechanics'
Collective is best described as one of informal differentiation
, al-
though three of the major features of this stage are minimized due to
the organization's small size — two full-time members, and one newly
hired half-time member. The two full-time members do clearly function
as a core group, but the presence of only one non-core member minimizes
the issues of informal power. Consequently, as Table 20 indicates,
power struggles (ID-13), feelings of powerless responsibility (ID-14),
and issues of inclusion/exclusion (ID-15) are absent at this time. In
truth, it probably should be said that they are "dormant," rather than
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TABLE 20
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR THE MECHANICS' COLLECTIVE
Characteristics
:
1 — de-emphasis of ideology
2 -
3 -
4 -
5 -
informal division of labor; first job
description
continued fluid membership but infor-
mal boundaries tighten
membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"
organization in period of rapid expan
sion/implementation
Leadershi p:
6 formation of the core group
7 -- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
enti re membershi p
8 lack of formal decision-making proce
dures
Rewards
:
9 -- increasing effectiveness and compet-
ence (learning through ski 1 1
-sharing)
10 -- sense of family in core group
1 1 — autonomy in work
1 2 -- personal growth
Problems and pressures:
13 -
14 -
15 -
16 -
17 -
18 -
power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and influence
core group feels responsibility but
none of the Dower
non-core members feel left out of
important decisions
organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or written down
outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookkeeping and inter-
nal accountabi 1 i ty
clientele/customers demand more con-
sistent servi ces
yes
yes, but no job descriptions cur
rently in use
yes
to a lesser extent now; growing em-
phasis on skills
yes
yes
yes, but inconsequential
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
NA: "dormant" or absent
NA: "dormant" or absent
NA: "dormant" or absent
yes, to an extreme
yes
yes
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absent, with the potential to re-emerge when and if MC takes on more new
meters. Two other minor exceptions to inform, differentiation should
also be noted: (1) no job descriptions exist now, although they have
appeared in the past (ID-3); and (2) the hiring of new members appears
to be based on skills at this point, although friendship is still a fac-
tor (ID-4). Other than the five exceptions, then, MC has all the other
features of irrfj)^ di fferentia
_tion. Of the consistent features, the
absence of written rules, regulations, and procedures is particularly
apparent (ID-16), as are the tightening membership boundaries (ID-3).
S tructural ^ory_. From Table 21 , we can see that the development
of the Mechanics' Collective has one very obvious theme - a general ab-
sence of enduring formal structure. Founded by two mechanics in the
winter of 1976, MC was originally conceived as the automotive repair
counterpart of a food cooperative: it would be a consumer- focused or-
ganization dedicated to providing low-cost facilities, tools and exper-
tise to members of the community who wanted to repair (or learn to re-
pair) their own cars. Due to this consumer orientation, the early meet-
ings of MC were open to the public and were attended by the two founders
who casually staffed MC, other interested mechanics, and a fair number
of "cooperative" members. In order to make ends meet, the two founders
not only charged co-op members minimal fees, but also performed some
direct repair work themselves. The job of service manager, a common co-
ordinating role in the car repair business, was rotated weekly between
the two founders initially, and later, as more part-time mechanics
joined MC, among them all. Most of the members' time, however, was
spent supervising "cooperative" members and teaching classes to would-be
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do-i t-your-sel fers
.
The first major crisis at MC occurred when the landlord, who shared
the same building, balked at the introduction of "women's day classes"
held on Wednesdays (without any men present). As a consequence of this
conflict, MC was forced to relocate in a more expensive rented building
early in 1977. During the crisis, however, the founders came to a sig-
nificant conclusion regarding the viability of the food co-op model they
had chosen. When it was time to search for a new building, and later,
when it became necessary to move MC's equipment, cooperative members
were conspicuous by their absence. Evidently cooperative members were
much more interested in an inexpensive place to fix their cars, than
they were in maintaining an organization which could provide this low-
cost option. With the increased rental overhead of the new building,
the founders were forced to perform a larger proportion of direct re-
pairs in order to pay the bills. The only other option would have been
to raise the fees charged to "cooperative" members, clearly a less de-
sirable alternative. During the spring of 1977, the volume of direct
repairs (called "commercial business" to distinguish it from "coopera-
tive" business) had grown considerably, and MC added two additional
part-time mechanics. Meetings were held only when needed, and although
they were usually announced publicly, and in advance, "cooperative" mem-
bers almost never attended.
By the early spring of 1977, the volume of commercial business had
increased to the point that the rotation of the service manager role was
no longer working. With increased volume, the job required more contin-
uity and an increasing number of financial skills. Since none of the
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members at MC really wanted the job, they decided to hire a mechanic
more skilled than themselves from outside the existing membership. Af-
ter a rudimentary job description was drawn up, MC advertised the posi-
tion and hired its first service manager in the spring of 1977. His
duties, in addition to occasional help with repair work and supervision
of "cooperative" members, essentially encompassed the scheduling of cus-
tomers, ordering parts, answering the phone, customer relations, and
several financial responsibilities (e.g., basic bookkeeping, paying
bills, making deposits, etc.). While the service manager was to play a
major role at MC, the members made it quite clear during his hiring that
all major decisions were still to be made by all the members.
With the new service manager, MC operations became smoother and
much better coordinated. MC moved to a larger garage space in the sum-
mer of 1977, and after defining its membership as paid collective mem-
bers, began to have regular meetings every two weeks. By the winter of
1978, the organization had instituted a two-week trial period for new
members and shortly after that began a somewhat formalized training pro-
gram for new members, all of whom at this point were women. The intro-
duction of women members at MC surfaced power struggles that had been
brewing for some time between the core group of the two MC founders and
the service manager, on one hand, and newer members, on the other. The
new women members demanded equality within the collective's decision-
making process, a demand which was mirrored by their straightforward at-
tempt to learn skills in a traditionally male area. Although the male
members made a number of compromises with the women, the underlying is-
sues of control and power were never resolved satisfactorily, resulting
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instead in an uneasy truce. During this period, the "cooperative" side
of MC was beginning to receive even less emphasis, as collective members
became increasingly concerned about earning a decent week's salary.
Supervising the "cooperative" members as they repaired their cars was
often enjoyable, but the fees that were charged never kept up with
costs, forcing MC to seek more commercial work in order to subsidize
their "cooperative" operations. In response to growing financial pres-
sures, MC expanded in the summer of 1978 at the same location, allowing
the members to work on several more cars at once. With the increased
commercial volume, however, the amount of administrative work also
mounted, putting an increasing amount of pressure on the service mana-
ger's time. The continuing power struggles and lack of help from other
members combined with the pressures of the growing business to eventual-
ly "burn out" the service manager, forcing him to resign from the orga-
nization in the fall of 1978.
With the service manager's resignation, much of MC's formal organi-
zation began to fall apart. The regular meeti ngs , trial periods, and
training programs all faded, and commercial volume declined, putting MC
on shaky financial ground. A replacement service manager, also a ;
skilled mechanic from outside MC, was hired at the end of 1978 with the
hope that his presence would help bring some order to MC's business af-
fairs. By the late summer of 1979, unfortunately, the new service mana-
ger's lack of skills had started to become apparent. He was either un-
willing or unable to handle MC's bookkeeping, and as a result, the fi-
nances fell into complete disarray. By this time, three of the long-
time members also left the organization, all pursuing opportunities
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which looked financially more rewarding than their jobs at MC. These
resignations reduced the membership to three ~ the service manager and
two other members. Later in the fall, one of the members discovered
that the dishonesty of the service manager was in large part to blame
for the MC's poor financial health, and successfully demanded his resig-
nation. The two remaining members developed a coherent plan for both
paying off their creditors and revitalizing MC's commercial business
throughout the winter of 1979-80. By the spring, they were able to add
the present half-time member, who should be working full-time in the
near future. At present, the volume of commercial business has begun to
return to previous levels and the remaining members take pride in the
increased quality of their repair work. Currently they are contemplat-
ing the re-incorporation of MC with by-laws which formalize the organi-
zation as a collectively-run workplace.
Categorization. The Mechanics' Collective is a Type 2 organiza-
tion, in that its development deviates at an early point from the Holleb
and Abrams' secnario, but in ways which apparently failed to turn around
the process of bureaucratization.
Reviewing MC's development, we find that the early days seemed
typical of consensual anarchy
.
Membership boundaries were fluid, no
tasks were differentiated, and the initial conception of MC was a very
politicized one. A little more than a year later, with the appearance
of the first basic job description and a tightening of the membership
boundaries, the organization clearly moved into the informal differenti-
ation stage. There was, however, one major event which stands out as an
anomaly at this time: the hiring of a "qualified outsider" as the serv-
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ice manager, wi thi
n informal diffe^ejUi^ we would expect that ex-
isting members, probably one or both of the founders, would emerge as
the persons informally performing these "management" functions at MC.
Actually, the hiring of "qualified outsiders" is a major feature of for-
51 differentiation, according to Holleb and Abrams, in that it begins
the creation of formal administrative hierarchies. During the first
service manager's stay at MC, however, none of the other features of
formal dmej^ijti^ mos t typical of growing formalization of top-
down authority
- ever emerged. As a matter of fact, MC has never moved
beyond the informal differentiation stage.
It is probably more reasonable, however, to view the hiring of the
first service manager as an early possible step in the direction of con-
sensual democracy, in that members deliberately hired a person for a
crucial garage position while at the same time emphasizing the one-mem-
ber, one-vote nature of the organization. Unfortunately, the job even-
tually proved to be too much for the service manager, and because no
other members were willing to share in his growing number of administra-
tive and financial tasks, he eventually resigned. His replacement, in
addition to being less than honest, also lacked the skills of his prede-
cessor, further contributing to a general decline in all aspects of MC's
organization and business. The members who currently remain at MC are
now particularly wary of the service manager role, indicating that they
would never reinstitute the position again without a more formal struc-
ture of accountability, and also some mechanisms for distributing the
burden of additional tasks that tend to engulf the person holding this
posi ti on.
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County Food Co^. Serving almost 400 members from 140 households and
about 100 non-members, the Country Food Co-op (CFC) provides its member-
ship with a 15-20% discount on their purchases in exchange for 3-1/2
hours of monthly labor from each household. CFC offers a full range of
food items and also carried a number of non-food items, such as paper
goods and cleaning supplies. Although the bulk of work at CFC is per-
formed by members, the organization is staffed by a half-time manager
and assistant who coordinate the efforts of members and oversee the or-
dering of goods at CFC's rented building. In addition to fulfilling
monthly work requirements, member households must leave with CFC a de-
posit equal to their average weekly purchases, an arrangement which not
only provides needed cash flow, but also has allowed CFC to develop the
capital necessary for its considerable inventory. Operating costs at
CFC are covered by a small "mark-up" on the wholesale prices of items
distributed to the membership. The total business volume at CFC ap-
proaches $150,000 annually, making it the fourth largest organization in
a regional federation of over 100 co-ops.
Current organizational practices
. Most of the work at CFC follows
the weekly cycle characteristic of other "pre-order" co-ops: (1) mem-
bers' individual orders are collected early in the week and tabulated
for the entire co-op; (2) the co-op places its orders with various
wholesalers who deliver one or two days later; and (3) members pick up
and pay for their individual orders on a distribution day towards the
end of the week. At CFC, however, there are two additions to this basic
pattern. First of all, CFC carries an inventory of over 100 items less
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perishable than fresh produce, thus eliminating the need for members to
"ore-order" them. And secondly, CFC operates an "extras store" at the
very end of the week, for both members and non-members alike. The "ex-
tras store" is an important addition to a pre-order co-op, since mem-
bers' orders rarely add up to exact case units of fresh produce, result-
ing in "extra" perishables each week. By opening one day each week to
sell "extras," as well as inventoried items, CFC is able to dispose of
produce that might otherwise spoil and sell additional inventoried goods
as wel 1
.
The labor necessary for operating CFC comes from two sources — the
largest proportion from members fulfilling their work requirement, the
remainder falling to the half-time manager and her assistant. Members
begin the cycle by tabulating the orders of individual households and
giving the results to the paid staff, who place the total orders and ar-
range deliveries with wholesalers. As the deliveries arrive, the paid
staff and members unload and then establish prices for the incoming
items. Simultaneously, member work crews fill orders of cheese and dry
goods from CFC's inventories. All of this activity gradually builds un-
til members arrive in the evening to pick up the distributed orders.
The distribution process itself is undoubtedly the busiest time of the
week at CFC. Coordinated by the paid staff, the members working during
that particular week perform a number of functions: (1) "counter work,"
in which workers behind a counter fill parts of members' orders from
produce boxes and the shelves behind them; (2) staffing the "front
desk," where members' work records are checked to insure that they are
eligible for their discount; (3) "cashiering"; and (4) cleaning up. A
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day later, the "extras store" is opened, once again staffed by members
under the direction of the manager and assistant. About the only func-
tions that do not follow this weekly pattern are bookkeeping and produc-
tion of the occasional newsletter, both performed by members, and inven-
tory, which is done by the paid staff.
Within the work performed by members, there are two major modes of
organization. Most of this work is distributed on a walk-in basis as
members appear for their scheduled hours at CFC; "walk-in" tasks are not
very difficult or complicated. Tabulating orders, cashiering, and one
or two other complex job areas, on the other hand, are organized in a
"brigade" fashion, in which particular groups of households specialize
in these tasks. "Cashiering," for example, requires two persons each
week for a 3-1/2 hour shift. The total "brigade" is composed of eight
households, two of which each send a member to work once every two
weeks. The advantage of this system is that there are an abundance of
these specialized workers among the "brigade" households, allowing re-
placement workers to be found easily in the event of sudden absences or
vacati ons
.
According to CFC's by-laws, the organization is a formal constitu-
tional democracy. While the paid staff make day-to-day decisions, an
elected board of directors (BoD) makes all policy and major financial
decisions. This board consists of no less than eight directors who are
elected at an annual meeting, and it has numerous powers and duties,
including the power to appoint both a secretary and a treasurer. Look-
ing more closely at the by-laws, however, it is evident that any co-op
member has the right to attend BoD meetings and also vote . Furthermore,
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a quorum of ten co-op members (including the directors and the two paid
staff) is required before a BoD meeting can conduct business. In es-
sence, then, what initially appears as a BoD meeting is in fact an open
membership meeting. Meetings are to be held at least monthly and all
decisions are made by majority rule, including amendments to the by-
laws. Further examination of the by-laws indicates that duties of the
BoD include, among other things, annual reviews of the paid staff and
their job descriptions, and the hiring and firing of paid staff.
Unfortunately, the by-laws of CFC do not accurately describe the
realities of the organization's governance system. Elections for new
directors have not been held at annual meetings for almost three years,
and the terms of any past directors have all expired. As a result, the
now infrequent "BoD" meetings are attended by the two paid staff, and
10-12 of the more interested CFC members. Due to the manager's famili-
arity with all aspects of CFC's operations, and its history, she plays
a dominant role in the meetings. To make matters worse, co-op members
usually avoid opposing the manager too strongly on issues, out of a fear
that she might resign, an action which she threatens on occasion. On a
day-to-day basis, the manager is largely an unquestioned decision-maker.
Job descriptions do exist for the manager and her assistant, but
are currently so out-of-date that they are of limited usefulness. The
"BoD" has not only failed to revise them, but has also never instituted
an annual review of the two paid staff. On the other hand, members of
the "BoD" in past years have developed a general set of job descriptions
for the "walk-in" work performed by members.
On occasion, two formal vehicles of communication are employed at
in
mem-
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CFC. A newsletter appears sporadically (2-3 times a year), offering a
mix of recent "BoD" decisions, upcoming issues, financial reports, and
recipes. Orientations for new members do occur periodically as well,
usually in the fall, when large numbers of new households join CFC.
With the recent creation of a detailed pamphlet describing CFC opera-
tions, however, it appears that the formal orientations, which presented
essentially the same information, will in all likelihood be discontin-
ued.
f^r^. Although CFC's membership includes a broad spectrum of
people from surrounding communities, almost half of the members are
their twenties and often students from local colleges. Actually
bership is defined in two different ways - as individuals and as house-
holds. The individual membership category is employed to bestow voting
rights for most situations. Household membership is used more frequent-
ly, however, because households represent the basic unit of ordering,
financial responsibility and labor at CFC. (It is entirely possible, of
course, to be both an individual and a household.) The formal obliga-
tions of membership are clearly stated in a descriptive brochure handed
to all new CFC members. In brief, the formal obligations of household
membership include the following: (1) a non- refundable, initial member-
ship fee; (2) a deposit equal to the household's average weekly pur-
chases, refundable upon termination of household membership; and (3)
3-1/2 hours of labor every four weeks. If household members fail to
meet any of these requirements, they can have their member privileges
revoked, meaning that they can still order through CFC, but must pay
non-member prices (about 20% higher than member prices). The most com-
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mon infraction, of course, is the failure of households to fulfill their
monthly work requirements. While the sanction of imposing non-member
prices on such households does formally exist, it tends to be enforced
only sporadically, due to the fact that the CFC is unable to utilize the
surplus of member labor that often arises. As a result of spotty en-
forcement of membership requirements, only about 50-60% of CFC's member
households actually work as often as they should, if at all. Despite
the formality surrounding CFC membership, no equivalent statement, for-
mal or informal, exists for the paid staff.
Due to the dual nature of membership at CFC, two different varieties
of turnover also exist. Turnover among households usually amounts to
about 20-25% annually, a figure which can be somewhat misleading. Since
many of the member households are "cooperative households" with their
own relatively high internal turnover, the rate of turnover for indivi-
dual members at CFC is substantially higher than for household members
-- approximately 40-50% annually.
Informal structure
. Without a doubt, the manager at CFC wields a
considerable amount of informal power. Not only does she made a number
of day-to-day operational decisions which spill over into policy areas,
but her opinions at "BoD" meetings are usually decisive because of an
awkward set of dynamics which have developed over the years of her ten-
ure. Due to her longeveity at CFC, the manager has effectively "out-
lasted" most of the membership interested in CFC's internal affairs,
giving her an almost exclusive working knowledge of all aspects of CFC's
operations. To make matters worse, she is fairly protective of her
knowledge, and continues to absorb new tasks, often exclaiming, "If you
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want something done right, you've got to do it yourself." As a conse-
quence, all these factors create a situation in which the manager is at
this point largely irreplaceable - no one in the membership would want
the long hours for her small part-time salary. If she were to leave
CFC, it would probably take the membership at least a year to understand
how the organization operates. Due to CFC's dependence on this manager,
members are reluctant to challenge her in "BoD" meetings for fear that
she might actually act on her periodic threat to quit. Although the
manager's centrality is a "taboo" topic in her presence, members do oc-
casionally discuss it among themselves. Among members interviewed,
opinion was mixed on the seriousness of this problem to CFC. While some
members express strong concerns about her "undemocratic style," others
are content for her to continue in the position, feeling that any exces-
sive attempts on her oart to control the organization would probably be
met with strong member opposition.
In addition, the manager and her assistant, along with two or three
long-term members, form a core group that is clearly evident at meet-
ings. Generally, the members of this core group merely support the
manager in meetings by skewing discussion and votes in her favor.
Choosing to follow the manager's lead, they rarely take leadership posi-
tions themselves. In between meetings, their influence seems more di-
rect. Most of these core group members visit with the manager at the
co-op during the week, helping with her tasks and discussing how certain
issues and problems facing CFC should be approached in the future. This
dynamic surfaces with some obviousness in meetings, when the manager and
two or three others suddenly support a solution to a problem which has
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barely surfaced as a topic of discussion.
It should also be pointed out that neither the manager or her as-
sistant were ever formally elected to these positions; instead, they
literally "grew" into them over the years.
Additional notes
.
Other unique features of the Country Food Co-op
include the following:
1. The manager's informal power and influence is Dartirularlv,
'tlonX ""Ar'thp
1'? 30 "1^ t0 mnter* working\iyFC^rtri *
2S tho ! lm P ressures mount towards the end of theday, the manager tends to loudly criticize members who makeinnocent mistakes The effect on some members is so negativethat they purposely try to work their scheduled hours in a wayas to avoid contact with the manager. On the other hand, themanager seems quite unaware of this effect, often exclaiming
when workers are late or absent, "People just don't know owto cooperate any more!"
2. Despite the central issue of an overbearing manager, CFCis known in its regional federation as one of the better-run
co-ops. The fairly elaborate work structure (which has little
to do with the manager) has in fact resulted from years of ef-fort on the part of several generations of devoted members
In fact, many of the work system innovations are developed by
members who wanted to circumvent the "boss-like" behavior of
the manager. These efforts are usually implicit attempts to
circumvent the manager's tendency to accumulate sole knowledge
of an increasing number of CFC tasks, especially those relat-
ing to distribution days. By developing basic job descrip-
tions for tasks performed by members, not only can the nega-
tive tone of subordination to the manager be diminished, but
general knowledge of CFC's operations, previously the province
of the manager, can be passed on to members on an ongoing ba-
sis as well
.
3. Other than fulfilling the work requirement, member parti-
cipation at CFC is very low for a theoretically member-con-
trolled organization. Of the almost 400 members, only about
15-20 at most can be turned out for a "crucial" meeting --
which amounts to no more than 5%. While such a low rate of
participation could be seen as a sign of general acceptance of
the current state of affairs at CFC, there is probably at
least one other important factor. Meetings at CFC have a long
history of lasting for too long and being very poorly run. In
addition, the few members who do have process skills are rare-
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ly supported in their attempts to establish a regular meetinnformat, meeting roles, or the detailed deci s Ion-Ski ng Drol &dures required by large meetinas 9 p ce
"
,
,
, ^ , , ui uic utM
g .
4. CFC while a disappointment as a member-controlled organi-zation, is undoubtedly a financial success at present a combination of facts which has led some newer members to 'con ?udethat CFC s excel ent financial condition to the presence of astrong manager." Conversations with older members, however
seem to suggest that the opposite may be closer to the truth'
" ^at financial success leads to a "strong manager." Accord-ing to these members, when the financial condition is good
member participation tends to be low - the co-op seems to 'be
operating properly and their participation "doesn't really
seem to be needed." Lack of member participation, of course
creates a vacuum of decision-making and work that a manager islikely to fill - creating a "strong" manager. On the otherhand, when the finances deteriorate to the point where mem-
bers food prices rise, member participation invariably in-
creases — they wonder where their money is going and suddenlybegin to attend meetings again; thus "weakening" the manager.
Research relationship
.
My original request for CFC research parti-
cipation was willingly cleared by 18 members present at an annual meet-
ing, despite some concerns raised by the manager. This willingness was
in large part due to the fact that I had been a member of CFC from 1971-
76, and had served as one of its first directors towards the end of my
membership. My part of the exchange consisted of delivering a talk at
the same meeting regarding the existing literature in my research area
and its particular relevance to food co-ops. Largely as a consequence
of this talk, several members at the meeting later compiled a basic docu-
ment for CFC which outlines the organization's history, basic member job
descriptions and member obligations. Currently, this document is handed
out to new members joining CFC. One other part of my past relationship
with CFC should also be mentioned. Largely due to issues raised by my-
self and others at a membership meeting in the late summer of 1975, I
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was asked to serve on a study group to look into a number of organiza-
tional difficulties. Among other changes, this committee proposed the
idea of formal by-laws and an elected BoD for the not so implicit pur-
pose of countering the current manager's growing informal power. During
this period, the committee became entangled in a long series of power
struggles with the manager - she was fairly aware of our intent. As a
result of our work, virtually all of the study committee was elected to
the new BoD in the early spring of 1976. After serving for several
months, I relocated that fall and consequently resigned from the BoD and
also terminated my membership.
Interviews. In all, eight past and present members of CFC were in-
terviewed: the manager, somewhat briefly; three past members of the
BoD, two of whom are still members; two new members; one long-term mem-
ber who recently left the area; and one of the original founders.
Other ^ojjrce s of info rma t i on . Other materials included the minutes
of several meetings, two versions of the by-laws, the report of the
study committee, the newly produced documents describing CFC to incoming
members, several newsletters, and an extensive personal file I developed
while I was a member and later, a director.
Current developmental state. According to the stages described by
Holleb and Abrams
,
the present state of CFC is best described as one of
informal differentiation
,
although it leans somewhat ambiguously in the
direction of both consensual democracy and formal differentiation
. Part
of this apparent complexity stems from the fact that CFC has both mem-
bers and a paid staff, with different features characteristic of the two
groups. Other complications arise from two prominent factors at CFC.
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Nominally, the organization is a constitutional democracy which formal-
izes member authority by means of an elected BoD and written by-laws.
While such an arrangement is typically a major feature of consensual
democracy we find that at CFC this governance structure rarely func-
tions as it should, if at all. At present there are no elected direc-
tors and consequently, no one to hold responsible for performing the
duties of the BoD, such as conducting personnel reviews of the paid
staff. Secondly, CFC has a "manager", a feature which could be typical
of either casual <Wj^ or fomn differentiation : depending upon
which way the authority structure works - bottom-up or top-down, re-
spectively. At present, the actual structure of authority at CFC is
ambiguous. If the members wanted to assert their authority, they could
reconstitute the BoD as spelled out in the by-laws. On the other hand,
if they continue to ignore the formal structure set by the by-laws, the
manager could end up directing the organization to a greater extent than
she does now. In short, the central issues within the informal differ-
entiation stage — those of power and inclusion/exclusion in the deci-
sion-making group -- have never been resolved successfully at CFC.
Power struggles, particularly regarding decision-making, still continue
within the organization, largely between members who attend "BoD" meet-
ings, and the manager, her assistant and two or three core group mem-
bers. In sum, it might be said that CFC currently lies in an "advanced
stage" of in forma 1 d i ffere n ti a ti on
, in that some features of the organi-
zation seem to be consistent with other stages, but the central issues
of informal differentiation have yet to find their resolution.
With this overview of CFC in mind, and with the recognition that
228
there are really two levels of organization - rembers and paid staff -
the items in Table 22 become more understandable. Examining the items
carefully, we see that the major features relating to power and inclu-
sion/exclusion issues still remain at CFC ( I D- 7 , 10, 13, 14, and 15).
On the other hand, several other characteristics are either absent or
only partially true, a situation requiring a detailed review of several
of the other items in this stage. Although much of the division of
member labor is informal (ID-2), it is clear that a large degree of for-
mal division of labor separates the tasks of the coordinator and her as-
sistant from those of the membership. Boundaries for members are atyp-
ically formal (ID-3), while membership boundaries for the staff are un-
stated at this time. Similarly, membership at CFC is open to anyone
willing to assume clearly stated responsibilities, while membership in
the core group is based entirely on friendship with the manager (ID-4).
CFC has formal decision-making procedures as specified in the by-laws,
but they are often ignored or casually reinvented as if they did not ex-
ist (ID-8). Several formal rules and regulations exist for members (ID-
16), which are enforced somewhat haphazardly, but no equivalent proce-
dures govern the paid staff, with one exception. The by-laws do contain
certain sections (i.e., hiring, firing, and review) which clearly subor-
dinate the paid staff to the "BoD", but they have never been implemented
And finally, issues of accountability raised by outside agencies (i.e.,
banks, town officials, etc.) have diminished considerably at this point
(ID-17), as have member demands for more consistent services from the
co-op (ID-18). In summary, then, we can see that CFC has the mechanisms
in place for asserting the final authority of the membership, but for
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TABLE 22
INFORMAL DIFFERENTIATION ITEMS FOR
Characteri sties
:
de-emphasis of ideology
informal division of labor; first job
descri ption
continued fluid membership but infor-
mal boundaries tighten
membership based on friendship or
"good vibes"
THE COUNTRY FOOD CO-OP
yes
5 - organization in period of rapid expan-
sion/implementation
Leadership:
6 formation of the core group
7 -- day-to-day decisions made by core
group with major decisions left to
entire membership
8 -- lack of formal decision-making proce-
dures
Rewards
:
9 -- increasing effectiveness and compet-
tence (learning through skill-sharing)
10 -- sense of family in core group
1 1 autonomy in work
12 -- personal growth
Problems and pressures:
13 -- power struggles between core group
and other members; jockeying for
status and influence
14
15
16
17
18
- core group feels responsibility but
none of the power
- non-core members feel left out of
important decisions
- organizational rules and regulations
apparent but not formally recognized
or wri tten down
- outside agencies, especially funders,
demand tighter bookkeeping and inter-
nal accountabi 1 i ty
- clientele/customers demand more con-
si stent servi ces
yes, for staff and members; some
formal divison of labor
staff, yes; members, no
members, no; core group, yes
yes, still expanding rapidly
yes
yes, although core group exerts
strong influence on all decisions
no, but rarely used
yes
yes
staff, yes; members, no but increasing
staff, yes; only involved members
yes
yes, but manager obviously feels
some power
yes, periodically
exist for members, but not usually
enforced; do not exist for staff
yes, but less now
less often now
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several reasons, these mechanisms either do not work or are not used.
Consequently, CFC still remains in the informal d^entUtion stage,
wavering between possible futures of formal affiwsaH^ or con^
sual democracy
.
Stn^cj^ country Food Co-op was started in the spring
of 1971 by two men who decided that the town of Country needed and could
support its own co-op (see Table 23). Previously, many town residents
had traveled to a large co-op located in a neighboring town, but had
been somewhat dissatisfied by the distance, the co-op's large size, and
its continual state of disorganization. After surveying local interest,
the two founders located a building with a large room which they could
rent on a once-a-week basis and established CFC as a very basic pre-
erder food co-op. Instead of buying directly from wholesalers, however,
CFC initially placed one large order at the large neighboring co-op, and
then trucked the order back to Country for distribution to CFC members.
Due to the rental arrangement, the co-op would be set up for distribu-
tion on one day each week and then be completely dismantled until the
following week. During this period, CFC operated in an atmosphere of
complete confusion and chaos, with 30 member households sharing in all
the tasks. Orders would be lost, the produce was of unpredictable qual-
ity, and there was always too much or too little of every food item or-
dered. Despite these shortcomings, CFC's first term of operation was a
moderate success. Common to most small pre-order co-ops, CFC then
closed for the summer -- both the volume of orders and the prices of
fresh produce declined to the point where it was unreasonable to oper-
ate .
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For the first three years, CFC operated on this seasonal cycle,
dosing every sunuier, but nonetheless attracting more members, which
meant a greater dollar volume, and a slowly but steadily expanding range
of food items. Meetings of the membership were held on an occasional
basis throughout the operati ng year, but because of their reputation for
disorganization, were usually attended sparsely. All the necessary la-
bor was still provided by members, in exchange for their lower food
prices, but one of the remaining founders, along with two or three other
members, began to emerge as a consistent core group within CFC. This
group invested a disproportionate amount of weekly time and energy in
keeping CFC alive and growing. In fact, by the end of 1973, the remain-
ing founder began to be referred to by other members as CFC's "coordin-
ator. "
In many ways, the formation of the core group was both a cause and
result of the erratic way in which most member households fulfilled
their monthly work requirements. Although the requirement was a recog-
nized obligation of CFC members, the work records were poorly kept, and
no sanctions other than social pressure were brought to bear if the re-
quirement was not met. Due to the unpredictable number of member work
on distribution days, the "coordinator" and other core group members
gradually emerged as the only individuals who could be counted on from
week to week. When members repeatedly failed to perform a specific
task or perform it poorly, core group members would often step in and do
the task themselves. In this way, many tasks originally shared by the
members became the regular domain of the core group. At this time, CFC
was growing, of course, resulting in brand new tasks which also fell to
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core group meters. With the increasing centrality of the core group
however, the initial problem with member labor gradually worsened. Over
time, members became even more lax at fulfilling their work requirement,
realizing that a few regulars and the coordinator would always be at the
co-op to do what was needed on distribution day. In this fashion, a
vicious circle began: members were erratic in working, which gave more
tasks to the core group; but as the core group took more obvious respon-
sibility for co-op tasks, members saw their participation as less essen-
tial. During this same period, a similar dynamic seemed to develop in
regard to CFC membership meetings. As one member said, "Why go to a
disorganized meeting when you know that a small group of people can and
will make the decisions anyway?" After joining CFC, new members gener-
ally seemed to come to the same conclusion after their first one or two
membership meetings. Consequently, most meetings were sparsely attended
and the core group usually constituted a strong minority if not a major-
ity of members present. On several occasions, no members would come to
meetings, placing the core group in the position of making decisions by
themselves or delaying them until a new meeting could be called. Re-;
peatedly frustrated by the lack of member attendance, the core group
often chose to make decisions by themselves, further convincing members
that their participation in meetings was unnecessary for CFC to operate.
After a long series of conflicts with the rented building's land-
lord, CFC discovered in the spring of 1974 that it would be evicted dur-
ing the summer. Another building was soon located which could be used
continuously, a significant improvement over the one-day-a-week rental
basis of the first building. With continuous occupancy, CFC was able to
create a permanent distribution point for their ore-order arrangement
complete with permanent counters, scales, coolers, and even shelves for
an inventory. After two months of preparation, CFC moved to the new
location in the summer of 1974, which was also their first year of sum-
mer operations. The new facility not only gave CFC a permanent and
identifiable location, but also the space necessary to expand its pro-
duce line. As the membership and volume of CFC continued to grow, an
increasing amount of work fell to members in the core group. Due to his
extensive time commitment, the "coordinator" asked at a general meeting
that he be reimbursed at the rate of $25 each week, and the few members
present agreed. With this first salary, another vicious circle began.
Other core groups members began to feel somewhat slighted by the deci-
sion; they, too, put in long hours without reimbursement. During the
fall of 1974, three other core group members also began receiving small
salaries as "coordinators." With the arrival of these salaried posi-
tions, however, members became even less responsible about fulfilling
the work requirement, sometimes saying, "Why should we do such and such
work, when we already have four paid people to do it?" Again, as a re-
sult of continuing expansion and declining member efforts, the work of
the paid coordinators continued to grow, pushing some of them to ask for
either salary increases or additional paid staff, both of which were
agreed to at meetings (bringing the paid staff to a total of five).
As CFC entered its second summer of continuous operation in 1975,
it became clear that the organization was entering a financial crisis.
Checks bounced, bills went upaid, and wholesalers became reluctant to
deliver. In desperation, the paid staff decided on their own to raise
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the "mark-up" on member purchases in order to generate the needed cash
flow, not once but twice. Since these crucial decisions were made with-
out formally announcing a membership meeting, a large proportion of the
members were enraged
- the cost of their food had climbed rapidly and
the crucial decisions had been made by only a small group. To make mat-
ters worse, the paid staff had also altered the work requirements in a
clearly inequitable way. Due to these volatile issues, member meetings
in the late summer of 1975 were very well attended. Throughout the dis-
cussions, however, it continually appeared that the core group was with-
holding vital information from the members. In reaction, the membership
established a "study group" of seven members which was to make a detail-
ed examination of all aspects of CFC and produce a report detailing
findings and recommendations. This study group met throughout the fall
and winter of 1975-76, finally presenting their work in the spring.
While they uncovered several questionable financial arrangements which
were to prove embarrassing to the core group of paid staff, their major
conclusion was that CFC was paying too many salaried staff for it to
keep food prices significantly lower than the supermarkets. In fact,
paid staff were performing several tasks previously taken care of by
members. The study group then presented two major areas of recommenda-
tions: (1) that CFC accept a set of by-laws establishing an elected BoD
with policy-making and personnel review powers; and (2) that CFC imple-
ment a "brigade" labor system which would allow members to reliably per-
form much of the work previously done by paid staff. The meetings at
which both the report and recommendations were discussed openly surfaced
the struggle for control that had been brewing for some time between the
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paid staff and the study group. In the end, the study group prevailed
and three members of the paid staff left CFC altogether, m addition,
all the members of the study group were elected to CFC's first BoD,
largely because of their obvious knowledge of the co-op and the disin-
terest of other members. At the same time
,
however, one of the two
women remaining from the previous (paid) core group was also elected,
precipitating a major debate over whether or not she should have voting
rights on the BoD as a paid staffer. Eventually she was granted voting
rights and the new BoD set about implementing the study group's remain-
ing recommendations as well as other new policies. For example, the new
BoD developed the first formal sanction at CFC for members who failed to
fulfill their work requirements. If member households neglected their
monthly work hours, they promptly lost their member food discount, pay-
ing supermarket prices at CFC instead. During this period the one woman
coordinator who served on the BoD began to emerge as the cental figure
at CFC, overshadowing the other remaining coordinator. Although the new
labor system for members reduced the overall amount of work falling to
paid coordinators, the remaining tasks had to be divided now between two
coordinators instead of five. Since one of the coordinators now played
a major role at CFC, her salary was raised to reflect her very busy
half-time commitment.
Over the summer of 1976, the "brigade" system was slowly expanded
to a number of CFC tasks. Many of these innovations promised to under-
mine the job areas performed by the dominant coordinator, however, and
she repeatedly stalled their implementation. With the reduced number of
salaries, CFC's financial health rapidly improved, making it possible to
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lower the W-up," a fact which pleased the existing rubers and at-
tracted new ones.
During the winter of 1976-77, the new BoD began to develop its
first serious difficulties. Several of the original directors left the
area, creating vacancies faster than replaces could be found and
voted in. By the summer of 1977, several new and vocal nepers decided
that the problem could be remedied by altering the by-laws to allow any
individual CFC member to vote at BoD meetings, in addition to the re-
maining directors. The effect, of course, was to dilute the intent of
the original by-laws: to create a stable body of elected policy-makers
at CFC who could, among other things, counter the possible abuses of
power by paid staff. After this change, the BoD meetings were largely
indistinguishable from the sparsely attended membership meetings which
preceded them. Members at the new "BoD" meetings tended to turn over
at roughly the same 40-50% annual rate characteristic of individual mem-
bers at CFC, creating a situation in which the dominant coordinator came
to be one of the few original BoD members always in attendance. In
addition, the turnover of meeting members gradually enhanced the infor-
mal power of the dominant coordinator - her detailed and continuous
knowledge of CFC's history and operations gave her opinions a justifi-
able air of authority. As the other original BoD structure fell apart,
the implementation of the "brigade" system, the work requirement sanc-
tions, and the personnel review process also deteriorated — largely due
to the influence of the dominant coordinator, who never really approved
of any of these innovations. As new members became involved in the
"BoD" meetings, they did take some positive steps, however. Although
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much of the "Mgade" system was soon forgotten, the existing wor k ar-
rangements for members were made more explicit. The first set of gen-
eral job descriptions for members were created in the spring of 1978
And, in the fall of 1979, on the advice of a speaker at their annual
meting, roughly the same group of interested members created an orien-
tation document which included menfcer job descriptions, a list of member
obligations, and a history of the organization.
Since the demise of the original BoD structure in the summer of
1977, however, little else has changed at CFC except for the dominant
coordinator's title. Sometime during the winter of 1978-79, her title
shifted from "coordinator" to "manager", an informal change with no
clearcut origins. At this point, the future direction of CFC is some-
what unclear. Although CFC is a financial success, the fate of its
governance process continues to vacillate uneasily between control by
the membership and control by its manager.
Categorization. The Country Food Co-op is a Type 2 organization -
its pattern of development deviates signi ficantly from the Holleb and
Abrams' model, but still failed to stop the process of bureaucratiza-
tion.
CFC's founding days in the spring of 1971 were very typical of the
consensual ajiarchy, stage. Loosely organized by the two founders, CFC
was characterized by relatively fluid boundaries, undifferentiated la-
bor, and general confusion. During the next two years, however, a dis-
tinct core group and "coordinator" began to emerge, both features of the
informal differentiation stage. By the time that CFC had moved to its
new location in 1974, this stage had developed more fully. The core
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group became largely synonymous with CFC's
"coordinators", individuals
who never were formally elected or hired, but simply grew into their po-
sitions at CFC. After hearing the report of the study group in the
early spring of 1976, the mentership voted to establish a set of by-laws
and an elected BoD in order to formalize member control at CFC. These
arrangements, of course, created a constitutional democracy, one major
step in the direction of consejnsual dejmcrac^. According to the Holleb
and Abrams' scenario, we would not expect to see such changes until a
crucial choicepoint had been reached in the formal ^Ij^rejUijtion
stage. At the time that CFC members decided to implement a constitu-
tional democracy, however, the organization was still in the normal
differentia tion stage. As we have seen, however, the constitutional
democracy was not in place very long before new members effectively dis-
mantled the structure, diluting formal member control. In summary,
then, the attempt to move towards consensual dejnocracy_ at CFC apparently
failed, leaving in place to the present day the unresolved issues of
power and control so typical of informal differentiation
.
Summary of Cases
From Table 24, we can see a general summary of the eight individu-
al cases, arranged by "Type" and indicating their current developmental
s ta te
.
The absence of a single Type 1 organization deserves an explana-
tion. Despite repeated attempts on my part, no true Type 1 organiza-
tions could be found -- organizations whose development faithfully fol-
lows the progression of stages outlined by Holleb and Abrams. Although
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TABLE 24
GENERAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Organization Type Name
Type 1
Type 2 Grocery Collective
Restaurant Collective
Magazine Group
Mechanics' Collective
Country Food Co-op
informal differentiation
since 1974
informal differentiation
since 1977
beginning formal differen
tiation 1980
informal differentiation
since 1977
informal differentiation
since 1974
Type 3 Warehouse Collective
Literature Col lecti ve
Studio Col lecti ve
consensual democracy since
1979 but some features of
informal differentiation
remaining
moving from informal dif-
ferentiation to consensual
democracy 1980
consensual democracy since
1974
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a number of the organizations appeared initially to be likely candidates
for this category, close scrutiny of their developmental histories in-
variably revealed that there had been at least brief, formal attests to
move towards consensu democracy, prior to the formal ^erentiation_
stage.
In all, there were five Type 2 organizations which deviated from
the Holleb and Abrams
'
scenario, but failed to either stop or inhibit
the process of bureaucratization: Grocery Collective, Restaurant Col-
lective, Magazine Group, Country Food Co-op, and Mechanics' Collective.
In all but one of the cases, these organizations still remain in the in-
formal dmej^nt^ The one exception, of course, is the
Magazine Group, which at this point appears to be moving rapidly from
Morml differentiation to formal differentiation
. At the same time,
it should be pointed out that all five of the Type 2 organizations would
have been Type 1 organizations, had it not been for one, or sometimes
two, formal attempts to create organizational structure characteristic
of consensual ,demc^racy_. If we were to ignore these attempts, all five
cases would then seem to follow the Holleb and Abrams' scenario quite
closely.
And finally, there are three Type 3 organizations - organizations
whose development was not only anomalous in terms of the Holleb and
Abrams progression, but also relatively successful, given their appar-
ent recovery from or avoidance of the bureaucratization process. Clear-
ly, the Studio Collective stands as an exemplary alternative institu-
tion, moving directly from consensual anarchy to consensual democracy
.
The other two cases in this category are also promising, although less
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clear-cut. The Warehouse Collective, largely because of its i„ cl usion
in the Federation's constitutional democracy, q ualifies as a consensual
^ocracj,, although see elements are either still lacking or^hT^
process of being put in place.
,„ the case of the Literature Collec-
tive, the organization is currently midway between info™! differentia-
tion and consent democracy, but quickly moving towards the latter.
Altogether, then, we find that none of the eight cases include
"first wave" alternative institutions typical of those studied by Holleb
and Abrams. All the organizations are apparently "second wave" alter-
native institutions, although only three have successfully developed in
ways which reflect their original consensual/democratic ideals.
CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION
Introduction
This discussion of the eight case studies presented in the previous
chapter has three major sections. First, we will briefly review the
general characteristics of the eight cases. Since all eight organiza-
tions are "second wave" alternative institutions, we should also comment
on the differences between these organizations and the "first wave" al-
ternative institutions examined by Holleb and Abrams. While the absence
of Type 1 organizations in the sample prevents detailed comparisons of
this sort, some overall contrasts are still possible. Secondly, we will
look at the structural factors which differentiate the Type 3 organiza-
tions from the less successful Type 2 organizations. In particular, we
will attempt to evaluate the proposition that there are three major
areas of structural components that are necessary to keep alternative
institutions alternative. And lastly, we will briefly consider some of
the non-structural features of the eight sample organizations. Before
we begin, however, there are three important considerations to bear in
mind.
Reducing the case study data to manageable proportions
. As we have
seen, the case study approach of this research has generated a set of
data which is incredibly rich, but at the same time, potentially over-
243
244
whelming. Had time and space allowed, of course, even more material
could have been included in the case studies. In order to make the task
of comparative analysis reasonable under such conditions, two devices
were used. First, some small details and supplementary information not
included in the case studies are occasionally employed in both the com-
parisons and their interpretation. Wherever such material is introduced,
however, it is clearly noted. And secondly, the comparisons are kept at
a level of analysis that allows patterns to become recognizable, but not
mired in unnecessary detail. This approach is quite appropriate given
the next consideration.
Recognizing the limitations of the sample
. Despite the richness of the
case studies, it is important to recognize that the sample includes only
eight organizations from a particular geographic region, factors which
set real limits on both the validity of possible findings, and the de-
gree to which these findings can be generalized. Furthermore, we need
to acknowledge that the sample is limited not only in size and geogra-
phy, but in time as well. As we have seen, the sample organizations are
from a different "generation" than those studied by Holleb and Abrams,
and undoubtedly promise to change even more as time passes. In other
words, the data are very time-bound. What was true of these organiza-
tions yesterday may not be true tomorrow — they can collapse, expand,
or even drastically reorganize themselves in previously unexpected ways.
And finally, all these limitations point to the necessity of one last
consi deration.
Maintaining an interventionist perspective . In essence, the immensity
245
of the data and their limited representativeness, in term, of numbers
and time, re-create fairly accurately the conditions which the interven-
tionist concerned with alternative institutions must endure in real
life. There are always a huge number of details from a limited number
of tentative cases, all of which can become rapidly outdated. Despite
these conditions, the interventionist is nonetheless constantly forced
by client organizations to generate practical answers from this unwieldy
and temporary data set. Thus the interventionist must quickly come to
at least tentative conclusions about what works and what does not work,
and be ready to apply these conclusions to real organizations in a state
of need.
I invite the reader to take the perspective of an interventionist
as we discuss the results of this research, pretending that this treat-
ment of the data must be the basis of tomorrow's consultation with one
of the less successful alternative institutions in the research sample.
As we will see, such a perspective is not only helpful in understanding
the results, but also very necessary for their interpretation. With all
these considerations in mind, let us now turn to discussion of the case
studies.
General Samp! e Characteristics
The most obvious feature shared by all eight organizations is their
deviation from the developmental scenario described by Holleb and Abrams.
In their model, of course, no formal structures consistent with consen-
sual/democratic ideals emerge until an alternative institution enters
the formal differentiation stage. In each of the eight sample organiza-
con-
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tions, however, there were distinct attempts to establish formal,
sensual/democratic structures ^rior to the formal differejiU^ stage
.
From Table 25, we can see that in four of the cases^^sT^empt to
move in the direction of consensual democracy occurred during infp_rmal
dll^renti^, while in the four remaining instances, these attempts
occurred during consensual anarchy. As we should recall, the criterion
for these early structures is that they were either actions or sets of
procedures which first represented the formal expression of final au-
thority on the part of an organization's members. Examining Table 25
more closely, we see that the attempts at formal structure fall into two
general categories. In five of the cases, the first formal structure
was largely one of coordination, in which the persons performing this
function were either representatives of departments, or elected or hired
by the entire membership. In the remaining three cases, the first at-
tempts at formal structure consisted of the implementation of various
constitutional democracies, arrangements which largely affected the
areas of decision-making and membership boundaries.
Due to "early" attempts to move in the direction of consensual de-
mocracy, then, all eight organizations qualify as "second wave" alter-
native institutions. The inability to locate "first wave" alternative
institutions typical of the Holleb and Abrams sample could, of course,
be due to the possibility that such organizations are merely more diffi-
cult to identify or less willing to engage in research participation.
In my opinion, however, this was not the case. While an examination of
only eight organizations in rural regions of New England does not in any
way constitute a comprehensive survey of existing alternative institu-
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TABLE 25
DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF SAMPLE ORGANIZATIONS DURING FIRST
ATTEMPT AT CONSENSUAL/DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE
Organization
^elopjrient^^ Structure
Grocery
Col 1 ecti ve
Wa rehouse
Col 1 ecti ve
Li terature
Col 1 ecti ve
Restaurant
Coll ecti ve
Magazine Group
Studio Collective
Mechanics 1
Col 1 ecti ve
Country Food Co-op
informal
differentiation
informal
differentiation
consensual anarchy
consensual anarchy
i n fo rma 1
differentiation
consensual anarchy
consensual anarchy
informal
differentiation
election of coordinators
(1975)
formal inclusion in
larger constitutional
democracy (1979)
member hiring of coor-
dinator (1978)
election of coordinators
(1976)
representative "pub-
lisher's group" (1979)
constitutional democracy
with by-laws and elected
officers (1974)
member hiring of service
manager (1977)
constitutional democracy
with by-laws and elected
Board of Di rectors
(1976)
sever-
in
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tions, I think it is safe to say that these results, at least in the
particular geographical regions, indicate the current predominance of
"second wave" alternative institutions. And, as a consequence of
al years of consultation with alternative institutions, I would say
addition that this trend is generally true not only in greater New En-
gland, but nationally as well. In one way, however, the term "predomi-
nance" can be somewhat misleading.
While many of the "first wave" alternative institutions of the type
studied by Holleb and Abrams have disappeared altogether, others have
been transformed into "second wave" organizations by later structural
innovations consistent with consensual/democratic ideals. Country Food
Co-op, for example, appears to be one such organization. Recalling that
CFC was founded in 1971, we can see that based on its first five years
alone, it clearly qualified as a "first wave" alternative institution -
it had no formal structures consistent with consensual democracy. Fur-
thermore, CFC progressed very slowly through the Holleb and Abrams
stages during this period, never moving beyond informal differentiation
.
In 1976, however, member attempts to establish a formal constitutional
democracy at CFC "transformed" it into a "second wave" organization.
This pattern, incidently, is not uncommon among food co-ops elsewhere.
In CFC's Federation in 1979, for instance, members at two other food co-
ops were engaged in almost identical attempts to create formal constitu-
tional democracies under the same conditions. As we can see then, the
distinction between "first wave" and "second wave" alternative institu-
tions can be merely a function of passing time -- and it should be. As
structural innovations become known, and as internal crises demand reso-
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lution, enters of alternative institutions often attempt to improve and
refine their organizations in ways consistent with founding ideals. As
we can see, then, the "predominance" of "second wave" alternative insti-
tutions is not only due to the emergence of new, more structurally so-
phisticated organizations, but also to the re-definition of older,
"first wave" organizations that had not progressed beyond irrformai dif-
ferenttati °" bGf0re thei> first attempts to create consensual /democratic
structures. Although the "predominance" of "second wave" organizations
in the research sample can be easily explained, the reasons for their
relative structural sophistication are much more difficult to identify.
In essence, we are asking not how, but why the eight sample organiza-
tions differ from those studied by Holleb and Abrams. Although analyses
later in the chapter will shed some light on this question, answers at
this point can only be framed in general terms.
Bearing in mind the fact that all eight sample organizations at-
tempted to create consensual/democratic structures prior to informal
differentiation, it appears that the major "choicepoint" in the Holleb
and Abrams model — between bureaucracy and consensual democracy - may
be occurring earlier in the sample organizations than in those examined
by Holleb and Abrams. As pointed out in previous chapters, the organi-
zations studied by Holleb and Abrams seemed largely unaware of this cru-
cial choice unti 1 the formal differentiation stage. Apparently, the mem-
bers of the eight organizations in the present study were cognizant of
these two options at an earlier stage of development. At this point,
however, we can only speculate about the reasons for their relatively
"early" awareness. For example, we would assume that members in the
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present sample may have learned fr0 m past experiences with other alter-
native institutions. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of members
from the sample organizations had also lived in "cooperative households"
during the 1970V These living arrangers, of course, can be quite
instructive about attempts to put the theories of shared work and deci-
sion-making into practice. At the Warehouse Collective, for example,
members indicated that the "job wheel" used to rotate routine mainte-
nance tasks was a direct result of the success of this device in their
individual cooperative households. Similarly, when queried about the
source of their consensual decision-making, members from several of the
sample organizations were able to point to their past involvement with
the Clamshell Alliance, a large New England anti-nuclear coalition,
which explicitly trained its members in the use of consensus as a deci-
sion-making device. At other times, the "early awareness" was due to
widely distributed articles on alternative institutions within the al-
ternative press. The Literature Collective, for instance, received ini-
tial inspiration for their elaborate system of job rotation from an ar-
ticle read by its members (Bernstein & Bowers, 1977). And in some of
the sample organizations, problems of size, scope and scale not shared
Holleb and Abrams' organizations literally forced members to consider
formal consensual/democratic structures. In the situations of the Ware-
house Collective and the Country Food Co-op, these issues demanded reso-
lution in order to make democratic notions workable at all, leading in
both cases to the creation of constitutional democracies.
In general terms, then, we can see that past experiences, cultural
milieu and problems of growth and size all seem to be factors which led
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the sample organizations to move in the direction of consensual democ-
racy at an earlier developmental stage than their predecessors studied
by Holleb and Abrams. In many ways, all these factors led to the devel-
opment of an informal working knowledge of alternative institutions ~
what seemed to work, what to avoid, what not to worry about. Spread by
word-of-mouth, direct experience and occasional books and articles, this
working knowledge clearly made an impact on the development of the or-
ganizations in our sample, and undoubtedly elsewhere as well.
In summary, then, we can see that the sample organizations appar-
ently had the benefit of information and perspectives not available to
"first wave" organizations like those studied by Holleb and Abrams.
Consequently, the sample organizations made various "earlier" choices to
move in the direction of consensual democracy, choices which have had
mixed results. While a comparison of the present sample with that of
Holleb and Abrams may be of historical interest, however, it does not
directly address the fundamental issue of this research - keeping al-
ternative institutions alternative. This issue can only be addressed by
examining the differences between Type 2 and Type 3 organizations in our
sample
— less successful versus more successful alternative institu-
tions. As we might expect, the major area of comparison concerns the
structural features of these organizations.
Structural Differences
The central proposition of this research is that three areas of
structural components are necessary to keep alternative institutions al
ternative: (1) formal structures of work, decision-making, and coordi-
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nation consistent wi th consensual/democratic ideals; (2) formal struc-
tures of maintenance; and (3) formal structures of organizational learn-
ing. In order to examine this assertion, a fairly complete list of the
formal structures falling in each of the three component areas was re-
quired. In creating such a list, the first step involved the recon-
struction of the a priori list of example structures presented in Chap-
ter VI, Method. In the course of the interviews, meters were specific-
ally asked about which of the example structures existed or had existed
in their organizations and which did not. On the basis of their an-
swers, the a priori list was revised to reflect onl^ those formal struc-
tures employed by the sample organizations at one time or another. The
resulting list of structural components, divided into the three major
areas, can be seen in Table 26. In addition, the present number of or-
ganizational members was included in the comparisons in order to comple-
ment other information. In the case of the Country Food Co-op, two
figures were used, the first indicating household members, the second
indicating individual members. Before we consider possible comparisons,
however, we need first to comment on the structural components and the
procedures involved in assessing their presence or absence in the sample
organizations
.
The items
.
The only two items in Table 26 which may not be familiar
from the case studies are "economic feedback mechanisms" (111-13), and
"'management level' information-sharing" (111-14), both items taken from
Bernstein's (1976) model. While the meaning of both phrases can be
found in Chapter III, a brief review is appropriate at this point. In
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TABLE 26
REVISED LIST OF FORMAL STRUCTURE BY COMPONENT AREA
I. Work, Decision-making and Coordination
1. recognized work procedures
2. written work procedures
3- group job descriptions
4. individual job descriptions
5. member work schedules
6. job rotation systems
7. regular member meetings
8. recognized decision-making procedures
9. written decision-making procedures
10. regular meeting roles
11. representative, hired, or elected "management" mechanisms12. management" position job descriptions
onanism
II. Maintenance
1. clear member boundaries
2. written rights, duties, obligations
3. member contracts/agreements
4. new member trial periods
5. new member orientation/training
6. ongoing member training
7. training/orientation material
s
8. mechanism for resolving disputes
9. regular personnel review process
10. acqepting/hiring procedures
11. removing/firing procedures
12. vehicles for sharing feelings
13. economic feedback mechanisms
14. "management level" information-sharing
III. Organizational Learning
1. regular, reflective meetings/retreats
2. study groups
3. formal process roles
4. consultants/external critics
5. criticism/self-criticism sessions
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essence, the first term refers to mechanisms which directly connect
.em-
bers' remuneration levels with the financial performance of their orga-
nization, like frequent monetary rewards based on productivity, effici-
ency, and so on. The second term points to mechanisms by which persons
in "management" positions share infection relevant to their position
with organizational members. Examples could include a section of meet-
ings devoted to this topic, special meetings, or even regular memoranda.
All the remaining items should be sel f-exolanatory
. Another item worthy
of mention is
"consultants/external critics" (III-4). If I exchanged
consultation time with a sample organization, this was not counted as an
instance of formal structure, since I initiated the original contact.
However, in * 0 cases - Studio Collective (SC) and Magazine Group (MG)
-- my consultation activities were initiated by the organization and
proceded the research, so both these instances were considered typical
of the item.
Deasjon cnteria. In order to decide whether a particular organization
could be characterized as employing a given structural component, a sim-
ple present/absent criterion was used, and the effectiveness or quality
of the component was not considered. In many of the cases, for example,
the same structural component might have varying purposes or expecta-
tions attached to it, making relative measures of effectiveness or qual-
ity unwieldy. In addition, some structural components, such as "remov-
ing/firing procedures" (11-11) might exist but never had been used also
making evaluation difficult. As we shall see, however, the complexity
of the data and the level of comparative analyses to which they are
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subjected both appear to justify the use of such a straightforward cri-
terion. In general, the minimum requirement for the presence of a
structural component was that most members interviewed could point to
its existence within the organization presently or in the past. In
those cases where current members knew little or nothing of the early
history of their organization, however, the presence of certain struc-
tures was ascertained from records, documents and historical accounts.
Information sources,. In all but a very few instances, the relevant in-
formation for determining the presence or absence of individual struc-
tural components at any time in the history of a oarticular organization
is directly available from the case studies or easily inferred from
them. The only exceptions are a few minor features of organizations
which were not included in the case studies for the sake of brevity.
In these few instances, the relevant information was taken from the
original research notes or from memory.
Cpjgpjnson of £resent formal structures
. Examining Table 27, we see a
comparison of Type 2 and Type 3 organizations by the three areas of
present structural components. While we may be drawn to examine the
particular structures characteristic of each organization, the overall
pattern of results is most striking. In general terms, we find that
Type 3 organizations have formal structures in all three categories,
while Type 2 organizations fail to have any structural components in the
organizational learning area. Furthermore, it is also clear that Type 3
organizations currently have more formal structures in the second area
of components -- maintenance -- and roughly the same number in the area
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TABLE 27
STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TYPE 2 AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS
AT PRESENT
Formal Structures
GC
II
Type 2
RC MG
Work, Decision-making and Coordination
recognized work procedures
3
written work procedure:
group
.job descri ptions
i:—individual job descri ptive
5. member work schedul es
Job rotation systems
7.
8
regular member meeting
^
recognized decision-making
procedures
10.
written decision-making &rflcedure§
11.
12.
regular meeting roles
representative, hired, or elected
"management" mechanic
"management" position job
descriptions
Maintenance
-L clear member boundariPQ
rights, duties,written
obi igations
4.
member contracts/agreements
new membe r trial periods
^ new member orientation/training
6. ongoing member training
training/orientation material s
mechanism for resolving disputes
9
-
regular personnel review pmrps<;
10.
11.
accepting/hiring procedures
removing/firing pror.pdurp^
1| vehicles for sharing feelings
13
14
economic feedback mechanisms
'management level" information
sharing
III Organizational Learning
regular, reflective meetings/
retreats
2. study groups
3. formal process roles
Ai consultants/external critics
5. criticism/ self-criticism sessions
MC CFC WC
X
Type 3
LC SC
members 22 28 6 3 140/400 7 3 15
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of work, decision-making, and coordination. This comparison, then, ap-
parently supports our major contention that successful alternative in-
stitutions require forma, structural components in each of the three
different areas. The logic of this comparison, however, does have a
major shortcoming.
While it is possible that the more successful organizations are
successful because they currently have structural components in all
three areas, this also suggests the converse - that no organizations
with components in all three areas at any_ time in their oast would be
less successful presently. In other words, a second test of our major
proposition would involve the examination of the unsuccessful organiza-
tions to see if at any point in their developmental history they too had
components in all three areas. If this were the case, then we would be
drawn to conclude that some other factor than formal structure in the
three areas really contributed to success or failure - that formal
structure was perhaps helpful, but certainly not necessary for success.
In order to make an appropriate comparison, let us now look at struc-
tures that may have existed at any point during each organization's
history
.
Comparison of formal structure present at any_ time. Examining Table 28,
we see a comparison of Type 2 and Type 3 organizations in terms of for-
mal structures that may have existed at any point in their development.
The striking features of the last comparison now are diminished -- all
but one of the Type 2 organizations had at least one instance of formal
structure in the organizational learning area. At the same time, how-
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TABLE 28
STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TYPE 2 AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS
AT ANY TIME IN THEIR HISTORIES
Formal Structures nr
Type 2
-
—
GC RC MP, Mr rrr
Type 3
WC LC SC
I. Work, Dec 1S1 on-making and Coordination
ii_ recoqmzed work procedures v v
^. written work procedure; 1 5 ^
±t—yroup job descriptions ~ y
v
4. individual ioh Hac^in^^ * &— 1
M X X..
j
x X
o. member work schedules 9 -j — x
o. job rotation systems — — n- x
regular member meetinqs y v a n X -
« recognized decision-making " S 5 2 a
procedures
y. written decision-makina procedure — 1
XjX
X
X
;
XXX
X
<lx
XX
x
>1U. regular meetinq roles v o n x
il. representative, hired, or elecT^ " * -
"management" mechanisms y X V v
A A
X X X
X X X"management" position job ' 5 -
description
x x
X X
inf flnanrft 1—11 1
• iiairiLcndnce
1. clear member boundaries y y v
Y V vL written rights, duties, ~ 5 5 *
obi igations
J. member contracts/aqreements ~" 1
4. new member trial periods ~ y o 5
3. new member orientation/tra ininq y~ Y
ongoing member training "
/. training/orientation materials " c 1
B. mechanism for resolvinq disputes 5
xxx
x
;
XXX
X
5
XX
xxx
>
y. regular personnel review process X "
1U. accepting/hirinq procedures ~H y v~
11. removing/tiring procedures ' X X y
12. vehicles for sharinq feelinqs 1'
13. economic feedback mechanisms -
14. management level" information- '
sharing v
X
X
X
X
X
>
X
X
X
>
x
-x.
-X*
X
x
><
III. Organizational Learning
j
1. regular, reflective meetings/
retreats y Y
d. study qroups jj
3. formal process roles x
X X X
4. consultants/external critics x
b. criticism/self-criticism sessions
[
X X X
X
members 22 28 6 3 140/400 7 3 15
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ever, we also see that the number of structures in this same category
increases for the successful Type 3 organizations as well, m addition,
it is apparent that Type 3 organizations still have relatively more
structures in the second area of components - maintenance. Neverthe-
less, this comparison appears to weaken the case for the "three areas of
structural components" proposition. Apparently the presence of formal
structures in all three areas is no guarantee of success for an alterna-
tive institution, and some set of factors other than formal structure
appears responsible for their success. On the other hand, there is a
way of modifying the original proposition slightly to make it more dis-
criminating between successful and unsuccessful alternative institutions
If we consider the role of formal structures in alternative institu-
tions, particularly those in the organizational learning area, we can
easily agree that these structures should be durable, regular, and en-
during
- not just invoked during a crisis, but ongoing features of al-
ternative institutions that serve the purpose of deliberate reflection
regarding both the position as well as the negative sides of organiza-
tional life. What this line of thinking suggests, of course, is that
some additional standard of durability and regularity needs to be added
to our original proposition: that in order to keep alternative institu-
tions alternative, three areas of sustained structural components need
to exist. If we define "sustained" formal structures as those which
have lasted at least a year5 over the course of an organization's devel-
opmental history, we have a basis for one more comparison.
Comparing sustained formal structures. From Table 29 we can see the ef-
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TABLE 29
STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF TYPE 2 AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS
LASTING AT LEAST ONE YEAR IN THEIR HISTORIES
Formal Structures
I. 'Work, Decision-making and CoordinaTi^"
—recoqni 7Pd work pm^,,^,
2. written work procedures
3. . qrQUP 1Qb dPSPr-j ptionc;
"
"
h individual job description s
5
* member work scheduTps
Type 2
GC RC MG
-X
6. job rotation systems
8.
regular member meeting s
9.
recognized decision-making
procedures
10
11
written decision-making Procedures
regular meeting roles
12
representative, hired, or elected
"management" mechanisms
"management" position job
description
II. Maintenance
L clear member boundaries
written rights, duties
obi igations
4.
5.
member contracts/agreements
new member trial periods
new member orientation/training
ongoing member training
training/orientation materials1_
8. mecha nism for resolving disputes
regular personal rev iew processrryr — _j k ' ^
1U. accepting/hiring procedures
removing/firing procedures11
12. vehi cles for sharing feeling s
Hi economic feedback mechanisms
14 "management
sharing
level" information
-X
X-
MC CFC
Type 3
WC LC SC
I
-X
-X-
—
-X-
-X'
III. Organizational Learning
1. regular, reflective meetings/
retreats
2. study groups "
—
1
X X X
3. formal process roles "
4. consultants/external critics
i
5. criticism/ self-criticism sessions
X
members 22 28 6 3 140/400 7
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fects of adding the one-year criterion to our original proposition. Be-
fore we attempt to interpret Table 29, however, it is necessary to con-
sider the side-effects created by the addition of the one-year criterion
and also issues surrounding two of the sample organizations.
Effects, of a^Wtions and del etions
. While the addition of the one-
year criterion does result once again in a pattern similar to our ini-
tial comparison of present structures in Table 27, there are some addi-
tions (-X-) and deletions (*) which deserve explanation. In essence,
this criterion results in the following changes relative to Table 27:
(1) any structures lasting one year or more in an organization's history
are added even if they do not exist at present; and (2) any structures
lasting less than one year do not appear, even if they exist presently
within an organization. Relative to their present state, then the one-
year criterion adds twelve more structural features to Tyoe 2 organiza-
tions, but deletes only one. Most of these additions occur in the case
of the Mechanics' Collective (MC), since structural changes over the
last year of its development resulted in the disappearance of several
sustained formal structures which existed previously. The one deletion
concerns the Magazine Group's (MG) trial period for new members, which
exists at present, ,but has been in place less than one year. For Type
3 organizations, on the other hand, we find that four formal structures
are added, and three are deleted. Three of the additions occur with the
Literature Collective, since they represent structural features charac-
teristic of the earlier development of the organization, when it was a
volunteer collective; and individual job descriptions did exist at the
Warehouse Collective in the past, but no longer, largely due to the cur-
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rent job rotation system. The deletions all occur in the case of the
Warehouse Collective, since three of their structures (1-9, H-5, and
H-6) have been in place less than one year. As we will see, these
additions and deletions will have two effects upon our comparison.
First of all, these additions and deletions tend to give Type 2 or-
ganizations a net gain of eleven examples of past formal structure, par-
ticularly affecting the area of work, decision-making, and coordination.
For Type 3 organizations, however, there is a net gain of only one exam-
ple of added formal structure. In other words, the one-year criterion
increases the number of sustained formal structures considerably more
for Type 2 organizations.
Secondly, and more importantly, the one-year criterion means that
comparisons of formal structure for some items are made between formal
structures which may not exist at present in the sample organizations.
Put another way, in some cases we are comparing patterns of sustained
formal structures without concern about whether they are currently used
or not. As we will see, however, this will not affect our comparison in
major ways. Before we can move on to an examination of the details of
this last comparison in Table 29, however, we need to also consider
features of two of the sample organizations, in order to discuss their
suitability as sources of information for this comparison.
Excluding a special^ case. In the first place, there is probably
good reason to withdraw the Magazine Group (MG) from our comparisons be-
cause financial rather than structural features played such a major role
in its structural development. As we may recall, MG's first steo in the
direction of consensual democracy was the creation of a representative
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"Publishers' group." Dissatisfied with son. of the asoects of this ar-
ranged, MG members instituted a second formal structure approximately
three and one half months later: a two-person
"management team," whose
day-to-day authority was balanced by the final authority of the members
constituting the "policy and planning committee." In brief, the long-
term viability of this structure was never tested, due to a major finan-
cial crisis at MG. This financial crisis, of course, was the primary
cause of a large number of member resignations - resignations which
left a "management team" without a membership to exert final authority
over it. After these resignations, then, very few formal structures in
any of the component areas remained - they literally left with the mem-
bers who resigned. For these reasons, the pattern of formal structures
for MG over the three previous comparisons becomes more understandable.
At present MG has only three of the formal structures on our list (Table
27). Examining Table 28, on the other hand, we find that MG had eleven
formal structures at some point in its history. Since most of these
structures were put in place less than one year previous to the finan-
cial crisis, however, we find in Table 29 tfiat MG has only two struc-
tural features which have endured more than a year -- "recognized deci-
sion-making procedures" (1-8), and "clear member boundaries" (II-l).
With the benefit of this detail, we should be able to see the rea-
son for disqualifying MG from our three comparisons. In essence, MG's
structural development does not allow us to test our central proposi-
tion, in any form, since financial factors for the most part, rather
than the presence or absence of particular structural features, diverted
MG's course away from its previous consensual/democratic direction. At
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the same time, of course, it is possible to argue that had MG developed
appropriate and workable formal structures earlier in its development,
it might have been able to plan and administer its finances more effec-
tively than it did. In fact some of the members who resigned took this
position, concluding that MG had "too little structure, too late."
While this conclusion may be true, we have no way of ever verifying it,
and consequently still must withdraw MG's data from the comparisons.
One other case study has similar elements, but they fall into a differ-
ent pattern -- a pattern worth mentioning.
Including a simijar case
.
Given the structural history of the
Mechanics' Collective (MC), we can recall a scenario vaguely resembling
that of the Magazine Group, complete with early attempts at consensual/
democratic structure, a financial crisis, and resignations. In short,
MC members created a service manager position to perform coordinating
functions, an arrangement which lasted approximately two and one half
years. In this case, however, the resignations came as MC's financial
situation deteriorated at the end of this term, largely brought on by an
unscrupulous service manager who filled the position during its last
year. These resignations, of course, did reduce the number of members
by one-half, and in turn, affected MC's structural development — both
the bi-weekly member meetings and the service manager position disap-
peared (see Tables 27, 28 and 29 for details). What differentiates the
development of the Mechanics' Collective from that of the Magazine
Group, however, is that MC's financial difficulties did not abbreviate
its first attempts at sustained formal structure — these structures ap-
parently deteriorated for other reasons. Although financial factors
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have clearly affected HC's current structural state, then, we are none-
theless able to evaluate our central proposition on the basis of sus-
tained formal structure which existed long before the financial crisis
ever occurred.
Now that we have redefined our sample by the exclusion of informa-
tion from the Magazine Group, we are finally in a position to examine
our comparison of sustained, formal structure more carefully. As we will
discover, the exclusion of MG not only makes for a fairer comparison,
but actually makes the case for our central proposition slightly less
evident.
Jhe actual comearison. From Table 29, we can finally examine the ef-
fects of adding the one-year criterion to our original proposition: the
overall pattern reverts to that of our initial comparison in Table 27.
Type 3 organizations are distinguished from Type 2 organizations by two
factors: (1) Type 3 organizations have had sustained formal structures
in the organizational learning area, while Tyoe 2 organizations have had
no sustained formal structure in this third area at any point in their
histories; and (2) Type 3 organizations have had more sustained formal
structures in the maintenance area than Type 2 organizations. Now that
we have found strong evidence for a slightly modified version of our
original proposition, it is appropriate to look more closely at the
actual formal structures which discriminate successful alternative in-
stitutions from their less successful counterparts in this third com-
parison.
Differences in first component area. As we can see from Table 29, there
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are few differences between Type 2 and Type 3 organizations in terms of
the number of sustained formal structures in the area of work, decision-
making and coordination. The only notable difference concerns "job ro-
tation systems" (1-6), where all Type 3 organizations have this charac-
teristic, but only one Type 2 organization, Country Food Co-op (CFC).
There was also a similar difference with "recognized decision-making
procedures" (1-8), where only one Type 2 organization could be charac-
terized by this item. There are, however, some major differences in the
qua1it
-
y of these structures which do deserve to be mentioned.
In general, the present/absent criterion, as we might expect,
biases this comparison in favor of Type 2 organizations, which in fact
often have only the bare essentials of a particular formal structure.
More specifically, one group of major qualitative differences tends to
cluster in those structures associated with meetings, differences which
were immediately apparent from my initial research and contract presen-
tations at member meetings. The only member meetings that I did not ob-
serve were those of the Mechanics' Collective (MC), due to their desire
to discuss the matter without my presence. In the instance of "regular
meeting roles" (1-10), for example, all of the organizations in the re-
defined sample use or have used these devices. In terms of the three
Type 2 organizations I was able to observe, however, the use of these
roles was much less effective than in all of the Type 3 organizations.
With Type 2 organizations, roles such as "facilitator" or "chairperson"
were less defined, more awkwardly employed, and occasionally neglected
altogether in the course of the meeting; in addition, it was evident
that persons filling these roles lacked the sense of certainty that
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often comes with the repeated practice of such functions. In Type 3 or-
ganizations, on the other hand, the reverse was generally the case -
members had a better sense of what these roles meant and were more
skilled at employing them. If a facilitator or chairperson did momen-
tarily lose the sense of procedural direction, the other members present
would often assist him or her in a graceful way, pointing out the
threads of continuity, but allowing the person in the role to pick them
up. One other feature of Type 3 meetings not included in the list of
formal structures was also quite noticeable - the use of regularized
formats that placed different types of topics within the context of an
overall agenda. Issues of feelings and interpersonal conflicts, for ex-
ample, were usually given special places in the agenda that allowed them
to be distinctly set aside from business items.
Summarizing the differences
. With the exception of "job rotation
systems" (1-6) and "recognized decision-making procedures" (1-8), then,
there were no other major quantitative differences between Type 2 and
Type 3 organizations in terms of the sustained formal structures they
employed in the area of work, decision-making and coordination. By sup-
plementing this comparison with qualitative information, however, we can
see some differences do exist which are not captured by the presence/
absence criterion. In general, formal structure regarding meeting roles
appeared more developed and defined in Type 3 organizations, and members
were more fluent with it. Having examined this first area of structural
components, we now turn to the second area.
Differences in the maintenance area . Glancing once again at Table 29,
268
we can see that Type 3 organizations have a higher number of sustained
formal structures in the maintenance area than do Type 2 organizations.
The most obvious differences occur with "vehicles for sharing feelings"
(H-12) and '"management level' information
-sharing" (H-l 4 ), where all
three Type 3 organizations have these formal structures, but none of the
Type 2 organizations have ever evidenced them. In addition, Table 29
also suggests that Type 3 organizations are generally stronger in those
structures associated with orientation and training functions (II-5, 6,
7) than Type 2 organizations. And finally, two of the Type 3 organiza-
tions have formal structures for resolving disputes (II-8), a feature
characteristic of none of the Type 2 organizations. Of all these dif-
ferences, however, only the first two are clearly strong enough to de-
serve further elaboration.
In the areas of "vehicles for sharing feelings", the formal struc-
tures of Type 3 organizations all take a similar form. For the Ware-
house Collective (WC) this function is deliberately included as a fea-
ture of the monthly meetings. At the Literature Collective (LC), this
structure is built into the format of bi-weekly meetings. And in the
case of the Studio Collective (SC), this structure is also tied to meet-
ings, but occurs much less frequently. At SC, the lengthy annual or
semi-annual retreats serve as the explicit forum for sharing feelings,
although this function tends to carry over in a more informal way to
weekly member meetings as well.
In all Type 3 organizations the structures for "'management level'
information-sharing" are largely identical: at their member meetings
there are regular, expected reports from members who are charged with
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various "management" functions. At the weekly meetings of the Studio
Collective, for examole, there is almost always a treasurer's report
which details current information relevant to the organization's finan-
cial status.
Due to the small number of formal maintenance structures in Type 2
organizations, qualitative differences were more difficult to assess.
The only noteworthy difference occurs in the area of "accepting/hiring
procedures" (11-10). In all Type 3 organizations, these procedures are
well organized, thorough, and employ a time-frame that allows thoughtful
consideration of applicants. In each case it was evident that these or-
ganizations consider the addition of new members a major matter which
deserves special attention. In Type 2 organizations utilizing these
procedures, however, the process was typically rushed, allowing neither
the new candidates nor the organizations enough time to adequately eval-
uate each other. Consequently, decisions to take some new members were
often regretted later on, by both parties.
Summarizing the differences
. In terms of the maintenance area,
Type 3 organizations clearly have a greater number of sustained formal
structures than Type 2 organizations. These differences are most pro-
nounced in terms of structures for sharing feelings and management- level
information, but are also evident in those areas concerned with orienta-
tion and training. In addition, some qualitative differences exist as
well, most notably in the more developed hiring/acceptance mechanisms
employed by Type 3 organizations.
Differences in organizational learning
. As pointed out previously, the
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most striking result of our comparison of sustained formal structures in
the organizational learning area (Table 29) is that only the more suc-
cessful Type 3 organizations have them. At this point it appears appro-
priate to consider these formal structures in some detail, on a case-by-
case basis.
Turning first to the Warehouse Collective (WC), we remember that
for two years it has held "monthly meetings" which are rotated among
members' homes. We should also remerrfcer that WC members discovered the
value of these meetings quite by accident - when all the members of a
Federation personnel committee failed to appear for an evaluation of one
WC member. This forum is still used for internal personnel reviews, but
is also used explicitly to resolve interpersonal issues, to perform
long-range planning and to develop policy proposals. The past products
of this "monthly meeting" are more indicative of its functions than the
topics it considers, however. For example, the earliest attempts to im-
plement job rotation, member training and new member orientations
emerged from these meetings. Furthermore, the meetings were continually
used to evaluate such structural innovations as well as refine them. In
addition, the idea for the formal constitutional democracy which com-
bines WC and Federation governance was both initially discussed and
later refined at the "monthly meetings." And finally, the original
single goal of serving co-ops in the Federation was modified in these
meetings to include a secondary goal of developing WC as a worker-con-
trolled workplace. In sum, WC members have consistently used this forum
to create an array of formal structures consistent with consensual/demo-
cratic ideals, and then have employed it again in evaluating and modify-
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ing these same creations as well as their internal goals.
Within the Literature Collective (LC), structures of organizational
learning take a somewhat different shape, but fulfill essentially simi-
lar purposes. Members interviewed traced their first deliberate at-
tempts at self-examination back to the institutionalization of criti-
cism/self-criticism sessions in the beginning of 1978. Placed at the
end of their large meetings, the use of this device rapidly led to the
development of a sophisticated meeting format, comolete with rotated
roles. In the resulting meetings, members eventually decided to halt
their operations entirely during the summer of 1978, so that they could
devote all of their available time to the development of both internal
structures and business procedures at LC. Later on, these wel 1
-organi zed
meetings served as the setting in which both the paid and volunteer mem-
bers decided that their collective should be composed of paid members
only, a major shift in goals. In the late spring of 1979, another regu-
lar basis for reflecting upon larger issues emerged at LC when the en-
tire second half of their bi-weekly meeting was set aside for such pur-
poses. Once again, most of the recent structural innovations at LC have
emerged from this regular forum. The existing job rotation system was
reviewed and completely overhauled, creating the current elaborate sys-
tem, and formal structures were developed for the orientation and train-
ing of new members.
And at the Studio Collective, the story is much the same. Ever
since the spring of 1977, SC members have held at least one, and often
two, lengthy retreats each year in addition to their weekly membership
meetings. Concrete products of these retreats have included the rein-
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statement of both rotated general maintenance and formal member con-
tracts. In both cases, the effects of letting these structures lapse
were examined and found to be detrimental to SC's organizational well-
being. In addition, these retreats have also served as the basis for
developing SC's secondary goal of promoting the personal and profession-
al growth of members, a goal which occasionally displaces the original
goal of providing members with stable, inexpensive studio space.
Summarizi ng, the d ifferences
. As we have seen, Type 2 organizations
not only lack the sustained formal structures of organizational learning
characteristic of Type 3 organizations, but also appear to lack the im-
portant ongoing functions performed by these structures. While some of
the Type 3 organizations use these forums in part for maintenance pur-
poses, such as resolving interpersonal disputes and sharing feelings, it
is very evident that another major function is also present - ongoing,
reflective consideration of the state of organizational affairs and
practices. From this reflective activity, members in all three organi-
zations have created new formal structures, modified old ones, and even
altered their organizational goals in major ways. In Argyris and
Schon's (1978) terms, then, we find that these sustained structures of
organizational learning had elements of both single loop and double loop
learning -- they not only served as a basis for creating and modifying
organizational structures to meet existing organizational goals, but
they also resulted in modifications of the goals themselves. In order
to fully appreciate the significance of sustained structures of organi-
zational learning, however, we need to look at them in relation to the
other two components, in effect, putting the organizations back together
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again
.
intej^cti^ ar^ Considering all of the compo-
nents of sustained formal structure at once, we can begin to fully ap-
preciate the particular functions played by all three areas. As sug-
gested previously, it is clear that formal structures in the first area
-- work, decision-making, and coordination - define the basic activi-
ties of both types of organizations, but this definition is more explic-
it and regularized within Type 3 organizations. As we move to the main-
tenance area, however, we can see how the additional structures in Type
3 organizations provide better support for the functions of the first
area by attending to issues of members' feelings, skills, and access to
information. And finally, when we consider the area of organizational
learning, we begin to understand its crucial function within Type 3 or-
ganizations more fully. In each of the Type 3 organizations, the formal
structures of organizational learning have consistently served as the
source of either new or refined formal structures in the other two com-
ponent areas — work, decision-making, and coordination; and mainte-
nance. In fact, if we turn back to the structural histories of each or-
ganization (Tables 9, 12, and 19), we find this dynamic graphically dis-
played in each case.
Furthermore, an abbreviated version of this last dynamic can also
be seen in the structural histories of some Type 2 organizations. In
these cases, however, the failure to continue formal structures of or-
ganizational learning appears to have resulted in the eventual demise of
structural innovations or modifications. Reconsidering the structural
274
history of the Country Food Co-oo (Table 23), for example, we see that
a short-lived study group generated a large number of new formal struc-
tures in both of the first two comoonent areas, but that most of these
structures rapidly deteriorated over the next two years. In a similar
way, six months of periodic evaluation meetings at the Restaurant Col-
lective (Table 14) resulted in changes of the coordination structure,
changes which failed to work effectively, but were nevertheless contin-
ued. In both these Type 2 organizations, a point was reached where the
new structures were not evaluated in terms of their original purposes
because the formal structures of organizational learning, which might
have performed these functions, had been discontinued. The situation
which resulted, of course, was much like that of travelers who plan an
extensive trip with the aid of a map and then forget to bring the map
with them - they become lost. Without an ongoing reflective forum,
members in both these organizations were unable to evaluate the path
created by their structural changes. Although in both cases there was a
clear sense that the organizations were not working as planned, no for-
mal
,
public, and enduring vehicle existed in either case for raising
these issues. Consequently, very important gaps between consensual /de-
mocratic ideals and organizational practice were never formally ques-
tioned, then or later. In fact, an informal but persistent taboo about
the topic quickly emerged in both cases, effectively submerging these im-
portant questions.
The comparison of the short-lived structures of organizational
learning of some Type 2 organizations with the more durable structures
characteristic of all Type 3 organizations is indeed significant. This
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comparison not only demonstrates the critical role played by organiza-
tional learning structures, but also adds additional confirming evidence
to our original proposition regarding the necessity of all three compon-
nents of formal structure. In order to conclude the case for this major
proposition, we now need to review the evidence which has emerged from
the comparisons.
Summarizing the overan structural comparison. With regard to the sam-
ple organizations, at least, we now have strong evidence for a slightly
modified version of our original proposition: that alternative institu-
tions, in order to remain alternative, need three areas of sustained for-
mal structure. The most striking feature of our final comparison was
that the more successful (Type 3) organizations were characterized by
sustained formal structures in all three areas, while the less success-
ful (Type 2) organizations lacked structures in the organizational
learning area altogether. In the area of work, decision-making, and co-
ordination, we found that Type 2 and Type 3 organizations had similar
numbers of sustained formal structures, but that among Type 3 organiza-
tions, these were often of higher quality. Moving on to the second
area, that of maintenance, we could clearly see that Type 3 organiza-
tions had more of these structures than each of the less successful or-
ganizations. And finally, we considered all three components together,
noting in particular the role of organizational learning structures in
the creation and modification of formal structures in the first two
areas. In addition, we also examined the effects of unsustained struc-
tures of organizational learning in two of the Type 2 organizations,
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further bolstering the strength of our major finding. With this over-
view, then, we can now consider some broader conclusions which have
emerged from our comparison.
An updated perspective
.
On the basis of all the information that we
have considered up to this point, it is evident that contemporary alter-
native institutions need not follow the developmental path detailed by
Holleb and Abrams (1975), a fact demonstrated by the case studies alone.
Among the same organizations we were able to recognize that successful
attempts to move to cojis^nsual dempcrjcy; could begin prior to formal
differentiation
,
starting from irifp^ djff^^ or even after
only a brief stay in cpnsejTs_uaJ_ anarxhy_. Put in more direct terms, we
can now say with certainty that "earlier choices" do exist for alterna-
tive institutions
- that at least in the short run, bureaucratization
is not an inevitable feature of their development.
Secondly, the current research results support a distinct conclu-
sion about which factors determine the success or failure of alternative
institutions. Holleb and Abrams, of course, pinpointed member political
commitment as the deciding factor. From the findings of our comparison,
however, it is now possible to identify specific structural features
which are strongly related to success or failure in these organizations.
As suggested in previous chapters, this shift in emphasis from personal
to structural features is a significant one, in that it directs our at-
tention away from questions of choosing the "right people" in an alter-
native institution to questions of choosing the right structures. This
is not to say that personal features might not be important, but rather
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to compensate for their sole emphasis in the past. Due to the clarity
of findings which support a structural interpretation of organizational
success, then, we know not only that "earlier choices" exist, but also
that these choices take the form of specific and applicable structures
in particular combination.
And thirdly, we are finally beginning to see the three areas of
structural components not as individual pieces of an organization, but
as an interactive system or process which creates the opportunity for
the further development and refinement of an alternative institution
along consensual /democrat! c lines. This "process" view allows us to
phrase the problem of bureaucratization in somewhat more constructive
ways. Instead of attempting to identify the forces which lead to bu-
reaucratization, we are now in a position to see bureaucratization as a
consequence of neglecting, discontinuing or not establishing the "pro-
cess" which appears to characterize the more successful sample organiza-
tions. In many ways, then, the view of alternative institutions which
emerges from the results closely parallels Bernstein's (1976) analysis
of workplace democratization — certain components are necessary for
this process to move forward, but if they are weak or missing, the pro-
cess decays. At this point, of course, we have primarily considered the
positive side of this cycle, and it now appears appropriate to briefly
explore the negative side as well. Several of the Type 2 organizations,
for example, appear to have stabilized in a bureaucratized state. We
know that they lack the basic "process" characteristic of successful or-
ganizations, but at this point, we have only vague hints about why this
is actually the case. By considering the "process" created by the three
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areas of formal structure, and the effects of Sonne non-structural fac-
tors upon it, we may be able to point in the direction of some answers
to this question.
Secondary Comparisons
In addition to the structural information which formed the basis of
the case studies, there was a considerable amount of supplemental infor-
mation which is also of comparative interest. Since the major focus of
data-gathering concerned the central research proposition, the collec-
tion of supplemental information was less thorough, reducing consider-
ably both the quantity and quality of the data which it produces. Nev-
ertheless, some valuable comparisons are still possible. As we will
discover, the inclusion of secondary factors in our analysis complements
our understanding of the dynamics underlying our central structural
finding. The first, and most obvious, secondary factor concerns the
rate at which members join and leave alternative institutions. In this
and the remaining comparisons, information from the Magazine Group is
included since such inclusion appeared justifiable.
Member turnover
.
Although exact turnover figures were somewhat diffi-
cult to determine for the relatively small sample organizations, it is
possible in all but one case to assign each organization to one of three
general categories of high, medium, and low, based on average turnover
throughout its history. Low turnover was taken to be below 20% annual-
ly, high turnover was considered to be in excess of 60%, and medium
turnover was represented by the gap in between. Examining Table 30, we
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TABLE 30
MEMBER TURNOVER AMONG TYPE 2 AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS
Type 2 Type 3
GC — High WC — Low
RC -- High LC -- Low
MG -- Low/Medium SC -- Low
MC -- Medium
CFC Medium
see the results of this comparison. The designation of "low/medium" for
the Magazine Group (MG) reflects the fact that this organization had
very low turnover until the recent member resignations.
In general, the case studies suggest that there is a unique rela-
tionship between member turnover and the sustained formal structures
which appear to underlie organizational success. In particular, high and
medium turnover appears to undermine the functioning and creation of
these structures in Type 2 organizations, while in Type 3 organizations,
the presence of certain structural features actually seems to lower
turnover. In order to gain a better sense of these dynamics, let us
first look at the issue of turnover in the Type 2 organizations.
Type 2 turnover . While in previous chapters it was argued that
high turnover among members can encourage bureaucratization because new
members represent a conventionalizing influence, this effect appeared to
be less important than others. True, the dilution of the by-laws at the
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Country Food Co-oo seemed to follow this pattern, but at the Grocery
Collective (GC), the Restaurant Collective (RC), and the Mechanics' Col-
lective (MC), another pattern emerged. In all three organizations, the
primary effect of high and medium turnover was the automatic
"pronation"
of those members who remained, encouraging the rise of informal manag-
ers. In the Grocery Collective, the high turnover rates also reduced
the election of coordinators or "clerks" to a largely meaningless event,
since newly-arrived members, representing a majority each year, could
know neither the office-seekers nor the actual responsibilities of the
coordinators' positions. And in all three organizations, year-to-year
continuity suffered as a consequence of high member turnover. New mem-
bers were less the carriers of conventional assumptions and actions than
they were simply uninformed about their organizations and their fellow
members
.
In terms of the structural approach which emerged from our earlier
comparisons, then, we can see that high and medium member turnover seems
to operate primarily on the structures of work, decision-making, and co-
ordination, preventing democratic procedures from really being democrat-
ic, and making seniority, not informed member control, the major factor
determining which members would rise to leadership positions. In addi-
tion we might suspect that high or medium turnover, because of the lack
of continuity it produces, would tend to discourage both the creation
and the continuation of formal structures of organizational learning.
Without the benefit of a large number of members who could recall the
original purposes of an organization and the intent of past structural
innovations, it would seem unlikely that questions of consistency be-
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tween founding ideals and actual practices would be raised. In general,
the situation is quite different in the case of Type 3 organizations.
Ml 2 turnover. The consistently low turnover rates in all Type 3
organizations appeared to result in an informed membership, deliberate
selection of persons in leadership positions, and a greater sensitivity
to issue of founding ideals and organizational practice. It is clear,
however, that some of the structural features of these organizations
directly affect their turnover rates as well. In particular, Type 3 or-
ganizations place a strong emphasis on the process of selecting new mem-
bers, stressing in this process the obligations of membership as well as
its benefits. In addition, the exemplary Studio Collective also re-
quires a relatively long trial period without voting privileges. The
overall effect of these structures is to ensure that the choice of mem-
bership is a suitable one, both for the new applicant as well as the or-
ganization. Such del iberateness obviously reduces the number of indi-
viduals who might join casually and then leave after only a brief period
of membership. In addition, all Type 3 organizations tend to incorpo-
rate more and better developed orientation and training structures, in
an attempt to ensure that new members, once carefully chosen, are then
quickly integrated into the organizations. And finally, the organiza-
tional success of the Type 3 organizations is clearly another factor re-
ducing member turnover. The realization among members that they are in
fact putting their ideals into practice creates a cohesiveness and a
sense of comraderie within these organizations which members often re-
ported is difficult to leave behind.
Turnover summary . With the aid of supplemental information avail-
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able from the case studies, we were able to compare the dynamics of high
and medium turnover in Type 2 organizations with the low turnover found
in Type 3 organizations. Although the detrimental effect of turnover
upon the structural features of Type 2 organizations was evident, we
were also able to see the way in which the structural features of Type 3
organizations, in turn, actually seemed to reduce turnover. Once sum-
marized, these tentative findings directly contradict earlier conclu-
sions about turnover in alternative institutions suggested by Rothschild
Whitt (1976). In her examination of conditions which facilitate and in-
hibit participatory/ democratic functioning in alternative institutions,
she implies that the high rate of transiency among members tends to mit-
igate against the process of bureaucratization. From our treatment of
the issue of turnover, however, we can now understand that, if anything,
high and medium levels of turnover mitigate against effective partici-
patory/democratic functioning, since they undermine the functions per-
formed by essential formal structures. Although turnover appears to be
an important secondary factor, there are others which deserve attention
as well
.
Differences in applying process- skills
. From direct observation of
meetings, interviews, and the case study material, it was possible to
make some very general judgments of the level of process skills in all
but one of the organizations (MC). These skills were roughly defined as
the ability of members to apply a knowledge of group dynamics in a pub-
lic way to improve the effectiveness of member meetings. For example,
at the beginning of a meeting, one member might ask that others share
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their expectations for what they hoped to accomplish; members might de-
liberately stop the business of a meeting when it became clear that un-
derlying interpersonal conflicts needed airing; or, a member might com-
ment that he or she felt a particular decision was being rushed, alert-
ing others to the possibility that the decision might in fact require
more thoughtful consideration. Organizations were categorized as high,
medium, or low on their overall application of process skills on the
basis of whether several, some, or very few instances were either seen
or reported. Due to the necessity to make a large proportion of these
judgments on the basis of direct observation, the resulting categoriza-
tion reflects the current state of the organizations only. From Table
31, we can see the results of this comparison. Type 2 organizations
fall in either the low or medium categories, while Type 3 organizations
fall only in the high category. While it is obvious that observations
on which these judgments are based represent a limited sampling of
TABLE 31
APPLICATION OF PROCESS SKILLS IN TYPE 2 AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS
Type 2
GC -- Low
RC Low
MG -- Medium
MC
CFC -- Medium
Type 3
WC — High
LC — High
SC — High
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behavior in meetings, I feel that they are generally representative
nonethel ess
.
The relationship between the application of process skills and
structural features was, of course, clearest in Type 3 organizations.
For the most part, the repeated application of these skills made the
regular meetings run smoothly, sharpened the sense and effectiveness of
meeting roles, and introduced a tone of del iberateness into decision-
making. In this way the use of process skills represented the use of an
informal practice to support an existing formal structure. In addition,
the low turnover rates in Type 3 organizations allowed new members un-
familiar with these skills to learn them through the repeated example of
other members. And finally, there was a general pattern in Type 3 orga-
nizations as to which members used these skills -- typically more senior
members with previous experience in other alternative institutions.
This pattern, of course, suggests another comparison.
Differences i_n age and experience
. If the success of Type 3 organiza-
tions is in any way a result of lessons learned from "first wave" orga-
nizations, either through direct experience or indirectly, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that at least some members of Type 3 organizations
would need to be old enough to have lived through the time when these
lessons were learned. Examining Table 32, we see an estimated age range
for each of the Type 2 and Type 3 organizations. As we might expect,
members in Type 3 organizations do tend to be slightly older, but not by
much. With the exception of Studio Collective members, who are consid-
erable older, we find that estimated average age, and presumably the ex-
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TABLE 32
ESTIMATES OF MEMBER AGE RANGES FOR TYPE 2 AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS
Type 2 Type 3
- early twenties
- early twenties
GC -
RC -
MG — late twenties
MC -- late twenties
CFC -- late twenties
WC -- late twenties
LC -- middle twenties
SC middle thirties
perience that might go with it, does not appear to be a major discrim-
inating factor. Examining average past experience itself, however, does
create a more complete picture.
Although information regarding past experience with other alterna-
tive institutions was gathered only for those members who were inter-
viewed, we nevertheless can develop a very rough idea of this factor in
the sample organizations. On the basis of three general categories of
past experience -- none or little, some, or much -- it was possible to
sort organizations in terms of the members who were interviewed, cre-
ating a very global sense of the distribution of past experience in each
organization. The certainty of this estimate, of course, is lowest for
the Country Food Co-op, given the large number of their members relative
to those interviewed. In all other cases, however, my contact with the
organizations allowed me to verify to a large degree the categorization
which resulted.
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TABLE 33
ESTIMATES OF MEMBER PAST EXPERIENCE FOR TYPE 2 AND TYPE 3 ORGANIZATIONS
J^ e 2 Type 3
GC — little WC — much
RC — 1 i ttl e LC - some
MG — some SC — much
MC — little
CFC — some
From Table 33 we see the results of this general comparison. Type
2 organizations fall into the little and some categories with regard to
past experience, while Type 3 organizations fall into the some and much
categories. Members of the Literature Collective (LC), we should re-
call, based the bulk of their structural innovations on a single article
appearing in an "alternative" publication. Thus, as we apparently see
here, past member experience (and age presumably) represented a less im-
portant factor in their organizational success. Within both the Ware-
house Collective and the Studio Collective, however, it was clear that
many of the specific structural features which they developed emerged in
part from members' past experiences in other alternative institutions.
And as an aside, one intriguing connection emerged during the process of
evaluating member past experience.
Given the limited geographical area of the sample, it should come
as no great surprise that several current members of Type 3 organiza-
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tions had been previous members of some of the Type 2 organizations in
years past. In this way I discovered a unique function olayed by the
Grocery Collective and the Restaurant Collective - they often serve as
a training ground for undergraduates with virtually no prior experience
with alternative institutions; upon "graduation" some of their members
then seek membership in other alternative institutions in the same gen-
eral region. In this way, we can see that the "age and experience"
argument can become only an "experience" argument - some of the lessons
to be learned from "first wave" alternative institutions can still be
learned in unsuccessful "second wave" organizations as well.
Other possible secondary comparisons
. In addition to the comparisons
that we have just seen, a number of other comparisons were performed as
well, but were not included because of their failure to reveal charac-
teristics which discriminated between Type 2 and Type 3 organizations.
Among other factors, issues of size, external pressures, and part-time
versus full-time members were considered, but failed to show any recog-
nizable patterns between the two types of organizations. On a case-by-
case basis, however, the effects of some of these variables appeared to
be somewhat relevant to the development of individual organizations.
Summary of secondary comparisons . In order to briefly examine some non-
structural differences which appeared to emerge from the case studies,
four additional comparisons were made of Type 2 and Type 3 organiza-
tions, in the areas of member turnover, application of process skills,
member age, and member experience. Although the information upon which
these comparisons were based was of a much more general nature than that
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of previous structural comparisons, some differences did emerge. The
more successful Type 3 organizations were shown to have consistently
lower member turnover rates than Type 2 organizations. Furthermore, it
appeared that turnover in Type 2 organizations acts to inhibit or render
ineffective some necessary structural features. In Type 3 organiza-
tions, however, the direction of influence seemed to be reversed - for-
mal structure in these organizations tended to reduce member turnover.
In the area of process skills, Type 3 organizations were found to evi-
dence a higher degree of the application of these skills in their meet-
ings than Type 2 organizations. And finally, the ages of members in
both Type 2 and Type 3 organizations were compared, based on the assump-
tion that age and experience with alternative institutions might be re-
lated. In the comparison, however, there was a tendency for members of
Type 3 organizations to be only slightly older than their less success-
ful counterparts. A complementary comparison of member past experience
in other alternative institutions did aopear to differentiate Type 2 and
Type 3 organizations more successfully, however, and Dointed to an im-
portant role played by some of the Type 2 organizations in the training
of eventual members of Type 3 organizations.
While none of these comparisons could serve as the basis of defin-
itive statements about either the sample or alternative institutions
more generally, they do suggest that further study of non-structural
features of alternative institutions might lead to a better understand-
ing of how such features interact with the structural components neces-
sary for the success of these organizations.
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Chapter Reflections
In this chapter we have demonstrated that three areas of sustained
formal structure appear to be necessary in order to keep alternative in-
stitutions alternative. Secondly, we have been able to see at least
some ways in which these structures operate together to produce a pro-
cess for the further elaboration and refinement of these organizations.
And lastly, following Bernstein's (1976) lead, we began an exploration
of non-structural features of these organizations, tracing where possi-
ble their interaction with the three areas of structural components.
Before we begin the task of tracing the implications of our results,
however, it is appropriate to stop and consider for a moment just what
these formal structures represent and the nature of their effect upon
the members of alternative institutions.
Throughout this paper it has been stated several times and in sev-
eral different ways that the creation of formal structures within alter-
native institutions is essential for transforming consensual/democratic
ideals into actual organizational practice. Although this case has been
made primarily on the organizational level, little has been said,
beyond occasional hints, about why this case is relevant on the indi-
vidual level as well
.
As we have seen from the case studies and our analysis of them, the
formal structures in these organizations are little more than the ex-
plicit expression of a belief about how things are to be done -- a set
of agreements shared by members. If we step back from the details of
the research, and consider the more successful organizations in our sam-
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Pie, a curious fact emerges. These are organizations, of seven, three,
and fifteen members, but compared to conventional organizations of
roughly the same size, they all have a relatively large number of formal
structures. What this fact should alert us to is the particular role
that formal structures play in alternative institutions.
In essence, the disproportionate number of formal structures in al-
ternative institutions is indicative of an important way in which these
organizations compensate for the prior training of their members within
the conventional world: these organizations need an extensive number of
formal structures precisely because they are attempting to create new
sets of relationships within organizational life. The relationship be-
tween a member and a coordinator, for instance, is obviously very dif-
ferent than that which exists between manager and employee. In order to
know how to act as either a member or a coordinator, however, it is ne-
cessary to reach some agreement about the shape of that relationship.
In the case of employees and managers, many of the basic agreements are
already in place before their first encounter -- implicit agreements
about the nature of work and decision-making which arise for both par-
ties from their respective, but very similar, past experiences in the
conventional world.
Attempting to create relationships which are contrary to or absent
from their common conventional experience, members of successful alter-
native institutions employ formal structures as vehicles for both defin-
ing and regularizing these new relationships. As we have seen from the
case studies, it takes more than criticism to keep a coordinator from
"acting like a manager," or for that matter, to keep members from acting
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like employees
- it takes formal structures and the shared agreements
which they represent to shape other ways of acting. In this fashion,
then, we can finally begin to appreciate the connections between the or-
ganizational development of alternative institutions and the individual
development of their members. The creation of formal structures consis-
tent with con sensual /democratic ideals not only ensures that these orga-
nizations will continue to function in new ways, but also provides the
basis for the individuals within them to learn how to think and act in
new ways. In a parallel fashion, of course, Bernstein (1976) has
pointed to similar individual effects which occur as a consequence of
involvement in the workplace democratization process. More specifical-
ly, Bernstein cites evidence which suggests that the members of success-
ful workplace democratization projects tend to carry their participa-
tory/democratic consciousness out into their communities, often becoming
very active in political and civic organizations.
On the basis of the interviews conducted within the current re-
search, there were clear hints of a complementary process of individual
development. In brief, a common theme emerged in interviews with some
members of the more successful organizations -- a theme of politiciza-
tion. After working within their organizations for a period of two or
more years, these members experienced a figure/ground reversal of sorts.
While at the beginning of their membership they were usually clear about
the basic purposes and necessity of formal structures in their organiza-
tions, these structures initially seemed to be somewhat artificial and
awkward -- creating boundaries and rules that restricted their individ-
ual actions. With the passage of time, however, as members operated
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within the confines of these structures, their apparentness largely dis-
appeared
- they became not a way of doing things, but the way things
were done. And at the same time, and more importantly, a second percep-
tual change seemed to occur, a very politicizing one: the extent and
oppressive nature of much of the implicit structure in the conventional
world was brought into sharp relief for them. Some of these members in-
dicated that this shift only strengthened their previous convictions,
while others pointed to this shift as a major factor underlying their
political activism in the communities where they lived.
With the aid of this one example and the material which preceded
it, then, we are alerted to one of the more intriguing intricacies of
alternative institutions which emerged during the course of this re-
search. There were, of course, several other apparent relationships be-
tween the individual and organizational levels uncovered as well, but
limitations of time and space prohibit their discussion. In essence,
the hints of these additional relationships suggest the need for more
research which focuses specifically upon the interplay between individu-
al experience and formal structures in alternative institutions. While
it is important to bear in mind the more intricate features of our sam-
ple organizations, at this point it is appropriate that we now return to
the major findings of the research and, in light of our overall purpose,
consider their implications.
CHAPTER IX
IMPLICATIONS
Introduction
As stated in the first chapter, the major purpose of this research
was to gain a better sense of the problem of bureaucratization and to
use these insights to improve both the design of new alternative insti-
tutions and intervention in existing ones. Given this purpose and the
clarity of our results, the implications discussed in this chapter are
quite practical in nature. As we will see, the findings of this re-
search not only indicate how alternative institutions can be desighed to
circumvent the problem of bureaucratization, but they also point to a
number of specific directions for the interventionist concerned with
these organizations.
Designing New Al ternati ve Institutions
In a general way, at least, the results of this study are quite ex-
plicit about the ideal characteristics of a successful alternative in-
stitution. The organization needs to have sustained formal structures
in three areas: (1) work, decision-making, and coordination; (2) main-
tenance; and (3) organizational learning. As the results have shown,
these formal structures can vary somewhat according to an organization's
particular operations, size, and other factors, but the essential func-
tions remain the same. In the first area, the function of these struc-
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tures is to insure that the central activities of an organization are
shared by members in an explicit manner, and if not shared, delegated in
such a fashion that the underlying principle of member control is valid-
ly upheld. In particular, the results suggest special attention in this
regard to the areas of decision-making and job-rotation. The function
of the second area of formal structures is essentially to maintain the
integrity of those in the first area, by ensuring that the membership is
relatively continuous, informed, well-trained and able to resolve under-
lying conflicts. The third area, of course, functions as an important
vehicle for monitoring and modifying structures in the first two areas
in light of organizational goals, and even redefining these goals at
times. The results, of course, suggest regular retreats or meetings set
aside for this purpose. In addition, the ideal organization attempts by
various maintenance structures to keep member turnover low, and member
process skills and past experience high. If all these features can be
put into place, it appears from our results that an alternative institu-
tion will have established the basic functions that are necessary for
its successful continuation. In reality, of course, it is difficult to
create a new alternative institution with all these features in place at
once. Nevertheless, it is helpful to know where to start. If we review
very briefly the early days of the Studio Collective, however, there are
some very good clues.
Lessons from an exemplary case . After some early planning, the founders
of the Studio Collective luckily discovered a defunct but ideally-suited
corporation and then wisely reactivated it for their own purposes. By
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incorporating at such an early time in their development, even before
they began to rent a building, the founders created an organization
which had five formal structures right from the start: (1) written de-
cision-making procedures, which included a process for amending these
procedures; (2) an elected "management" mechanism; (3) clear membership
boundaries; (4) procedures for accepting members; and (5) procedures for
removing members. In terms of the three areas of formal structure,
then, we see that the Studio Collective began with two structures in the
first area and three in the second. The only way in which we could
fault the founders of this organization would be in terms of their ne-
glect of the organizational learning area — their first formal retreat
did not occur until roughly three years later.
The essential lesson to be gleaned from the early days at the Stu-
dio Collective is that the act of incorporation with the appropriate by-
laws is an excellent way to begin an alternative institution, even while
it is still in the planning stages. From the history of this organiza-
tion it is clear that the early formality of the agreements among mem-
bers was essential to its continued survival over the first three years.
Without these agreements, for example, it is doubtful that the members
who failed to live up to them could have been successfully removed from
the organization. What the founders of the Studio Collective estab-
lished, of course, was a constitutional democracy which outlined several
essential formal structures, but also provided for a formal mechanism
for changing those structures. While the Studio Collective did not have
a formal structure for organizational learning at its start, it is evi-
dent from its case material that an informal structure met this essen-
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tial need initially. From the case study it was clear that member gath-
erings in the restaurant located in the Studio Collective's building
provided an ongoing forum for both the discussion of organizational af-
fairs and their subsequent modification. Prior to their first formal
retreat, for instance, members apparently used this informal mechanism
of organizational learning in modifying their by-laws, beginning the ro-
tation of general maintenance, and creating several other structural
changes. From the perspective of our major findings, then, the Studio
Collective was also very lucky in this second instance - the particular
physical aspects of their building created an informal setting in which
members could engage in organizational learning. In the design of new
alternative institutions, however, it appears ill-advised to rely on in-
formal structures to perform such an important function, even from the
very beginning.
While the findings of the research point to general features of the
ideal alternative institution, it is obvious from the brief discussion
of the early days of the Studio Collective that exemplary cases of suc-
cessful alternative institutions can also be instructive, in that they
point to specific sets of workable arrangements. In particular, such
cases, when examined in light of our findings, point to the basic ele-
ments of formal structure which need to be put in place in order for a
fledgling alternative institution to start out on the right foot. So
while our research did not examine the structural conditions which ap-
pear necessary for successful beginnings of alternative institutions,
the findings nevertheless provide a specific framework for considering
the problem. In addition, this same structural framework does have im-
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plications for at least one major problem which alternative institutions
might encounter.
Designing organizations to counter member turnover
. In several of our
less successful cases, we were able to see the debilitating effects of
member turnover upon alternative institutions. While our results have
shown that more successful organizations can counter turnover by careful
attention to the selection of members, the use of trial periods, etc.,
it is clear that in some situations there may be real limits to the ef-
fectiveness of these structural answers. In the cases of both the Gro-
cery Collective and the Restaurant Collective, for instance, member
turnover was also due in part to the fact that members were undergradu-
ate students whose maximum tenure could be no more than four or five
years in length. In other words, the pool of applicants from which
these organizations drew their members had a high "background level" of
turnover. In terms of our major findings, it appears that such a condi-
tion could be countered not only by attempts to reduce turnover among
members, but also by efforts to alter certain maintenance structures in
order to compensate for the problem. In particular, the framework of
our findings suggests two possibilities in these particular cases.
First, it seems reasonable to suggest that those formal structures
in the area of orientation and training would need to be especially
elaborated under such conditions, making it possible to integrate new
members quickly and effectively into the organization. And secondly,
given the large number of applicants in both of these cases, it also
seems sound to suggest that members be selected perhaps midway through
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the semester prior to their actually working merrfcershi p, a mechanism
which not only would allow the time necessary for adequate training to
take place, but would also help ensure that the election of coordinators
was a more informed and deliberate event.
What these examples suggest, of course, is that the structures
which fall in the three areas can be modified in creative ways to coun-
teract the particular set of external pressures that may impinge on an
alternative institution. These examples, of course, also raise ques-
tions of how we might even go about encouraging less successful organi-
zations, like those in our sample, to consider such structural innova-
tions. As we will see, the findings of the research also point to very
practical suggestions in this area as well.
Interventi on i_n Alternative Institutions
The research findings are particularly relevant to intervention
activity within alternative institutions because they not only identify
for the interventionist what should be occurring within these organiza-
tions, but also because they actually point in general terms to a frame-
work for intervention itself. In order to appreciate these points, we
need first to consider briefly the alternative institutions which seek
outside assistance and the nature of this assistance when it finally ar-
rives.
Typical conditions of intervention . It is rare in my experience to find
alternative institutions which have successfully reached consensual de-
mocracy needing little more than helpful hints or new information. As
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our research has shown, these organizations have all three areas of
structural components and are usually quite able to use them effectively
to confront any internal problems that might arise. The organizations
who seek out assistance are more like the less successful alternative
institutions among our sample - typically weak in the maintenance area
and lacking formal structures of organizational learning. They do not
approach a consultant with the idea of adding more structural compo-
nents, however; they usually seek help because the pressure of internal
conflicts and strains has reached a certain breaking point. Meetings
erupt in arguments, members threaten to resign, important decisions can-
not be made, and there appears to be no internal route to resolving
these issues. To make matters worse, whatever unbearable situation
finally emerges has probably been with the organization for some time.
A typical intervention
.
In many cases, the first major meeting between
a consultant and members results in their first retreat, or, at least
their first retreat in quite a while. During this meeting, or in a
series of them, it is usually the case that the consultant and members
will come to a basic agreement about the nature of the immediate prob-
lems of the organization, allowing the consultant to make suggestions
about what might be done about them. Eager to find solutions, and even
to implement them, the members are typically quite willing to accept the
consultant's suggestions. Some members, of course, are skeptical, but
are generally willing to try the proposed changes. These changes are
often structural in nature — a new way of running meetings, a mechanism
for resolving disputes, or a job description for the coordinator.
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Subtleties and dilemmas for intervention
. At first glance, it appears
that the findings of this research would be of great value to a consul-
tant in the scenario like the one just described. Aware of the struc-
tural features necessary for a successful alternative institution, he or
she could simply evaluate what areas of components were weak or missing
and propose that the a Dpropriate structural additions or modifications
be instituted. In fact, this general style is currently very popular
among consultants who work with alternative institutions. In light of
our findings, however, there appears to be a significant shortcoming in
such an approach.
If, as our findings suggest, successful alternative institutions
require three areas of sustained formal structure, the approach de-
scribed in the previous scenario may work well for the first two areas,
but when it comes to the third area -- organizational learning — this
approach promises to be counterproductive. The crux of the matter lies
with the nature of the intervention activity itself. As we have defined
structures of organizational learning, the use of consultants clearly
falls in this category; and thinking back to our intervention scenario,
we can see why -- the activity often produces new structures and modi-
fies existing ones within the organization. There are several problems
inherent in the use of consultants to perform this vital function, how-
ever.
First, most alternative institutions are unable to afford the regu-
lar services of a consultant. The result, of course, is that the orga-
nizational learning function served by the consultant cannot be sus-
tained in most cases. Secondly, it is the consultant in this style of
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intervention who actually performs the organizational learning function,
not the members of the organization. True, they provide the relevant
information, but it is the consultant who actually attempts to solve
pressing organizational problems. Due to this feature of the consulting
arrangement, of course, the organization tends to become very dependent
upon the consultant, seeing the resolution of internal conflicts and
problems as his or her domain. And, to make matters worse, if the con-
sultant is particularly successful with proposed changes in the organi-
zation, this dependency is bound to grow.
From this brief overview, then, we can see that this style of in-
tervention is actually contrary to the implications of the research.
This situation arises not only because the use of consultants is neces-
sarily discontinuous for financial reasons, but also because it places
the important function of organizational learning with the consultant
rather than with an organization's members. Turning back to the actual
methods of this research, however, it is possible to uncover a way in
which these problems might be circumvented.
Hints of another approach
. Stated more positively, the findings of this
research suggest that at least one goal of intervention in alternative
institutions is the creation of sustained formal structures of organiza-
tional learning. From our previous example, it is clear that some im-
portant variation in the typical style of intervention is necessary if
this goal is to be achieved, a variation that allows the function ful-
filled by the consultant to be transferred to the members in a way that
is neither time-consuming or expensive. In addition, this variation
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must also be able to capture the attention of members whose foremost
concern is usually to find immediate answers to pressing organizational
i s s ue s
.
In the course- of pursuing this research, it became obvious that one
aspect of the method pointed in a promising direction. After the first
two or three interviews, I began to conclude these sessions by showing
members the basic Holleb and Abrams stages, along with a brief overview
of their model. My purpose, of course, was to have members verify more
directly the information which seemed to emerge from the interviews, by
having them identify any stages which characterized the current state of
the organization and any past stages as well. The reaction to the Hol-
leb and Abrams material was nearly the same with all the members I in-
terviewed -- they were intrigued by the stage model, particularly as it
related to their own organization, and inevitably asked me for a copy.
Their interest was really quite understandable; the Holleb and Abrams
model not only allows an organization to be placed within a broader con-
text of development, but it also explains that many of the issues and
difficulties which an organization faces are characteristic of a parti-
cular stage of development. For members of less successful organiza-
tions in particular, the realization that other organizations also faced
similar problems was a source of fascination, and in some cases, relief
-- it made their own situations more understandable. From this experi-
ence, it was evident that the Holleb and Abrams model was not only a
diagnostic device, but an educational one as well -- a potentially valu-
able way to share the perspective of an interventionist with the members
of alternative institutions.
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In the hands of members of one of these organizations, the Holleb
and Abrams model raises three essential questions: how did the organi-
zation begin; where is it now; and where is it going. This third ques-
tion, of course, is dramatized to some extent by the mutually exclusive
nature of the last two stages of the model - consensual temocjrac^ or
bureaucracy. As we should recognize, these are the basic questions m
asked during the organizational learning process, a feature which sug-
gests both another possible use for the Holleb and Abrams model and some
features of different intervention styles.
Some elements of a different approach
.
My experiences during the course
of the research suggest that it might be one excellent device to shift
the locus of responsibility for organizational learning from the consul-
tant back to the members of an alternative institution. Basically, the
Holleb and Abrams model can become a central part of one important step
of the intervention process — diagnosis. It is relatively easy to
imagine how the Holleb and Abrams model, combined in a format which in-
cluded the entire list of formal structures, might lead to a relatively
effective initial diagnostic session with an organization. In order to
further remove the consultant from this process, it might also be possi-
ble to mail these materials with a brief written explanation to the or-
ganization prior to the consultant's arrival. We need to remember at
the same time, however, that encouraging members to think about the
broader issues of their organization is no guarantee that they will ac-
tually meet and discuss them. This issue points to one other step in
the intervention process that might be a reasonable area for encouraging
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formal structures of organizational learning.
Contracting
.
Usually near the beginning of a consulting relation-
ship, some sort of contract is negotiated between consultant and client.
These contracts often vary in expl ici tness , and in the situation we are
concerned with, it appears the more explicit the contract, the better.
As we might expect, there are strong pressures, even in alternative in-
stitutions, that can push a consultant back into the common role de-
scribed earlier. At the risk of being repetitive, it is clear that a
different intervention style also needs explicit agreements to define
and sustain it. Furthermore, there could be features of this contract
which would encourage formal structures of organizational learning in
the client organization. In my own consulting experience, the period of
contracting can be an especially appropriate time to pursue enduring ar-
rangements, since both the client organization's sense of need and will-
ingness to accept such arrangements are heightened by the existing in-
ternal crisis. Waiting until after crisis has been resolved to insti-
tute such innovations is less likely to succeed — they don't seem as
necessary to the client. For example, the consultant could require, as
a condition of his or her involvement, that members meet once every
month by themselves somewhere other than workplace. As we have seen
from the case of the Warehouse Collective, just the act of meeting to-
gether in a non-business setting can be fruitful enough to encourage
such meetings on a regular basis. Another possible feature of the con-
tract might be an item which restricts the consultant's role to an in-
formation-providing but not advice-giving role, either soon after the
start of consultation or at some pre-defined point in its course. This
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arrangement, as we can see, concretizes the expectation that at some
point the client organization will need to take primary responsibility
for its own organization learning. And finally, one other possible fea-
ture of the initial contract could be the creation of formal roles,
groups, or even positions within the organization for purposes of orga-
nizational learning. In particular, ongoing "process roles" or study
groups can facilitate such a function, and can be enduring, provided the
members in these positions have their duties formally included in their
job descriptions and are reimbursed for the time they spend at them.
In the other areas of the intervention process — initial contact,
implementation, evaluation and termination -- we can see that this gen-
eral theme of placing responsibility for solving internal problems and
issues with the client organization could be possible as well. At the
same time, however, we should not pretend that any of these notions are
particularly new in themselves. In many ways, they follow some of the
general principles of intervention put forth by Argyris (1970). To my
knowledge, however, Argyris has never attempted to apply them to the
unique predicaments of alternative institutions.
Imp! ications Summary
In this chapter, we have seen that the results of this research
have very practical applications. Not only do they provide a general
description of an ideal alternative institution, but they also create a
basic framework for the evaluation of the beginnings of exemplary orga-
nizations, an evaluation which can point to important first steps for
emergent alternative institutions. In addition, these results suggest
306
that prevailing intervention attempts, in the long run at least, are
contrary to the creation of a set of structural features necessary for
the success of alternative institutions. In light of this observation,
some modifications of prevailing intervention methods were suggested.
CHAPTER X
SUMMARY
This research investigated the issue of keeping alternative insti-
tutions alternative both as an organizational problem of bureaucratiza-
tion and as a research area with methodological complications. More
specifically, the research addressed both sides of the issue by defining
bureaucratization as gradual transformation of member control into con-
ventional hierarchical control, and by employing an action-research
model. To develop a coherent context for substantive and methodological
questions, a detailed literature review identified several relevant
areas of past research and commentary. In this review the Holleb and
Abrams (1975) model of organizational development was examined in de-
tail. Following consideration of workplace democratization and organi-
zational learning areas, a central research proposition emerged: suc-
cessful alternative institutions require formal organizational structure
in three areas: (1) work, decision-making and coordination; (2) main-
tenance; and (3) organizational learning. To evaluate this proposition,
interviews and documents were obtained from eight varied alternative in-
stitutions from the same geographical region. By employing the Holleb
and Abrams model, the current state and the previous structural develop-
ment of each organization was assessed, resulting in eight detailed case
studies. By equating organizational success with the same model's con-
sensual democracy stage, the case studies were divided into three suc-
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cessful and five unsuccessful instances, and were then subjected to
three comparisons of structural features to test the research proposi-
tion. The first comparison examined current structural features and ap-
peared to support the proposition. Successful organizations employed
all three areas of formal structure while unsuccessful ones employed
only those in the first two areas. In order to assess the converse of
the proposition, that no organization with formal structures in all
three areas could be unsuccessful, a second comparison was devised that
considered instances of formal structure throughout each organization's
history. In this comparison, both types of organizations evidenced for-
mal structures in all three areas, apparently invalidating the proposi-
tion. Based on a rationale that formal structure should be enduring,
the original proposition was modified to say organizational success re-
sulted from sus tained formal structure in all three areas. By defining
sustained structures as those lasting at least one year, a third compar
ison was performed which produced a pattern of results very similar to
the first comparison: successful organizations employed sustained for-
mal structures in all three areas, while unsuccessful organizations em-
ployed them only in the first two areas. Since the results strongly
supported the modified proposition, the comparison was examined in de-
tail. In the area of work, decision-making, and coordination, only sue
cessful organizations employed sustained structures of job rotation and
decision-making. In the maintenance area, successful organizations
showed considerably more structures than unsuccessful organizations, es
pecially in regard to information sharing, conflict resolution, and mem
ber orientation and training. Since only successful organizations em-
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ployed sustained formal structures of organizational learning, their
specific structures, usually retreats or special portions of meetings,
were scrutinized closely. This examination revealed that the organiza-
tional learning structures were consistently used by members to create
and modify structures in the first two areas, as well as to alter orga-
nizational goals. From this examination, it was apparent that sustained
formal structures of organizational learning were central to the success
of these alternative institutions. Following this major structural com-
parison, some comparisons of no n- structural features were also made.
The results of these secondary comparisons generally suggested that in
contrast to unsuccessful organizations, successful organizations have
lower member turnover, and slightly older members with better process
skills and more relevant past experience. The results were shown to
have practical applications for the design and creation of new alterna-
tive institutions, as well as for intervention activity within existing
ones
.
FOOTNOTES
throughout this paper the term "organizational structure" (or
nlzl &MSho!$J S defined in the 9eneral terms outlined by PughU9M> t p. Z39): All organizations have to make provisions for continu-ing activities directed towards the achievement of given aims Requ-larities in such activities as task allocation, the exercise of author-ity and co-ordination functionings are developed. Such regularities
constitute the organization's structure.
.
." (italics mine). On a more
concrete level, organizational structure refers to the roles, rules and
procedures which specify how tasks are allocated, how authority is exer-
cised and how co-ordination is achieved.
While most definitions of bureaucratic hierarchy are drawn from
Weber's (1947, pp. 329-336) descriptions of ideal bureaucratic forms,
close examination of his descriptive characteristics reveals that many
of these could be applied to non-bureaucratic settings as well (e.g. "a
continuous organization of official functions bound by rules"). Herbst
(1976) offers another definition of bureaucratic hierarchy which appears
most useful. He defines bureaucratic hierarchy by identifying the as-
sumptions on which this form of organization is predicated: (1) that a
single hierarchical structure exists in terms of which units and indi-
viduals are related to one another; (2) that a uniform superior-subor-
dinate relationship is ideal (thus excluding relationships between units
and individuals on the same level); (3) that the tasks of the organiza-
tion can be divided into successively smaller and independent elements;
(4) that one job should be equated with one person or unit and vice-
versa; and (5) that distinct, single boundaries should separate units
and individuals. According to Herbst, it is much easier to define bu-
reaucratic hierarchy on the basis of these assumptions than to attempt
categorization by descriptive elements. In order to provide some varie-
ty in terminology, the adjective "conventional" will be used synonymous-
ly with the adjectives bureaucratic and hierarchical.
3The term bureaucratization as used here refers to the deteriora-
tion of systems based upon the ideals of shared work and decision-mak-
ing, be they informal or institutionalized, into more conventional rela-
tionships endemic to bureaucratic hierarchy, where authority, power and
over-all responsibility are the province of a few in an organization.
Given such a definition, two extreme cases of bureaucratization are pos-
sible. In the first and more common situation, work and decisions are
initially shared in a vague, informal way, but move toward conventional
arrangements. In the second case, shared work and decision-making are
formally institutionalized arrangements which decay in the direction of
bureaucratic and hierarchical ones. Although the degree of initial in-
stitutionalization of participatory ideals may vary, then, the basic
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same
direction of bureaucratization remains the
4The term formal structure as it is used here and throughout thetext refers to regularized organizational activities which are explicit-ly recognized and used by members of an organization. This explicitness
may extend to written form, as in the case of by-laws. Informal struc-ture is not characterized by this explicitness.
ihe one-year criterion deserves some explanation. Actually a
two-year criterion was also considered, but this standard eliminated so
many of the formal structures in less successful organizations that the
resulting comparisons were based upon very little information. The one-
year criterion seemed justifiable for other reasons as well. Members
usually recalled events and structures in terms of seasons and years.
A criterion of less than one year (e.g. six months) proved unwieldy
since members could rarely pinpoint events and the duration of particu-
lar arrangements in terms more accurate than years and seasons.
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